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Abstract
This thesis seeks to analyze two questions central to the economic welfare of rural house-
holds in developing countries: the trade-offs between equity and efficiency induced by hybrid
forms of property rights, and the decisions made by households in the process of human
capital accumulation, particularly in early childhood. The first two chapters examine the
impact of periodic land reallocations and tenancy reforms in China and India, respectively,
on intravillage land inequality and the investment decisions made by rural households. The
final chapter turns the focus to inequality within the household, analyzing how intrahouse-
hold allocation of educational resources in rural China responds to inequities in endowment
between children.
In the first chapter, I evaluate the impact of village-level land reallocations in China
on household economic outcomes. Since land was decollectivized in China in 1983, village
leaders have implemented regular forced reallocations of land designed to enhance intravillage
equity and attain other policy goals. I estimate the impact of insecure tenure using the
past history of land shifts as an instrument for current tenure insecurity, and find that an
increase in the probability of losing the current plot yields a decrease in agricultural inputs
and production of around one standard deviation. Though the costs of insecure tenure are
high, structural estimates of the varying cost of reallocation across different villages suggest
the choice to reallocate does reflect an optimizing process on the part of village officials, who
reallocate where the net benefit is larger. However, the observed pattern of reallocations
would be optimal only given an objective function for the village leader that places an
extremely high weight on equity, and even given this objective function, there is evidence
that village leaders may be making some costly mistakes.
In the second chapter, coauthored with Timothy Besley, Rohini Pande and Vijayendra
Rao, we seek to analyze the long-run impact of land reform in southern India. Though land
reform policies have been widely enacted across the developing world, evidence about the
long-run impact of these policies remains quite limited. In this paper, we provide evidence
about these long-run effects by combining the quasi-random assignment of linguistically
similar areas to South Indian states that subsequently pursued different tenancy regulation
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policies with cross-caste variation in landownership. Roughly thirty years after the bulk of
land reform occurred, land inequality is lower in more regulated areas, but the impact differs
by caste group. Tenancy reforms increase own-cultivation among middle caste households,
but render low caste households more likely to work as daily agricultural laborers. At the
same time, an increase in agricultural wages is observed. These results are consistent with
credit markets playing a central role in determining the long-run impact of land reform:
tenancy regulations increased land sales to the relatively richer and more productive middle
caste tenants but reduced land access for poorer low caste tenants.
In the final chapter, I analyze the strategies employed by households in rural China
to allocate educational expenditure to children of different initial endowments, examining
whether parents use educational funding to reinforce or compensate for these differences.
Empirical results obtained employing early-childhood climatic shocks as an instrument for
endowment, measured as height-for-age, indicate that parental expenditure is preferentially
directed to the relatively weaker child. In response to the mean difference in endowment
between siblings, parents redirect between 10 and 20% of discretionary educational spending
to the child with lower endowment, and this effect is robust across multiple measures of
endowment and multiple measures of climatic shocks. This analysis is consistent with the
hypothesis that parents use the intrahousehold allocation of resources to compensate for
differences in endowment and thus in expected welfare, between their children.
Thesis Supervisor: Abhijit Banerjee
Title: Ford International Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Esther Duflo
Title: Abdul Latif Jameel Professor of Poverty Alleviation and Development Economics
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Chapter 1
Reallocating Wealth? Insecure
Property Rights and Agricultural
Investment in Rural China
1.1 Introduction
The establishment of clear land rights has long been considered a key milestone in the
development of the modern industrialized countries. Because land is the principal asset in
a preindustrial economy, the development of an institutional structure that encourages its
efficient use is argued to enhance growth substantially (North & Thomas 1973). Conversely,
the absence of stable and enforced property rights is widely identified as a major impediment
to growth in today's developing countries (De Soto 2000).
Despite this emphasis on the importance of private property rights, however, collectively
owned or managed land remains a widespread phenomenon in the developing world. Collec-
tive or partly collective land structures continue to be predominant in rural areas in China,
in Mexico, and in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. These forms of land ownership can
yield substantial benefits in terms of equity, but they may also generate significant efficiency
costs.
In China, the post-Mao period saw the emergence of a hybrid system of landownership,
in which formal title to land is held by the village collective and use rights are held by house-
holds. Moreover, plots are subject to periodic reallocations between households conducted
by village officials every three to five years, thereby generating systematic insecurity in land
tenure. These reallocations represent the outcome of a bargaining process between officials
and households that weighs the costs and benefits of the associated disruption in property
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rights. The objective of this paper is to estimate the economic costs of insecure land tenure
induced by these periodic reallocations, and to demonstrate that village officials do respond
to variation in these costs in shaping the relative security of local property rights.
First, I examine variation in tenure insecurity within a village conditional on a reallocation
being conducted. Households that have recently had their land reallocated are less likely
to have their land reallocated in a subsequent round, and accordingly the past history of
changes in landownership can be employed as an instrument for the probability of loss of the
current plot. The results show that the reduction in the probability of losing the current plot
as a result of past inclusion in a reallocation, a decrease of around 5% on a base probability
of 56%, results in an increase in the use of agricultural inputs and in total agricultural output
of between .05 and .1 standard deviations, with no evidence of simultaneous substitution out
of non-agricultural activities.
This effect of relatively more secure tenure is evident for households that both gained
and lost land in the past. Accordingly, any plausible alternative channel for the observed
pattern would require that an unobservable shock correlated with reallocation affect both
relatively rich and relatively poor households in the same way relative to the mean. The
observed pattern of symmetric increased investments by households at both ends of the land-
ownership distribution in the year of a reallocation is inconsistent with most obvious sources
of omitted variable bias.
Second, while these reduced form estimates capture a uniform effect of reallocation, the
observed variation in the propensity to reallocate across space and time suggests that the
costs and benefits of reallocation are in fact far from uniform. It is plausible that officials will
choose to reallocate in areas where disruption of land tenure is less costly - more specifically,
less costly in terms of investment foregone as a result of insecure land rights.
To test this hypothesis, I estimate an agricultural production function that allows for
spatial variation in the returns to agricultural inputs. I find that the propensity to reallo-
cate is negatively correlated with returns to lagged inputs, and thus with the magnitude of
the investments lost as a result of the induced insecurity of tenure. Despite the fact that
reallocations generate large costs, the observed pattern of reallocations does seem to reflect
an optimizing process on the part of the village official.
In the final part of the analysis, I postulate a functional form for the objective function
that underlies this optimizing process and seek to estimate parameters for this function that
would best reproduce the observed pattern of reallocations. The results suggest first, that
reallocations are only optimal for a village leader that places an extremely high weight on in-
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creased equity relative to the potential output losses induced by a reallocation. Second, even
given an objective function that values equity, village leaders are making some potentially
costly errors by reallocating where the relative balance of benefits and costs is unfavorable.
To sum up, the evidence from variation in property rights in China suggests that even
incremental shifts in the security of land tenure in a context of partly collective land rights
can have large economic implications. In addition, variation in the frequency of reallocations
is correlated with their costs, with reallocations occurring most frequently where they are
least costly. Thus at a local level, property rights adapt to reflect the relative returns to
secure property rights in different economic environments.
This paper supplements an existing literature that has evaluated the impact of vary-
ing regimes of property rights in China. Feder, Lau, Lin & Luo (1992) argue based on a
before-and-after analysis that excessive investment in nonproductive assets such as housing
is evidence of the negative impact of insecure land tenure. Brandt, Huang, Li & Rozelle
(2002) analyze the impact of land tenure by comparing households' private plots, assigned
permanently to households in some villages for their personal cultivation, with responsibility
land that is subject to reallocations. Similarly, de la Rupelle, Quheng, Shi & Vendryes (2009)
use household-level heterogeneity in land rights within a village to identify the impact of re-
allocations on outmigration, finding that insecure land rights induce temporary, rather than
permanent, outmigration in order to ensure claims are retained on land left behind. Both
papers make the assumption that plots are exogenously assigned to different contractual
types within a village.
Jacoby, Li & Rozelle (2002) analyze the impact of insecure tenure on investment in rural
China by using a hazard model to estimate predicted risks of expropriation for different
plots held. They find that a higher expropriation risk decreases investment in organic fer-
tilizer, employing the identifying assumption that the hazard of reallocation is exogenous to
household characteristics.
There is also a larger literature about the economic impact of property rights that eval-
uates land reforms in which tenants without formal title are endowed with stronger prop-
erty rights (Banerjee, Gertler & Ghatak 2002, Besley & Burgess 2000). Goldstein & Udry
(2008) analyze property rights in Ghana and conclude that individuals with more secure
tenure rights by virtue of their more powerful political positions invest more in maintaining
soil fertility. Another set of papers focused on urban land policy in Latin America finds
that land titling increases labor supply and investment (Besley 1995, Field 2005, Galiani &
Schargrodsky 2010). In the historical literature, Hornbeck (2010) analyzes the impact of the
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introduction of barbed wire on agricultural productivity in the western U.S., and concludes
that the stronger protections of land title afforded by barbed wire led to a significant increase
in settlement, land values and crop productivity.
This paper adds to this existing literature while making a number of new contributions.
First, I evaluate the impact of insecure tenure on an unusually large set of economic outcomes.
Second, I demonstrate a systematic correlation between the frequency of local disruptions to
property rights and variation in the costs of those disruptions, estimated using an agricultural
production function. Third, I estimate parameters of the objective function corresponding
to the village leader's choice to reallocate. Given that China has been the site of some of
the most far-reaching experiments in property rights over the last fifty years, evidence about
both the political economy and the economic consequences of insecure property rights in
rural China can be a useful contribution to the ongoing debate about how to structure land
rights to maximize rural growth (Deininger & Binswanger 1999).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides an overview of the
relevant institutional background. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 provide a brief conceptual framework
for the analysis and describe the data. Section 1.5 presents the results focusing on intravillage
heterogeneity in security of tenure, while Section 1.6 analyzes cross-sectional variation in the
costs of reallocation derived from an estimation of the agricultural production function.
Section 1.7 discusses estimation of the village leader's objective function, and Section 1.8
concludes.
1.2 Background
Property rights in China have a long and tumultuous history in the post-1949 era, and
the institutional framework that governs rural households remains unusually complex. This
section provides a broad overview of the history of property rights during the Communist
period, as well as the characteristics of the periodic reallocations that have been a feature
of the rural land ownership system since 1983.
1.2.1 Property rights under the Household Responsibility System
Since 1983, land rights in China have been characterized by a system of collective land
tenure in which partial use rights are assigned to the household, a system widely known as
the household responsibility system. Prior to this, agricultural production in China between
1962 and 1978 was largely organized around the institution of the production team, a unit
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consisting of 20 to 30 households that jointly farmed agricultural land and sold the resulting
output, distributing the associated income to participating laborers according to a system
of workpoints intended to reward labor, skill and political commitment.1 The overarching
imperative of agricultural policy during this Maoist period was to maximize grain production
in order to feed urban areas and support industrialization drives, a goal enforced using sub-
stantial mandatory production quotas and low procurement prices. By 1978, the cumulative
impact of these policies was disastrous, leading to low rural income, land degradation and a
severe undersupply of non-grain crops (Walker 1984).
As a result, the new government led by Deng Xiaoping, acceding to power shortly after
Mao Zedong's death, introduced major changes in agricultural policy. First, the household
was reinstated as the primary unit of agricultural production under a system variously known
as household contracting or the household responsibility system. Each household was pro-
vided with an allocation of land for its own use, while land title continued to be held by the
village. The household also committed to the delivery of a fixed amount of quota grain sold
to the state at a preset price, in addition to taxes owed.
Excess production could then either be sold to the state at a higher, above-quota price, or
at rural markets (Lin 1992), with the household having full rights over residual, post-quota
income. Households were also allowed control over a private plot of land used to cultivate
crops other than grain or to raise animals; income from this plot accrued entirely to the
household (Walker 1984). The average per capita land endowment was small, less than one
fifteenth of a hectare, and a household's endowment generally comprised several fragmented
parcels (Wen 1989).
At the same time, major adjustments were made to the state's system of agricultural tar-
gets and agricultural procurement. Prices for government procurement of most agricultural
goods, previously so low that they often did not cover costs, were raised substantially. In
addition, a previously elaborate system of targets for sown area, inputs, production and yield
for a variety of agricultural productions was simplified to government procurement targets
for key agricultural goods only (Lin 1992).
These changes were implemented in a piecemeal fashion between 1979 and 1983, begin-
ning with a few isolated provincial or local experiments, and subsequently spreading widely
to a point of almost total decollectivization by the end of 1983 (Unger 1985). The establish-
ment of the household responsibility system led to a substantial increase in the growth rate
'The team farming system was itself a retreat from the much larger agricultural communes formed during
the Great Leap Forward between 1958 and 1962, in which land and labor were collectivized in communes of
6,000-8,000 households (Chinn 1979).
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of agricultural output, which had been only 2% annually over the previous 25 years. Between
1978 and 1984, agricultural output increased nearly 8% annually. One analysis estimated
that roughly half of this growth was due to increased use of inputs, particularly fertilizer,
and half to the assignment of land use rights to households (Lin 1992).
1.2.2 Land reallocations
However, property rights under the household responsibility system remained crucially in-
complete, principally because land was subject to periodic land reallocations. The stated
aim of these reallocations was to promote equity in land ownership, and to adjust land-
holdings in response to changes in household size.2 However, the policy clearly created an
opportunity ripe for rent-seeking by local officials (either local government officials or Party
leaders, known as cadres).
Accordingly, the literature has observed that "it is not uncommon that a few village
cadres or officials choose to conduct readjustments simply in order to exert their influence
and authority for other dubious purposes" (Keliang, Prosterman, Jianping, Ping, Reidinger
& Yiwen 2007). Another analysis noted that the threat of reallocation was frequently used
as a carrot and stick to ensure compliance with other administrative goals (family plan-
ning targets, grain quotas, corvee labor obligations, and taxes) relevant to local leaders'
opportunities for promotion. Leaders employed the threat of land reallocation to induce
households to comply with other policy goals and minimize their enforcement costs, or to
punish households for an absence of compliance (Rozelle & Li 1998).
At the same time, reallocations required considerable investment of time on the part of
village leaders, entailing "countless discussions and negotiations among village cadres and
the involved households pertaining to the new land assignment exercise" (Kung 2000, Brandt
et al. 2002). To cite a specific example, a survey in July-August of 1999 found that a third
of villages that had decided to carry out a reallocation in accordance with a land law passed
the previous August had still not implemented it (Schwarzwalder, Prosterman, Jianping,
Riedinger & Ping 2002). Though reallocations normally occurred at the end of the year
during the fallow winter period, the lapse in time required for implementation introduced
scope for strategic behavior, for example hastening the marriage of sons (or delaying the
marriage of daughters) in order to maximize the number of family members in the household
2 Given that variation in the number of children is limited by virtue of the One Child Policy, the relevant
changes in household size are normally driven by marriage of adult children. Daughters typically exit the
household, while daughters-in-law will arrive. Other changes might be driven by migration, death, or changes
in extended family structure.
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when its required allotment of land was determined (Unger 2005).
A larger literature in both economics and political science has assembled descriptive
evidence about the frequency and nature of land reallocations over time. Brandt et al.
(2002) find that there is a negative correlation between the frequency of reallocations and
the number of plots per household, as well as the total number of households in the village.
Kung (2000) uses a separate survey of land reallocations and notes that reallocations decline
in frequency when terrain is more rugged or hilly, and when landholdings are more scattered
or fragmented. Unger (2005) also documents the negative relationship between topography
and reallocations and finds a negative relationship between the frequency of reallocations
and the availability of off-farm income-earning opportunities.
The central government has made periodic attempts to regulate reallocations. By the
1990s, national policymakers became increasingly concerned that insecure tenure was the
primary reason for a decline in agricultural growth rates relative to the early years of the
Household Responsibility System. As a result, a (nonbinding) policy directive was issued
in 1993 establishing a fixed term of land tenure equal to thirty years. This policy was
then embodied in law in 1998, requiring that land be contracted to households for 30 years.
Readjustments during this period were still allowed, but needed to be approved by two thirds
of village members; villages were also allowed to conduct a reallocation immediately after
the introduction of the new policy.3 The law also mandated the issuance of written contracts
or certificates to farmers.
Despite the seeming boldness of this reform, subsequent survey evidence indicated that
its implementation was extremely mixed. A majority of farmers continued to express low
confidence in their tenure security and believed subsequent reallocations were inevitable
(Schwarzwalder et al. 2002). A later law in 2002 outlawed reallocations completely except
in extreme cases and spelled out the right to lease, exchange and carry out other land
transactions, excluding sale and mortgage. This reform is, however, beyond the chronological
scope of this analysis (Keliang et al. 2007), which will focus on the impact of reallocations
on rural economic outcomes between 1987 and 2002.'
3A survey in 1999 reported in Schwarzwalder et al. (2002) inquired about whether villages had decided
to conduct such a reallocation and whether it had taken place, the source of the previously cited data about
the delay inherent in the implementation of reallocations.
4Data from the household survey employed here is not publicly available for the years after 2002; accord-
ingly, it is not possible to employ data from the post-2002 period in a placebo test. There is, in addition, an
ongoing debate about how well these subsequent reforms were implemented and thus how secure property
rights in the post-2002 period are.
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1.3 Conceptual framework
1.3.1 Optimizing reallocation
Consider the decision made by a village leader of whether or not to undertake a reallocation in
a given village in a given year. A reallocation has both costs and benefits. The advantages
may include private benefits for the official in rent extraction or future opportunities for
promotion, as well as quasi-public benefits such as an increase in equity that may also be
valued by village households.
On the other hand, reallocations also have costs. Households that are uncertain about
their long-term tenure on a given plot will not make investments whose returns accrue partly
in the medium-term, thus resulting in a decline in agricultural investment and output; a
simple model of a household production function demonstrating this result is presented
in Appendix L.A. These costs are clearly highly salient to households. For simplicity, I will
assume here that officials are themselves indifferent to this loss in output. They are, however,
forced to take into account the preferences of households by bargaining over whether or not
to hold a reallocation.
Assume that the official and each household face a variant of the single-seller, single-buyer
problem; they need to bargain over the sale of a single good, a reallocation of land. The
official places a value B on this reallocation, capturing benefits that include opportunities
for rent-seeking and decreased intravillage inequality.
Each household i in the village places a value on a reallocation that can be written as
follows, equal to the negative of the value of continued land tenure V plus the value of the
expected change in land w(E[AL]). For simplicity, I assume that every household in the
village would have its land tenure disrupted by the reallocation.
Vi = -Vi + w(E[ALj]) (1.1)
i is defined more specifically as the loss in output due to foregone investments that are
not made when tenure insecurity is introduced by a reallocation. Note that XfR denotes
a vector of agricultural investments made by household i in the absence of a reallocation,
while Xr denotes investment in the case of a reallocation.
Og = F(XfR) - F(XR) (1.2)
Some households may place a negative value on reallocation if they face significant losses
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due to reduced long-term investment, and thus they will seek to avoid a reallocation. Others
may place a positive value on reallocation if they expect to gain land in the process. Each
household has the option to impose a bargaining or lobbying cost ci on the official in the case
of the outcome they do not prefer: i.e., a household that prefers a reallocation be avoided
can inflict a lobbying cost at the time of the reallocation, and vice versa for a household that
prefers a reallocation. 5
Total bargaining costs are summed across all households in the case of a reallocation,
defined C(R = 1) = Ej c(R = 1), or a non-reallocation, defined C(R = 0) = E> c1(R = 0).
There is also a transactional cost of time and effort T needed to redefine land boundaries.
This transactional cost is assumed to be higher for localities with more rugged topogra-
phy; this assumption is consistent with the prior literature, as well as the intuition that
implementing a land swap perceived to be fair is more challenging in areas with variable
topography and thus more local heterogeneity in land quality.
The village official will reallocate if the benefits exceed the sum of bargaining and trans-
action costs:
B > C(R = 1) - C(R = 0) + T (1.3)
Accordingly, the variable Rt, defined as equal to one if a reallocation occurs in village v in
year t and zero otherwise, can be viewed as a function of benefits of the reallocation for the
official, its costs in lost output, and the topographic characteristics of the village.
Rvt = f (Bvt, Ct, TV) (1.4)
This conceptual framework suggests that villages where households place a larger value
on continued land tenure, i.e. jjh = F(XR) - F(Xf) is greater, should also exhibit a
lower frequency of reallocations. In these villages, the cost in terms of foregone output
of tenure insecurity is greater, and accordingly households will bargain more aggressively
against reallocations.6
Intuitively, in some villages there may be few profitable long-term investments available.
'This framework assumes that households can commit to imposing a certain cost on village officials. While
this is clearly a strong assumption, it could be easily nested in a multi-period model in which households that
fail to impose the postulated bargaining penalty on the official suffer a loss of credibility in future bargaining
rounds.
6 1n addition, none of the preceding analysis precludes the possibility that the official himself also faces a
direct loss from foregone output, via lowered tax revenue or other channels. In this case, the direct benefit
B of reallocation will be lower in villages where the lost output as a result of tenure insecurity is larger; this
serves only to strengthen the postulated negative correlation between the output costs of reallocation and
their frequency.
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A reallocation will decrease the probability that households in the village will make such
investments because they face the risk of losing their plot prior to the next growing season,
and thus losing any lagged returns to this year's investments. However, this may not be a
significant loss if these lagged returns are low in magnitude. More specifically, the difference
in investment and thus in output between the reallocation and the non-reallocation case is
increasing in the returns to lagged agricultural inputs, a comparative static also demonstrated
in Appendix L.A. If the returns to lagged inputs are higher, the loss in investment as a
result of a reallocation is higher, the net benefit of reallocation for the official is lower, and
accordingly reallocations should be observed less frequently.
1.3.2 Optimizing household-level land shifts
To sum up, the observed distribution of reallocations across villages and years can be under-
stood as the outcome of a complex bargaining process that leads to some officials choosing
to conduct reallocations in certain years while others do not. However, village leaders who
have chosen to hold a reallocation then face another set of optimization decisions: how and
to whom to reallocate land within the village. Some households will gain or lose land, while
other households may not see changes to their landholdings.
The probability that a given household i in village v and year t will see its land reallocated
is denoted Diet; it is assumed to be a function of household characteristics Xiet, conditional
on Rt = 1. If there is no reallocation, then Divt = 0 for all households.
D1vt {f (Xit) if Rt = 1 (1.5)
0 if Rvt = 0
Potential household covariates X;iv relevant to the reallocation decision could include de-
mographic characteristics that render the household a poor match with its current land al-
lotment; the household's current position in the overall distribution of landownership, given
the village leader's interest in equity; and the past history of land shifts for the household.
Accordingly, there are two sources of variation in insecure tenure for the households of
interest, corresponding to two separate optimization margins for the village official. There is
variation in the household probability of land shifts Divt conditional on a reallocation occur-
ring (Rvt = 1), corresponding to the official's choice of which households to reallocate. There
is also variation in the probability of reallocation across villages and years, corresponding
the official's choice of whether or not to hold a reallocation. In this analysis, I will exploit
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both sources of variation in tenure insecurity.
1.4 Data
The dataset employed here is a panel collected by the China Research Center for the Rural
Economy (RCRE), comprising a sample of 299 villages in 13 provinces in China every year
between 1986 and 2002, excluding 1992 and 1994. Figure 1-1 shows the sample counties. A
randomly selected sample of households in each surveyed village forms the panel; the mean
number of households in a village-year cell is 69. Summary statistics are shown in Table 2.7.
Measures of land reallocation are constructed using household reports of changes in their
household landholdings from year to year, excluding land leased.7 A shift in landholdings is
identified at the household level if a household reports a change in land area owned of at least
.1 mu, where a mu is the Chinese unit of land area (comprising .165 acres). 8 A reallocation
is defined to have occurred when the proportion of households reporting a change in their
landholdings in a given village in a given year exceeds the 75th percentile across all village-
years or the proportion of land reported transferred exceeds the 75th percentile across all
village-years. This definition is employed to exclude those cases where a small number of
households report a change in landholdings as a result of measurement error or a private
contractual arrangement that is not sanctioned by the village leadership.
Figure 1-2 shows histograms for both measures used to define reallocations. Both show a
spike close to zero and a long right tail with a higher proportion of transfers. The reallocation
measure employed captures this right tail. In addition, the first stage and the reduced form
are robust to altering this definition, and results employing varying definitions of reallocations
will be shown in the robustness checks.9
Past literature on reallocations that has estimated their frequency has largely used data
drawn from two sources: surveys of village leaders, e.g. Kung (2000), or surveys of indi-
vidual households conducted periodically by the Rural Development Institute that obtain
retrospective statistics over a long recall period (Schwarzwalder et al. 2002). Survey data
7There is no uniform policy regarding the legality of land leasing arrangements in rural China. In this
sample, leasing is rare; only around 8% of household-year observations report any land leased in or out.
Leased land is thus of limited relevance to the rural economy overall.
8.1 mu represents around 2% of median land owned.
9This definition makes no distinction between different types of plots that households may hold (e.g.,
responsibility land versus private plots); though the dataset reports limited information on holdings of
responsibility land, inputs and agricultural production are not reported by type of plot. Accordingly, the
resulting estimates should be viewed as mean effects across all household landholdings.
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of leaders has the advantage of employing a clear definition of reallocation. However, lead-
ers may also face incentives to bias reports of reallocations toward zero to avoid reporting
reallocations that are not in line with national land policy guidelines. Retrospective data
collected at the household level, on the other hand, may be imprecise and biased by recent
events.
While survey data of leaders indicate that reallocations occur around every 5 years
(Kung 2000), the reallocation measure constructed here R,,t shows reallocations occurring
around every three years. It is plausible that a measure based on household reports of land
shifts will be noisier and thus more likely to generate spurious reports of land reallocations,
a source of classical measurement error. However, this strategy for identifying household
reallocations has the additional advantage of allowing the direct examination of the changes
in landholdings at the household level that were induced as a result of the reallocation. A
measure constructed from reports by village leaders, by contrast, provides no information
about the mechanics of the implementation of the reallocation within the village.
1.5 Intravillage heterogeneity in security of tenure
1.5.1 First stage
In analyzing reallocations, I will begin by considering variation in tenure insecurity within
a village, taking as given the observed distribution of reallocations across different villages
and years. When a reallocation does occur in the sample villages, ex ante all households face
the risk of the suspension of their use rights and the transfer of their plot. However, not all
households experience a change in landholdings in every reallocation.
In order to evaluate the effect of variation in security of tenure on economic outcomes,
it is useful to begin by analyzing the characteristics of households that do have their land
reallocated. Assuming that the quantity of land already held is of first-order relevance, I first
estimate the probability of a household's land being reallocated conditional on a reallocation
occurring in the village for households in each decile of landownership. These probabilities
are shown graphically in Figure 1-3.
The evidence indicates that land transfers are broadly progressive. The probability of
receiving a positive transfer of land via a reallocation is generally decreasing by decile, and
the probability of a negative transfer is increasing. Only the tenth (and richest) decile
appears to be somewhat insulated from the effects of reallocations. Otherwise, households
from the lower deciles are generally more likely to gain land, and households from the upper
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deciles more likely to lose it.
Now, assume one reallocation has already occurred in every village in the past. Both
reallocation "winners" and reallocation "losers" have experienced a shock to their landhold-
ings and, presumably, to other economic outcomes as well. Two groups of households can be
defined based on whether their land was affected in the last reallocation: DPE. = 1 defined
for household i in village v in year t denotes a household that gained land in the previous
reallocation (on average, three to five years prior), and DN2j = 1 denotes a household
that lost land. These households have received opposite shocks, relative to the unaffected
households, with the median (absolute) change in landholdings observed as a result of a
reallocation around one third of median land owned.
There is, however, one characteristic common to all households that had their land re-
allocated in the previous round: a decline in the probability that their land tenure will be
disrupted again in the next reallocation. Reallocating land for a household incurs fixed trans-
action costs. Accordingly, it is logical to assume that village leaders will seek to minimize the
number of land transfers they effect over time, conditional on reaching their goals of equity
or an improved match between households and land, and this in turn implies that a series of
incremental land transfers is unlikely to be welfare-maximizing for the official. Instead, they
would seek to fully adjust a household's land to its optimal level when a reallocation is im-
plemented, implying a lengthy period until either subsequent demographic shocks render the
household's landholding suboptimal, or the household is again due for an equity-enhancing
shift in land.
To test this hypothesis, I estimate the impact of past reallocation inclusion on a dummy
variable capturing inclusion in the current reallocation, denoted Dio, for household i in village
v in year t. Divt is defined to be equal to one if a household reports any change in total land
owned above the threshold (.1 mu) in the year of the reallocation. Rt is defined as equal to
one if a reallocation is observed in village v in year t. The independent variable of interest
is a dummy variable for a household's past reallocation inclusion; I estimate the effect of
this variable on Dit in years in which reallocation is observed. A control for each strata of
landownership prior to reallocation Livt and village and year fixed effects are included.10
v= /31DPJ + f 2DNj + i33Lit + v-, + + ± t (1.6)
This equation is estimated for the household panel post-1995, to allow for coding of D.7J
ioLi,, is an integer variable controlling for each vingtile (5%) of landownership, i.e. ranging from 1 to 20.
This controls for the position of the household in the overall distribution of landownership.
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based on prior reallocations reported in the first section of the panel. 1995 is chosen as the
cut-off year as a new and more comprehensive survey of household economic outcomes was
administered for the first time in that year. The coefficients on #1 and #2 from estimating
(1.6) are shown in Column (1) of Table 3.4, and are negative and significant. In other words,
inclusion in a reallocation leads to a significant decrease in the probability that a given
household will have its land adjusted again in the next reallocation for both past reallocation
gainers and past reallocation losers, compared to households that were not reallocated. This
is consistent with the intuition that multiple, sequential reallocations of land for the same
household are unlikely to be optimal.
These results suggest that past reallocation history generates a plausible source of quasi-
exogenous variation in current tenure insecurity. The implied exclusion restriction is that a
reallocation has no differential impact on households that were included in a past reallocation
and households that were not included, other than via the channel of differential probability
of current reallocation and thus differential tenure insecurity. Column (2) shows the result of
estimating the same equation with past reallocation participation pooled across gainer and
loser households. The pooled dummy for past inclusion in a reallocation is denoted Dt.
Divt= 31 D , ± f 2Livt + vv + t + Eivt (1.7)
This is the first stage relationship of interest, and the same negative and significant relation-
ship is evident.
In the two-stage least squares analysis, I employ the same specification using the full
sample of both reallocation and non-reallocation years, and add a full set of interactions
with Rvt. The coefficient on D,-, when Rt = 0 is zero by construction, and thus the
primary coefficients of interest in the first stage are identical. Having had land reallocated in
the past is correlated with the probability of a disruption to current land tenure, but only if
a reallocation is actually occurring in the village; otherwise, the impact of past reallocation
on current reallocation is precisely zero.
Moreover, the heterogeneity of past reallocation patterns (including both gainers and
losers) can be used as an additional test of the exclusion restriction. Any bias in unobserv-
ables as a result of past reallocation-induced shocks to land is presumed to be of opposite
sign for past land gainers, who now own more land than the mean household, and land
losers, who now own less land. Figure 1-4 shows estimated kernel densities of landownership
for households with past positive and negative shocks to landholdings in reallocations, par-
tialling out village and year fixed effects. Both a shift right in the distribution for past land
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gainers and a shift left for past land losers are evident.
Accordingly, if the reduced form impact of past reallocation status on economic outcomes
in a reallocation year is observed for both past land gainers and past land losers, this suggests
that the observed effect is plausibly interpreted as a causal estimate of the impact of tenure
security on economic outcomes. A violation of the exclusion restriction would require that
reallocation is correlated with a shock that affects both the relatively land-poor and the
relatively land-rich, a non-monotonic pattern that would seem a priori implausible. Further
evidence about the validity of the exclusion restriction will be presented in the next section.
1.5.2 Reduced form and 2SLS
The reduced form specification is the following, where Yvt denotes economic outcomes at
the household level. Controls for lagged household reallocation D-1, strata of landownership
Livt and the full set of interactions with reallocation Ret are included.
Yv = 1D x R + 0 2D- + 3Liv + 4Lit x R + vv + yt + v, x Rt + t x + ivt (1.8)
The reduced form can also be estimated as the "split" reduced form, including both DPl
and DNi, and the corresponding interactions as explanatory variables. The 2SLS specifica-
tion is the following, where Divt is a dummy for forced reallocation of land at the household
level, instrumented by D-1 x Rvt.
Yvt = 31Divt + 02 D- + /33Lit -+- ± 4Livt x Rt + vv ± ( -±- vv x Rvt ± 'yt x Rvt ± -i-t (1.9)
The assumed timing in each year is as follows: a signal about the reallocation is received
prior to household's investment decisions. Investments are made and output is realized. Sub-
sequently, land is reallocated after the harvest." While the exact timing of the reallocation
decision vis-a-vis household investment decisions doubtless varies, the assumption is that
the considerable time required to implement a reallocation requires a decision to be made
at a point that overlaps with the period of key investments, in line with the evidence that
households are observed to respond strategically to early notifications about future realloca-
tions in decisions about household formation and marriage. Such strategic behavior would
be impossible if the decision to reallocate was simultaneous with the actual implementation.
Eight outcome variables are reported for each specification: land cultivated, fertilizer,
"There is considerable anthropological evidence that reallocations normally occur during the fallow period
in winter. See for example (Unger 2005).
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agricultural labor, a dummy for agricultural structures, moveable capital, grain production,
and dummies for labor in a non-agricultural household business and for labor outside the
household. Land cultivated, fertilizer, agricultural labor and grain production are normalized
by the area of land owned prior to the reallocation; all variables are then normalized by the
mean and standard deviation of the outcome variable in the control (non-participating)
households.12
Reduced form results Panel A of Table 3.5 shows the results from estimating the reduced
form, and Panel B the "split" reduced form with dummies for both past reallocation gainers
and losers, DP' x Roi and DN2l x Rt± respectively. Note again that all dependent variables
are normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
In Panel A, the coefficients on the interaction D- x R,,t are generally positive and
significant with magnitude between .05 and .1, reflecting greater agricultural investments by
households that were included in the last reallocation and accordingly enjoy greater tenure
security. No effect is observed for moveable capital, labor input into household businesses or
labor in outside enterprises. This is consistent with the intuition that the returns to moveable
capital (an index of animals, tools and machines owned) and non-agricultural activities are
unaffected by reallocations.
In the split reduced form, the coefficients are positive and significant for households that
gained and lost land in the past. The fact that the estimated coefficients are generally
slightly larger for past losers is consistent with the evidence of a larger first stage for these
households (i.e., their relative tenure security is greater). However, the final row of Panel B
reports a test of equality of the coefficients #1l and 32 on DPJ x R~t and DNJ-v x Rt, and
the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal is uniformly not rejected.
In addition, the assumption that there is no omitted channel that is biasing the esti-
mated effect for both land losers and land winners can be tested by examining the estimated
coefficients on DP-J and DNgl. In general, these coefficients are of opposite sign, though
not statistically significant; households that gained land seem to employ less inputs per acre
and are somewhat less likely to have non-agricultural businesses. Most importantly, the
absence of any pattern of symmetric and significant coefficients on the dummies for past
reallocation gainers and losers suggests there is no common bias in observables across both
12 Fertilizer is defined as the mean of total fertilizer and the most common subtype of fertilizer used,
carbamide. Moveable capital is defined as the sum of animals and tools; agricultural structures is equal to
one if a household reports any agricultural structures or associated machines. The top 5% and bottom 1%
of observations of each continuous outcome variable are trimmed to remove the influence of outliers. The
asymmetry reflects the much longer right tail in the distribution of agricultural input variables.
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sets of households. The only exceptions are positive coefficients on the probability of outside
labor.
The exclusion restriction for the instrumental variables analysis requires that there is no
shock correlated with a village-level reallocation Rt that differentially affects households in-
cluded in the previous reallocation. If households that had their land previously reallocated
either positively or negatively showed characteristics that were significantly different from
households with no previous reallocations in non-reallocation years, this would suggest that
the past history of reallocations generated different trends for both land winners and land
losers. Furthermore, if there were an interaction between these trends and Rt, the coeffi-
cients of interest would be biased. Given the absence of any evidence of significant difference
in outcomes for past reallocation participants in non-reallocation years, however, it seems
implausible that there is another, independent shock correlated with R,,t that affects only
these households in reallocation years. Further evidence about differing trends for past land
gainers and land losers in the years prior to a reallocation will be presented in the robustness
checks.
2SLS results To reiterate the key assumptions underlying the two-stage least squares re-
sult, the exclusion restriction requires that a reallocation has no differential effect on house-
holds that were and were not included in the previous reallocation, other than via the channel
of differential tenure security. Given the asymmetric nature of past reallocation inclusion,
encompassing both reallocation winners and reallocation losers, the necessary assumption
can be further refined: there is no shock correlated with a reallocation that affects both
relatively land-poor and relatively land-rich households compared to the mean.
Under this assumption, Table 1.4 shows the results from estimating equation (3.13), the
instrumental variables specification. The coefficients indicate that households facing the
mean probability of losing their plot in a reallocation year (around .6) exhibit a decline
in area sown, fertilizer, agricultural labor and total agricultural production, all around .8
standard deviations in magnitude. There is no significant change in moveable capital and
no change in the probability of non-agricultural employment. While there is weak evidence
of a decline in agricultural structures, the estimated effect is not significant.
These results are consistent with a model of household behavior in which households
decrease the use of inputs that have medium-term returns and inputs that are complementary
to those medium-term investments. The shift in sown area may reflect a decline in the
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prevalence of multicropping. 13 Optimized rnulticropping yields long-term benefits in terms
of soil nutrition and health (Zhang, Shen, Li & Liu 2004), and thus households expecting
short tenure may be less likely to multicrop. The decline in both multicropping and fertilizer
use generates a decline in agricultural labor, presumably a complementary input.
On the other hand, no effect is observed for non-agricultural activities. Given that both
the establishment of a non-agricultural household business and the search for outside em-
ployment (often rationed.in rural China) may require considerable initial, and potentially
irreversible, investments, it would be implausible to see a substantial divergence in non-
agricultural investments between households with different short-term expectations of land
tenure. No such divergence is observed. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that
the observed impacts represent the effect of variation in short-term insecurity in land tenure,
rather than other unobserved differences between households with different reallocation his-
tories.
Panel B of the same table shows the results of estimating equation (3.13) controlling
for a quadratic polynomial in land area held by each household, also interacted with Rt.
This specification tests whether differences in plot size between households that did and did
not participate in past reallocations are a source of bias, and the estimated coefficients are
consistent and in fact more precise. Panels C through E show the two-stage least squares
results where the sample is restricted according to certain criteria. These specifications are
discussed below in the robustness checks.
1.5.3 Robustness checks
This section presents a series of robustness checks on the above results.
Differing trends for households with different past reallocation histories It can
also be hypothesized that households included in the last reallocation, who enjoy relatively
greater tenure security, begin to show higher investments in years prior to the subsequent
reallocation. This pattern could emerge for two reasons: first, while the previous specification
assumed that households have perfect information about the timing of a reallocation, in fact
this information may be noisy. Households may perceive some latent risk of a reallocation
occurring in the year or two prior to its actual date. Second, even if they perfectly anticipate
1 3 The average household in this dataset is multicropping around 50% of land owned, a rate consistent
with previous estimates from agricultural censuses and remote sensing data (Frolking, Qiu, Boles, Xiao, Liu,
Zhuang, Li & Qin 2004).
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the next reallocation date, they may begin to taper down investments that have a time
horizon longer than the anticipated time lapse to the next reallocation.
The objective of this robustness check is to evaluate whether the difference in agricul-
tural investments between households that previously participated in a reallocation (who
have relatively greater tenure security) and households that did not (who have less tenure
security) is evident in years prior to the implementation of a reallocation. In order to test
this hypothesis, the reduced form equation (1.8) is re-estimated for the reallocation year
(denoted T=0) and each year leading up to a reallocation. For simplicity, the variable Rvt
and associated leads Rv1 (one year prior to the reallocation), Rf 2 (two years prior to the
reallocation), etc. enter the equation linearly rather than interacted with village and year
fixed effects." Thus the equation of interest can be written as follows, for example for the
first lead R+:
Yivt = #1Dt' x R 1 +# 2D- +# 3 Livt + #4R21 + vv + +yt ei (1.10)
The estimated parameters, capturing the difference in outcomes between households that
were included in past reallocations and those that were not in each specified year leading up
to a reallocation, are then graphed in Figure 1-5 along with a 90% confidence interval.
The graphs show that for outcomes that are affected by reallocations (fertilizer, sown
area, labor, structures and agricultural production), there is generally a pattern of increas-
ing divergence between households previously included in reallocations and households not
previously included in the year prior to the next reallocation. Though the estimated coef-
ficients are not statistically significant, they are positive for R~t'; there is little evidence of
a significant trend in longer lags. However, for those outcomes that are hypothesized to be
unaffected by tenure security, no significant trend is observed.
These results provide suggestive evidence that households at higher risk of losing their
plots may begin tapering their investments in the years prior to a reallocation, though the
largest effect is seen in the reallocation year. The absence of any systematic trend in longer
lags or for other variables, however, suggests that there are no unobservable characteristics of
households previously included in reallocations that are driving the results. In addition, the
evidence of a divergence in agricultural inputs between households with different probabilities
of future loss of their plot prior to the year of the reallocation suggests that the prior estimates
"The reallocation lead variables are coded as follows: moving backwards from the final observed realloca-
tion, each previous year is coded as T=+1, T=+2, etc. When a year with another reallocation is encountered,
all the lead variables are re-set to zero. The regression sample size thus shrinks with each additional lead
year; for each newly defined sample, the bottom 10% of outliers are trimmed.
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of the impact of insecure tenure on investment may be conservative.
Miscoding partial versus full reallocations A second potential challenge to this es-
timation strategy is the possibility that some of the reallocations identified are what the
literature has described as partial reallocations, distinguished by the fact that only house-
holds that have had changes in their household composition experience incremental shifts in
landholdings, without full swaps of their plots. In this case, households that need more land
might receive an incremental, additional transfer, while households that have too much land
would lose part of their holdings (Keliang et al. 2007).
In order to address this possibility, there are two separate cases that should be considered.
One is that the past reallocation, on the basis of which DP' and DN-v were defined, is in
fact not a full reallocation. The second is that the current event that is generating insecurity
in tenure, captured by dummy Rt = 1, is not a full reallocation.
Under the first case, some households for which D, = 1 may have previously had their
land reallocated partly or primarily because of their changes in composition. If this were
the case, then the exclusion restriction required for the instrumental variables specification
requires that a reallocation has no differential effect on households that previously experi-
enced a change in composition compared to those that did not, other than via the channel
of differing tenure security. A violation of this exclusion restriction would arise if there is a
shock correlated with reallocation that differentially affects households with a past history
of demographic shifts.
On the other hand, if what we identify as a current reallocation is in fact a partial
reallocation or some other type of irregularity in land transfer, and households' expectations
are rational, then only some households are subject to decreased tenure insecurity: more
specifically, those households that expect to lose land based on a shift in their household's
composition. The exclusion restriction implied by this specification requires that there is no
shock correlated with land reallocations that differentially affects relatively land-rich (on a
per capita basis) households.
In both cases, the exclusion restriction is not the same as that postulated for the primary
analysis, primarily because the specification can no longer be interpreted as a symmetric
and non-monotonic effect of greater tenure security observed for both relatively land-poor
and relatively land-rich households. Accordingly, if miscoding is common and reallocation is
correlated with other shocks that affect relatively land-rich households or households with
previously unstable composition, this could generate bias. In order to test the robustness of
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the results to potential bias introduced by the miscoding of partial reallocations, I restrict
the sample in several ways.
First, I restrict the sample to households that did not previously report a change in
composition in the year of the previous reallocation. These are households that have a history
of demographic stability. If the primary results represent bias introduced by correlated shocks
for demographically unstable households, this specification should show no significant effect.
The results are shown in Panel C, and the estimated coefficients are consistent in both sign
and magnitude.
Second, I evaluate the effect of households that can reasonably be assumed not to be
relatively land-rich on a per capita basis. If the miscoding of partial reallocations as Rt
is common and the estimated effect reflects a correlated shock for these relatively land-rich
households, these specifications should show no effect. Panels D and E show the results of
re-estimating equation (3.13) restricting the sample first to households that have gained or
remained constant in composition (Panel D), and second to households in the bottom half
of the land distribution (Panel E). These are households that on the basis of demography
and land ownership are plausibly land-gainers, not land-losers. The results again remain
consistent in both sign and magnitude, suggesting that there is little bias introduced by
miscoding and the potential of correlated shocks for land-rich households.
Alternate measures of reallocation As an additional robustness check, I re-calculate
the primary measure of reallocation Rt using alternate definitions based on varying cut-offs
in the proportion of households reporting land transfers and the proportion of total land
reported transferred. While the primary measure of reallocation employs a cutoff of 75%, I
employ a range of cutoffs between 40% and 80% and then use these alternate measures to
estimate the reduced form with sown area as the dependent variable, equation (1.8).5 The
reduced form coefficients along with a 90% confidence interval are then graphed in Figure
1-6.
The results show a consistently positive coefficient on the independent variable D-1 x Rt
regardless of the cutoff employed, and the estimated coefficients are also significant or close to
significant over a wide range of potential definitions of Rot. This suggests that the observed
results are not merely an artifact of the definition of reallocation employed.
15Note that when Rt, is re-defined, Divt is also re-defined as household-level reallocation inclusion can
only vary in a year where Rt = 1.
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Information as a channel for predicting reallocations The identification strategy also
requires the assumption that there are no unobservable characteristics shared by households
that experienced both negative and positive shocks to their landholdings in past reallocations
that could co-vary with future reallocations. One potentially plausible assumption would
be that village officials, who execute reallocations, systematically have more information
about households that have similar characteristics to themselves and thus are more likely
to participate in their social networks. Given the greater informational salience of these
"socially proximate" households, officials may be more likely to alter their landholdings to a
level the official regards as optimal. This unobservable proximity to village officials could also
generate other time-varying effects if, for example, village leaders prefer to simultaneously
implement a reallocation with another policy shift that also differentially affects households
with close ties to the village leadership.
This hypothesis can be tested by examining whether there are any characteristics that,
when shared with village officials, render proximate households symmetrically more likely
to experience positive and negative reallocation shocks to their landholdings. A series of
dummy variables are defined that capture households' economic specializations (whether
they cultivate rice or wheat, and whether they report household businesses of any of the
enumerated types), and a limited number of social characteristics enumerated in the survey
(the presence within the household of an individual with education beyond high school, a
veteran, resident grandparents or a Communist party member).
For each village-year cell, the mean of this dummy is calculated for households that are
reported to be led by a village official, and this official mean is denoted 0 ,t. The equations of
interest regress the dummies for positive and negative reallocation in years in which Rt = 1
on the household indicator of interest Izet, the official indicator O,,t and the interaction IvetOt.
The equation also includes a control for each strata of landownership Li2 t and village and
year fixed effects. The specification is thus parallel to the original first stage, where the
primary independent variable of interest is the interaction between official and individual
characteristics. The objective is to test whether households with a particular economic or
social characteristic are more likely to have their land reallocated in villages where officials
share this characteristic.
DivN = 01itvt ± /2Izvt -|- f 3 Ovt -+ 4L i ±vt -|-+ ± esvt (1.11)
The results shown in Table 1.5 indicate no clear pattern of coefficients across the various
interaction terms. The only household characteristics that seem to generate substantial shifts
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in both reallocation probabilities are wheat cultivation, husbandry and educational levels,
but the effects are not symmetric: when officials engage in husbandry, households that also
do so are more likely to gain land in a reallocation and less likely to lose it (i.e., they are
favored). Thus it is plausible to conclude that there is very little evidence that informational
proximity to village officials serves as a common source of bias for both households that gain
land and households that lose land in a reallocation.
1.6 Cross-sectional variation in reallocation costs
If the exclusion restriction for the 2SLS specification estimated above is valid, then the result-
ing estimates represent the causal effect of a change in the probability of losing the current
plot on investment and economic outcomes within the same village and year, conditional on
the observed distribution of official reallocation decisions. The estimated cost is uniform for
all villages. However, the heterogeneity in the observed probability of reallocation suggests
that the benefits and costs of reallocation are far from constant. Moreover, the bargain-
ing process that generates the observed distribution of reallocations is itself a function of
these benefits and costs. Accordingly, it is reasonable to hypothesize that there should be a
negative correlation between the costs of reallocation and its probability.
The measure for relative costs of reallocation employed here is derived from the model
of household optimization outlined in Appendix L.A. Households are assumed to equate the
ratio of returns to labor Nt and fertilizer F in agriculture to the ratio of factor prices. In
the case of a reallocation, there are no lagged returns to fertilizer and the solution given a
Cobb-Douglas production function is standard:
Ft = wtaF Nt (1.12)
rtaN
In the counterfactual case of no reallocation, the returns to fertilizer are realized both this
period and next period and the ratio of returns to labor and fertilizer has a more complex
form. The optimal level of fertilizer solves the following equation equating the ratio of returns
to labor and fertilizer (both this period and next period) to the ratio of factor prices.
Wt _ ONt (.3
rt ax ± 02,14+1
OFt OFt
o = ONt Wt
0_= (1.14)
!2L+ O1t44 rtOFt O Ft
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The first-order condition indicates that when the returns to lagged investment are higher,
fertilizer use increases, a result shown algebraically for the Cobb-Douglas case in the ap-
pendix. Accordingly, when the returns to lagged investment are higher, the difference in
investment between the reallocation and the non-reallocation case and thus the cost of a
reallocation is higher - presumably making reallocations less likely.
The objective of this section is to test the hypothesis that the frequency of reallocations is
correlated with their relative cost by estimating a production function that allows the returns
to agricultural inputs to vary cross-sectionally. First, I will describe the methodology used
to estimate the production function. Second, I will present the primary results that test
the correlation between returns to lagged investment and reallocations. Third, I will use a
difference-in-difference strategy exploiting variation in crop composition over time to examine
the robustness of this correlation to the potential endogeneity of agricultural inputs.
1.6.1 Estimating an agricultural production function
The production function postulated is Cobb-Douglas; inputs are labor, land area, fertilizer
and lagged fertilizer. 'Sown area, seeds, labor and output for grain cultivation are reported
separately, and fertilizer employed is assumed to be devoted to grain cultivation proportion-
ately relative to its share in total sown area. Lagged inputs are set equal to the amount
of that input used in the previous year, provided that the household did not participate in
a reallocation last year (i.e., conditional on the household cultivating the same land this
year and last year). The objective is to identify lagged returns of inputs on land cultivated
continuously by the same household.
First, I estimate the production function using OLS with village, year and crop fixed
effects, employing both the full sample and the sample restricted to rice and wheat pro-
ducers.' 6 This specification follows the methodology employed in other production function
analyses of Chinese agriculture (Lin 1992, Wan & Cheng 2001). The dependent variable is
value added in grain production, equal to grain production valued at the market price minus
the cost of seeds." Xigt is the quantity of input j used by household i at time t and Fit,
denotes lagged fertilizer; lower-case letters denote log inputs. I focus initially on lagged
161n order to identify these households, a dummy for rice or wheat production is set equal to one if a
household reports positive sown area for one crop (rice or wheat) and no sown area for the other crop
throughout the entire panel.
17The standard production function literature has generally employed either value added in production
(Olley & Pakes 1996) or revenue (Levinsohn & Petrin 2003) as the dependent variable. The primary specifi-
cation here employs value added, but in the cross-sectional analysis I will also present results using revenue
(the grain harvest valued at the market price) as the dependent variable.
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fertilizer because the medium-term returns to this input are most intuitive to estimate and
interpret, but I will also estimate the lagged returns to labor, fertilizer and sown area in a
subsequent robustness check. pc, v, and yt denote crop, village and year fixed effects.
J
yit = (Caxit + Cjfiyt- 1) + c +v + ± ei (1.15)
j=1
Clearly, ordinary least squares estimates of the returns to agricultural inputs may be
biased by the presence of unobserved shocks to productivity. For robustness, the production
function is re-estimated using dynamic panel methods as described in Blundell & Bond
(2000). A detailed description of the methodology and the results can be found in Appendix
1.B, but in essence, the postulated production function imposes an AR(1) structure on the
errors, yielding orthogonality of lagged levels of the independent variables and the error
term in the first-differenced equation. Additional restrictions on the correlation between the
household fixed effect r7i and differences AXit and AYt allow for the imposition of additional
moment conditions that employ lagged differences as an instrument for the equation in levels.
Given that the use of lagged levels as instruments requires dropping observations without
observed lags, I estimate the production function only with the full sample of grain producers
in order to maintain adequate power. While the primary specification employs the full set
of lagged instruments, I also restrict the instruments employed to lags three and four to
evaluate the robustness of the results to a change in the instrument set.
The results from the estimation of the production function using both methods can
be found in Table 1.6. Each specification is reported with and without the returns to
lagged fertilizer. The pattern of coefficients is relatively consistent, with several caveats.
The estimated returns to labor are more variable in the dynamic panel regressions and not
statistically significant. The point estimates for returns to both fertilizer and lagged fertilizer
are larger in the dynamic panel specification, though noisy in the case of lagged fertilizer;
however, the difference between the two sets of estimates is not significant. Comparing across
all the specifications, the returns to lagged fertilizer are between 10% and 40% of the returns
to contemporaneous fertilizer, consistent with the intuition that a non-trivial component of
the returns to fertilizer are realized in the medium-term.
The final rows of Table 1.6 report for the dynamic panel specification the results of the
Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions and the chi-squared test of common fac-
tor restrictions imposed in the minimum distance model used to estimate the coefficients.
(Again, details can be found in Appendix 1.B.) While the overidentifying restriction is re-
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jected for specifications excluding lagged returns to fertilizer, for the primary specification
the validity of lagged levels as instruments is not rejected at the 10% level (Column 3) or at
the 5% level (Column 4). The test of common factor restrictions is uniformly not rejected.
1.6.2 Variation in returns to investment and reallocations
In order to test the hypothesis that there is variation in the returns to lagged investment that
is correlated with variation in reallocation behavior, I now estimate the production function
allowing the returns to inputs to vary by province and crop. Interaction effects between crop
fixed effects , and province fixed effects A, and all agricultural inputs (xijt and fiy,t_-) are
included. The equation is again estimated using both OLS with crop, village and year fixed
effects and dynamic panel GMM.
J C P J
yit= Z(ajxijt + affij,t_1) + (E pc + E A,5) x (E ajijt)
i= c=-1 ,-1 i=1 (1.16)CP
+ ( pc + A) x af f,t_1+ lc + vv +tE + it
c=1 p=1
I then calculate the return to lagged fertilizer for each household, corresponding to the
linear combination of the returns in the province and for the crop cultivated. This allows for
the calculation of the mean return to lagged fertilizer in a given village, which is normalized
by the estimated standard error of af and denoted afv,. Ret, a dummy for reallocation in
each village-year, is then regressed on the mean return to lagged fertilizer, standardized to
have mean zero and standard deviation one. A control for topographic characteristics Te,
also correlated with reallocation frequency, is also included.' 8
Rvt = 316f,v + 0 2T + evt (1.17)
The objective of this regression is to identify whether there is a cross-sectional corre-
lation between the returns to lagged investment and the probability of reallocation: more
specifically, whether there are fewer reallocations when the returns to lagged investment are
higher and thus the cost of a reallocation in terms of foregone agricultural investment is
higher. The standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping the two-step procedure (the
18The topographic characteristic employed is the proportion of village land that is forested; this is one
of the few topographic characteristics reported in the village survey and thus available at the village level.
Geographic coordinates are available only at the county level.
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estimation of the production function and the estimation of equation (1.17)) with clustering
at the provincial level.
The results can be found in Table 1.7. In Panel A, the estimated coefficients capturing the
correlation between returns to lagged investment estimated using OLS and the reallocation
probability are significant and negative, consistent with the hypothesis that village officials
respond to variation in the costs of reallocation. A one standard deviation increase in the
returns to lagged fertilizer leads to a decline in the probability of reallocation of around 5
percentage points on a base probability of roughly 33%, a proportional effect of around 15%.
These results are consistent across specifications in which the value of the grain harvest and
value-added in grain production are employed as the dependent variable, outliers in returns
to investment are trimmed, and the sample is restricted to only rice and wheat producers.
I also report in Panel A the coefficient on the measure of topographic variability To, which
is negative as expected though noisily estimated: reallocations are most transactionally
intensive, and thus less frequent, in areas with more challenging topography. While the
same control variable is also included in all subsequent results estimating equation (1.17),
the coefficient #2 is not reported in Panels B through D for concision.
As a robustness check, the production function in equation (1.16) is re-estimated allowing
for cross-sectionally varying lagged returns to agricultural labor and area sown, as well as
fertilizer. The coefficient on lagged fertilizer and the mean coefficient on all lagged inputs
are then employed as the independent variable in (1.17), and the results are shown in Panel
B of Table 1.7. The coefficients are again negative and of comparable magnitude.
Panel A of Table 1.8 shows the results employing the return to agricultural inputs esti-
mated using the dynamic panel methodology; details on the implementation of the bootstrap
in this case can also be found in the appendix. The coefficients are generally of similar sign
and magnitude, though the results employing grain value as the dependent variable in the
production function are noisy. This suggests that the correlation between returns to lagged
agricultural inputs and the frequency of reallocations does not reflect any systematic bias in
the estimation of the production function.
Panel B of the same table shows one final robustness check in which the production
function is re-estimated allowing the returns to inputs to vary at the level of the village v:
J V J V
yit Z (cgxist + a5 fij,t_1) + (E vvj) x (E aejxist) + (E vv) X a5 fi(,t11
j=1 V=1 j=1 v=1 (1.18)
±ILC ± V4, ± Yt ± fivt
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This allows for the inclusion of province fixed effects in the estimation of equation (1.17), to
test whether the correlation between returns to lagged fertilizer and reallocation behavior is
evident within provinces; standard errors are clustered at the village level. The results can
be found in Panel B of Table 1.8, and the coefficients are again negative, though smaller
and not statistically significant using the two-step bootstrap. Even within provinces, villages
with higher returns to fertilizer seem to report less frequent reallocations, consistent with
the hypothesis that village leaders respond to the relative costs of reallocations in choosing
whether or not to reallocate.
One potential challenge to this conclusion would be the possibility of reverse causation:
villages with frequent reallocations exhibit lower returns to agricultural inputs precisely be-
cause they reallocate land frequently. There are two responses to this argument. First, the
agricultural production function is estimated only using data from households with contin-
uous tenure on the same plot last year and this year. Thus any direct effect of reallocations
(transactional costs of swapping plots, for example) should not be a source of bias. Second,
the reduced form results have already shown that areas with greater frequency of reallo-
cations show lower levels of agricultural inputs. This should, all things equal, generate an
upward bias in the estimated returns to inputs in areas with higher frequency of reallocations,
a bias that runs in the opposite direction from the detected effect.
1.6.3 Difference-in-difference in crop composition
As an alternate strategy to address the endogeneity of the estimated returns to agricultural
inputs, I employ a dif-in-dif specification that exploits differing climatic conditions conducive
to the cultivation of different grain crops and differing price shocks across those crops. The
interaction of climate and price shocks generates shifts in crop composition and thus shifts
in the estimated returns to fertilizer. I can then test whether these estimated returns predict
reallocation patterns.
First, I define a dummy variable equal to one if rice cultivation (as opposed to wheat,
the other primary grain crop) is reported in a given village-year. Rice cultivation is more
common in villages with higher mean precipitation, and more common in years where the
reported rice price is higher. These relationships are shown in the first two columns of Table
1.9. The price employed is the price for mandatory grain quota sales to the government;
all rural households are required to sell a certain inframarginal quantity of grain to the
government at a price that is below market price, but varies across grains.19 When the rice
19The rice quota price employed is constructed by calculating the reported quota price for each household
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quota price increases, some villages who were previously not cultivating rice switch into rice
production while villages already cultivating rice report no change. This generates a negative
coefficient on the interaction of quota price and precipitation, shown in Column (3).
Using the dummy for rice cultivation, I then impute the lagged return to fertilizer using
crop-specific returns estimated on the nationwide sample of data, again using both value
added and grain revenue as the dependent variable. This estimated lagged return is denoted
df,. For villages that report rice (no rice) production, df,, is set equal to the estimated
returns to lagged fertilizer for rice (wheat). I then regress a dummy for reallocation on the
estimated lagged return instrumented by the interaction of precipitation and price, including
village and year fixed effects.
Re, = #&f,v + v, + yt (1.19)
The key result shown in Columns (4) and (5) of Table 1.9 shows the expected negative
correlation between the imputed return to lagged fertilizer and the probability of realloca-
tion; Column (4) uses the estimated return to lagged fertilizer with grain revenue as the
dependent variable, and Column (5) uses the estimated return from the value-added specifi-
cation. This suggests that the negative correlation between medium-term returns to fertilizer
and reallocation patterns does not simply reflect an underlying difference in unobservable
characteristics across regions with varying frequencies of reported reallocations.
The exclusion restriction for this specification requires that an increase in the rice quota
price has no disparate effect across areas with differing levels of precipitation other than via
a shift in crop composition. I can control directly for a cross-sectionally varying effect of
quota revenue, capturing the direct effect of a higher quota price for rice, and the estimated
coefficient is not significantly different, though the standard error is slightly larger.
Taken together, the evidence of a correlation between reallocation propensity and the
estimated returns to agricultural inputs is consistent with the hypothesis that village offi-
cials are selecting into reallocation on the basis of its relative costs in foregone agricultural
investment. Thus despite the fact that reallocations and the associated tenure insecurity
generate substantial costs, the decision by village leaders to implement them does not seem
to reflect pure irrationality. This raises the question of what the benefits of reallocations are,
for both officials and rural households, and whether the observed pattern of reallocations
could in fact be optimal under certain conditions.
and calculating the mean quota price in each province and year for households that are solely rice producers.
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1.7 Estimating the village leader's objective function
The conceptual model used to frame this analysis stated that village officials will choose
to reallocate when the benefits exceed the costs, where the benefits were hypothesized to
be greater intravillage equity and extraction of rents, and the costs were the loss in output
induced by tenure insecurity and the transactional burden of conducting the reallocation.
Given a parameterization of these elements, the observed pattern of reallocations can be
used to infer the relative weights assigned to greater equity vis-a-vis foregone output and
transactional costs in the village official's objective function using a revealed preference
approach.
The benefits of reallocation Bei are measured here by the increase in equity as a result
of a reallocation. Reallocations on average do not result in a decrease in static measures
of inequality in land distribution (e.g., the Gini coefficient). This presumably reflects the
fact that the majority of land transfers implemented in reallocations are plot swaps, rather
than reconfigurations of plots. Accordingly, households swap positions in roughly the same
overall distribution of landownership.
For this reason, I employ a dynamic measure of inequality designed to capture the intu-
ition that one of the primary objectives of reallocation is to ensure that households' average
landholdings over time, relative to the size of the household, are (relatively) equitable. In
other words, no household is characterized by landholdings per capita that are permanently
above or below the median. First, I define ft as the within-household mean of land owned
per capita for household i in periods t, t-1 and t-2. I then calculate three standard measures
of inequality for this measure Lit, the Gini coefficient and the general entropy measures GE
(1) and GE (2).
Table 1.10 shows the results from estimating the following equation in which inequality
measures It are regressed on a dummy for reallocation and village and year fixed effects.
Ivt = i 1RO + 02Iv,t-1 + Vv + T + Evt (1.20)
The estimated coefficients suggest that reallocating land results in a significant decline in
each measure of inequality, with the estimated magnitude of the effect between 5% and
10%.20 Reallocations move households that previously had higher per-capita landholdings
down in the landownership distribution and vice versa, thus generating convergence in the
mean per-capita landholdings reported by each household over time. Moreover, reallocations
20This equation is estimated on the full panel of observed villages and years from 1987 to 2002.
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are more common in years in which these measures of inequality are higher. This pattern is
evident in Columns (3) through (6) of the same table, showing the results of the following
regression:
Rt= #Im,t_1 ± ve + 7y + E t (1.21)
The evidence suggests that increasing equity is one of the goals that village leaders seek to
achieve when they reallocate land, and reallocations are at least a moderately effective tool
in attaining this objective.
Bet is then defined as the absolute value of the decline in the specified inequality measure
(Gini or general entropy) induced by a reallocation, normalized on a scale of 0 to 100. In
years that did not experience a reallocation, the counterfactual benefit Bt is estimated
as a random draw from a normal distribution that has the mean and standard deviation
corresponding to the observed mean and standard deviation of reallocation benefit over
all reallocations observed in that village.21 T,, the topographic burden of reallocation, is
measured as the percentage of land in the village that is forested (again, on a scale of 0 to
100).
The cost Ct of a reallocation is the estimated difference between output in the case of
a reallocation in a given village and year and output in the absence of a reallocation. This
difference is calculated employing the decline in sown area, labor and fertilizer predicted by
the reduced form results, scaled by the mean risk of plot loss for households in a reallocation
year. 22 Cvt the total cost of a reallocation in village v in year t, is the sum of the difference
in output across all H households observed in the village, valued at the market price in
hundreds of yuan.
H
Cet= AY (1.22)
i=1
The net benefit of reallocations OPt is then defined as a simple quadratic function of the
benefits and costs. The weight on the quadratic function of C, lost revenue due to decreased
agricultural output, is normalized to one.
@,t = a,(Bvt + B2t) - a 2 (Tv + T2) - (Cvt + C2t) (1.23)
If @pv > 0, then a reallocation is optimal; if it is less than zero, a reallocation is not
optimal. For postulated values of c 1 and a 2 , a distribution of optimal reallocations can
21 1n estimation, I repeat this exercise using 100 random draws for each non-reallocation year.
22The decline in output is then calculated using the estimated returns to agricultural inputs allowing these
returns to vary by province and crop, as in Section 1.6.2.
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be generated and compared to the observed distribution of reallocations. The objective
is to identify parameter values that best reproduce the observed pattern of reallocations.
More specifically, I wish to identify parameters that maximize the accurate prediction rate
across all (reallocation and non-reallocation) years, as well as minimizing the difference in
prediction rates between reallocation and non-reallocation years.23 Define 'rT as the percent
of all reallocation and non-reallocation events that are accurately predicted by the postulated
parameters, and Wr and rNR as the percent of reallocations and non-reallocations that are
accurately predicted, calculated separately. The objective is to maximize #r, defined as
r =1rT - |rR - rNRII (1.24)
r is maximized by performing a grid search across potential values of a1 and a 2. The
range of parameters tested is 0 to 100 for both parameters; the increments of the grid
are varied for each specification, and reported in the results table. Standard errors are
bootstrapped across two hundred replications with re-sampling at the village-year level. For
each specification, a1 and a 2 are reported as well as 7rR and rNR-
Following this optimization process, I infer the predicted distribution of reallocations,
conditional on the estimated weights, that would be optimal from the perspective of the
official: namely, reallocating only when the net benefit is positive. I can then compare the
estimated cost per reallocation of the optimal reallocations to the observed reallocations.
The difference AC as a percentage of the cost of the observed reallocations is reported in
the final row of Table 1.11.
The results show that the estimated weight on greater equity in the village leader's
objective function is around 10, while the estimated weight on the transactional burden
imposed by elevation is indistinguishable from zero. Converting these estimates to more
easily understandable magnitudes, at the median level of C and B, officials are willing to
trade off a 1% increase in equity in landownership against a 25% decline in revenue from
grain production.
The estimated parameters predicts around 50% of the observed events, both reallocations
and non-reallocations. Most importantly, comparing the implied distribution of optimal re-
allocations given these weights and the observed distribution, the foregone output as a result
of reallocations would be around 40-50% lower per reallocation if village leaders reallocated
2If the objective was defined simply as maximizing 7rT, given an observed reallocation rate of around one
third, the resulting parameters predict the observed non-reallocations with a high degree of accuracy, while
having little predictive power for reallocations.
40
only where the net benefit as estimated by #, were positive.
It is important to note that one potential reason that the estimated weight on equity
in the village leader's objective function is relatively high could be that in fact there are
substantial private benefits (e.g., rent extraction) for the official in conducting a reallocation
that this analysis fails to take into account. However, given that households presumably
place no value (or negative value) on these rents, this exercise is nonetheless informative
about the relative weight on equity gains that would have to characterize the household's
utility function in order for the observed pattern of reallocations to be optimal.
The results suggest first, that the observed distribution of reallocation decisions is con-
sistent with village leaders placing a high weight on the benefit of greater equity compared
to potential output losses. Second, even given this greater weight on equity, and despite the
fact that village leaders are partially optimizing the choice of reallocations, they are also
making significant and costly errors. Accordingly, the objective of enhanced equity could be
achieved at considerably lower cost given a different set of reallocation decisions.
1.8 Conclusion
Although secure property rights are perceived as immensely important to economic develop-
ment, the literature on the impact of inframarginal variation in property rights on economic
outcomes remains relatively sparse. This paper contributes to this literature by evaluating
one of the most unusual and far-reaching experiments in land property rights over the last
half-century, the system of village-based reallocations of land in China. Implemented in order
to maintain relative equity among households and to allow for adjustment of landholdings
in absence of any rural land market, this system generates periodic disruptions in property
rights for rural households, who have no guarantee that they will continue to farm the plot
they currently hold.
Using an identification strategy that exploits intra-village variation in security of tenure,
as well as cross-village variation in the propensity to reallocate land, this analysis finds that
a lower probability of land reallocation has a substantial impact on households' economic
behavior. Households that are less likely to see their tenure on their current plot disrupted by
virtue of their past inclusion in a reallocation employ more agricultural inputs and produce
more output than other households, and this effect is of substantial magnitude.
At the same time, there is evidence that officials respond to variation in the costs of
disrupting property rights in choosing whether or not to hold a reallocation. Village leaders
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are less likely to reallocate in villages where disruptions to property rights are costly, but
they appear to make some significant mistakes in reallocating where the net benefit, even
given a substantial weight on greater equity in the official's objective function, is negative.
Thus while property rights institutions at a micro-level adapt to reflect the relative costs and
benefits of different institutional structures in different economic contexts, this adaptation
process is far from perfect.
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1.9 Figures and tables
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Figure 1-3: Probability of reallocation participation by decile of landownership
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Figure 1-5: Anticipation of reallocation in pre-reallocation years
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Village pop. 1690.794 (1134.75)
Village hh 417.90 (276.29)
Land per hh (hectare) .40 (.37)
Plots per hh 5.96 (4.94)
Households sampled 68.42 (26.99)
Reallocation dummy .53 (.50)
Forestry prop. .22 (.29)
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Table 1.2: Intravillage variation in reallocation probability: First stage
Diet Diet
(1) (2)
D Pi -.038(.014)***
DN-; 
-.043(.014)***
D-1 -.041(.013)***
Mean Diet .558 .558
F 5.436 10.831
Obs. 14973 14973
Notes: All specifications include village and year fixed effects, a control for vingtile of landownership, and
standard errors clustered at the village-year level. The independent variables in Column (1) are dummy
variables equal to one if a household's land was reallocated positively (DP-t) or negatively (DN-j) in the
previous reallocation. The independent variable in Column (2) is a pooled dummy equal to one if the
household had its land reallocated in a previous reallocation, D-1. The sample is restricted to village-years
in which a reallocation is observed. Asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.
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Table 1.3: Intravillage variation in reallocation probability: Reduced form
Sown Fertilizer Labor Structures Other Agri. Hh Outside
area Fertilizer Labor Structures cap. prod. business labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Reduced form
D- x Rt, .067 .062 .041 .021 -. 016 .062 -. 005 -.011(.030)** (.023)*** (.025)* (.022) (.023) (.027)** (.023) (.026)
D- .022 .013 .030 .007 .006 .016 -.00006 .031(.014) (.011) (.013)** (.011) (.009) (.014) (.013) (.014)**
Obs. 46030 47841 46760 49376 49376 46465 49376 49376
Panel B: Split reduced form
DP- x R, t .061 .042 .052 .031 -.012 .055 .016 .019(.036)* (.024)* (.029)* (.026) (.034) (.032)* (.030) (.033)
DN~ x Rt .072 .074 .035 .015 -.018 .067 -.017 -.029(.034)** (.026)*** (.028) (.025) (.025) (.031)** (.025) (.029)
DPj- -. 020 -. 009 -.003 -.008 .015 -.020 -. 002 .028(.015) (.012) (.015) (.014) (.013) (.015) (.015) (.016)*
DN- .047 .027 .051 .016 .00004 .038 .001 .032
(.016)*** (.012)** (.015)*** (.013) (.011) (.016)** (.015) (.016)**
Test: #1 = /2 .742 .165 .640 .651 .888 .702 .250 .139
Obs. 46030 47841 46760 49376 49376 46465 49376 49376
All specifications include village and year fixed effects
landownership also interacted with Rt, and standard
interacted with Rt, a control for vingtile of
errors clustered at the village-year level. The
independent variable in Panel A is the interaction between a pooled dummy equal to one if the household
had its land reallocated in a previous reallocation, D-, and a dummy for a current reallocation Ret. The
independent variables in Panel B are the interactions between dummy variables equal to one if a
household's land was reallocated positively (DPJ) or negatively (DNa) in the previous reallocation and
Rt. The dependent variables are sown area, fertilizer, agricultural labor, agricultural structures, tools and
animals owned, and dummies for participating in a non-agricultural business or in outside labor; sown area,
fertilizer, agricultural production and agricultural labor are reported per acre owned, and all variables are
normalized relative to the control observations. Asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
level. The final row of Panel B reports the p-value for a test of equality on the coefficients of DPi.J x Rt
and DNi x Rew.
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Table 1.4: Intravillage variation in reallocation probability: 2SLS estimates
Sown Fertilizer Labor Structures Other Agri. Hh Outside
area Fertilizer Labor Structures cap. prod. business labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: IV estimates
Allocation dummy -1.581 -1.347 -1.059 -. 500 .376 -1.433 .114 .259(.829)* (.633)** (.742) (.546) (.544) (.733)* (.557) (.621)
Obs. 46030 47841 46760 49376 49376 46465 49376 49376
Panel B: IV with polynomial in land area
Allocation dummy -1.604 -1.325 -1.055 -.457 .387 -1.410 .107 .243(.794)** (.609)** (.708) (.525) (.514) (.693)** (.535) (.597)
Obs. 46030 47841 46760 49376 49376 46465 49376 49376
Panel C: IV excluding households with past demographic instability
Allocation dummy -2.993 -2.428 -2.580 -.612 .003 -1.916 -. 896 .145(1.525)** (1.139)** (1.602) (.866) (.956) (1.272) (.900) (.963)
Obs. 22724 23493 23177 24324 24324 22912 24324 24324
Panel D: IV excluding shrinking households
Allocation dummy -1.565 -1.388 -1.225 -.282 .565 -1.346 -.088 .280(.877)* (.726)* (.827) (.567) (.632) (.826) (.616) (.666)
Obs. 40461 42108 41138 43514 43514 40855 43514 43514
Panel E: IV for households below median of landownership
Allocation dummy -1.530 -1.291 -1.077 -.828 .220 -1.383 -.464 -. 142(.870)* (.618)** (.894) (.585) (.419) (.818)* (.568) (.637)
Obs. 22336 23510 22530 24877 24877 22554 24877 24877
Notes: All specifications include village and year fixed effects interacted with Rt, a control for vingtile of
landownership also interacted with R,,t, a control for D-1 and standard errors clustered at the village-year
level. The independent variable is a dummy for a household having its land reallocated, instrumented by
D-1 x Rt. The dependent variables are sown area, fertilizer, agricultural labor, agricultural structures,
tools and animals owned, and dummies for participating in a non-agricultural business or in outside labor;
sown area, fertilizer, agricultural production and agricultural labor are reported per acre owned, and all
variables are normalized relative to the control observations. Asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and
1 percent level. In Panel B, a quadratic polynomial in land area is added. In Panel C, the sample is
restricted to households with no past history of demographic shifts in reallocation years; in Panel D, the
sample is restricted to households that report either constant or increasing household size; in Panel E, it is
restricted to households in the lowest five deciles of landownership.
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Table 1.5: Information as a channel for predicting reallocations
Allocation pos. Allocation neg. Allocation pos. Allocation neg.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rice int. .080 -.092 Retail int. .016 -.039
(.065) (.078) (.043) (.043)
Wheat int. .036 -.227 Fish int. .052 .086
(.062) (.082)*** (.061) (.058)
Husb. int. .080 -.103 Educ. int. -.039 .132
(.037)** (.038)*** (.033) (.034)***
Manu. int. -. 022 .026 Vet int. -. 015 .049
(.052) (.059) (.121) (.069)
Trans. int. -. 086 .158 Grandparent int. -. 030 .059
(.087) (.102) (.023) (.029)**
Cons. int. -. 115 -.157 Party int. .005 -9.02e-06
(.166) (.165) (.031) (.038)
Notes: Each cell corresponds to a separate regression including village and year fixed effects and a control
for vingtile of landownership; standard errors are clustered at the village-year level. The dependent
variable is a dummy for positive or negative changes in land in a reallocation as indicated; the independent
variable reported is the interaction between a household dummy of interest and the mean of that dummy
among government officials' households in that village-year. The dummy variables are indicators for
whether the household engages in rice or wheat cultivation, or husbandry, manufacturing, transportation,
construction, retail or fishing as a household business, as well as indicators for the presence within the
household of a principal laborer with education beyond high school, a veteran of the armed forces,
residential grandparents, or a member of the Communist party. Additional independent variables not
reported are the household and official dummy entering linearly. The sample is restricted to years in which
a reallocation occurs. Asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.
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Table 1.6: Estimated returns to agricultural inputs
OLS Dynamic panel GMM
Full sample Rice and wheat prod. Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grain area .620 .607 .576 .631 0.667 0.664 0.647 0.611(.022)*** (.025)*** (.029)*** (.018)*** (0.192)*** (0.184)*** (0.178)*** (0.189)***
Labor .126 .134 .130 .125 0.035 0.133 0.108 0.234(.013)*** (.014)*** (.019)*** (.012)*** (0.193) (0.185) (0.180) (0.191)
Fertilizer .120 .118 .131 .102 0.324 0.288 0.308 0.264(.009)*** (.010)*** (.015)*** (.009)*** (0.151)** (0.102)*** (0.118)*** (0.106)**
Lagged fertilizer .015 .014 0.122 0.158(.006)*** (.006)** (0.094) (0.118)
Lags as instruments Full set Lags 3-4 Full set Lags 3-4
Sargan-Hansen p-value 0.017 0.011 0.195 0.095
Test of overidentifying restrictions 0.824 0.616 0.875 0.912
Obs. 51073 42460 33789 28383 30019 30019 30019 30019
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression estimating the returns to agricultural inputs; the dependent variable is value added in
grain production (the grain harvest valued at the market price in each village-year minus the cost of seeds). Columns 1 through 4 report
estimates of the returns to agricultural inputs estimated in an OLS specification with village, year and crop fixed effects; in columns 3 and 4,
the specification is restricted to rice and wheat producers. Columns 5 through 8 report estimation results employing a dynamic panel GMM
methodology, employing the full sample. Asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.
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Table 1.7: Returns to lagged fertilizer and reallocation probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Lagged fertilizer
Returns to lagged fertilizer -.097 -.092 -. 090 -. 084 -.069 -.038 -.080 -.073
[.030]*** [.033]*** [.037]** [.043]** [.025]** [.032] [.032]** [.042]*
Forestry prop. -.084 -.086 -. 088 -. 079 -. 109 -.102 -.081 -.091
[.056] [.058] [.060] [.059] [.072] [.082] [.057] [.059]
Prod. fun. sample All households Rice and wheat producers
Prod fun. dep. variable Value added Grain prod. Value added Grain prod.
Outliers trimmed No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 896 847 811 733 896 811 811 761
Panel B: Lagged fertilizer, area and labor
Returns to lagged fertilizer -. 106 -.043 -. 088 -. 058
[.036]** [.035] [.038]** [.031 ]*
Mean return to lagged inputs -.058 -.045 -.068 -.046[.031]* [.041] [.034]** [.044]
Prod. fun. sample All households Rice and wheat producers
Prod fun. dep. variable Value added Grain prod. Value added Grain prod.
Obs. 896 896 896 896 811 811 811 811
Notes: The dependent variable is reallocation at the village-year level; all standard errors are clustered at
the province level, and the independent variables are standardized to have mean zero and standard
deviation one. The independent variable is the mean estimated return to lagged fertilizer or to other lagged
inputs in the village-year, normalized by the standard error. Returns to agricultural inputs are allowed to
vary by province and crop; all households and rice/wheat producers denotes the sample used to estimate
the production function, and value-added or grain value denotes the dependent variable used. All
specifications include a control for topographic variability (the proportion of land forested), though the
coefficient is reported only in Panel A for concision. Asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1
percent level.
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Table 1.8: Returns to lagged fertilizer and reallocation probability
Panel A: Dynamic panel coefficients
Returns to lagged fertilizer
Prod. fun. sample
Prod fun. dep. variable
Obs.
-.072
[.045]
.023
[.041]
All households
Value added Grain prod.
848 644
-.082
[.037]**
-.034
[.045]
Rice and wheat producers
Value added Grain prod.
816 585
Panel B: Lagged fertilizer with variation at the village level
Returns to lagged fertilizer
Prod. fun. sample
Prod fun. dep. variable
Fixed effect
Outliers trimmed
Obs.
-.023 -.021 -.030 -. 030 -.035 -.033 -. 030 -.020[.0201 [.018] [.021] [.028] [.024] [.021] [.023] [.029]
Value
Prov.
No
853
All households
added Grain prod.
Prov. Prov. Prov.
Yes No Yes
845 844 836
Rice and wheat producers
Value added Grain prod.
Prov. Prov. Prov. Prov.
No Yes No Yes
837 831 818 812
Notes: The dependent variable is reallocation at the village-year level; all standard errors are clustered at
the province level, and the independent variables are standardized to have mean zero and standard
deviation one. The independent variable is the mean estimated return to lagged fertilizer in the
village-year, normalized by the standard error. In Panel A, the coefficients in the agricultural production
function are estimated using dynamic panel GMM. In Panel B, returns to agricultural inputs are allowed to
vary by village. All specifications include a control for topographic variability (the proportion of land
forested), though the coefficient is not reported for concision. Asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and
1 percent level.
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Table 1.9: Difference-in-difference estimates of lagged fertilizer returns
Rice dummy Reallocation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Precipitation .272
(.029)***
Rice quota price .020
(.004)***
Precipitation price int -.157
(.063)**
Fertilizer return -2.521 -.776(1.508)* (.464)*
Obs. 903 1077 847 847 847
F 88.733 17.329 5.1 2.277 2.277
Notes: The dependent variable is Columns (1) to (3) is a dummy for whether rice is cultivated in a given
village-year. The dependent variable in Columns (5) and (6) is a dummy for whether a reallocation occurs.
Mean precipitation, the rice quota price and the interaction are normalized to have mean zero and
standard deviation one. The estimated return to lagged fertilizer is imputed using the dummy for rice
cultivation and the returns to lagged fertilizer for rice and wheat production estimated on the full sample.
Asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.
Table 1.10: Benefits of reallocation
Gini GE 1 GE 2 Reallocation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reallocation -.007 -.004 -. 005
(.001)*** (.001)*** (.002)***
Lagged Gini .770 .933
(.017)*** (.321)***
Lagged GE(1) .857 .947
(.018)*** (.368)**
Lagged GE(2) .842 .570(.020)*** (.290)**
Mean dep. variable .182 .066 .070 .352 .352 .352
Obs. 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664
Notes: The dependent variable is Columns (1) to (3) is the specified measure of inequality in Lt, defined
as the mean of per-capita landholdings for household i over period t and the two preceding periods. The
dependent variable in Columns (4) through (6) is a dummy for reallocation at the village-year level. All
regressions include village and year fixed effects; asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
level.
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Table 1.11: Parameters of the village leader's objective function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ai 6 6 12 12 10 10(14.044) (36.216) (2.100)*** (2.302)*** (3.061)*** (15.315)
a2 0 0 0 0 0 0(.171) (.242) (0) (0) (0) (.086)
rR 0.504 0.504 0.444 0.444 0.452 0.452(.026)*** (.028)*** (.034)*** (.031)*** (.026)*** (.024)***
7
rNR 0.495 0.495 0.446 0.446 0.455 0.455(.025)*** (.025)*** (.035)*** (.032)*** (.029)*** (.029)***
AC -0.498 -0.498 -0.459 -0.459 -0.417 -0.417(.243)** (.550) (.130)** (.128)** (.134)** (.203)**
Inequality measure employed Gini Gini GE(1) GE(1) GE(2) GE(2)
Grid step (ai) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Grid step (a2) 1 .5 1 .5 1 .5
Notes: The coefficients correspond to the estimated weights on equity and transactional costs in the village
leader's objective function. 7rR and 7rNR are the proportion of reallocation and non-reallocation events
respectively predicted by the estimated parameters. AC is the percent difference in cost between the
observed distribution of reallocations and the optimal distribution of reallocations conditional on the
estimated weights. Standard errors are calculated using a bootstrap with 200 replications.
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L.A Appendix: Household optimization problem
Assume the household seeks to maximize value-added profits in agricultural production (i.e.,
profits minus the cost of seeds); the production function is not constrained to be constant
returns to scale, and evidence suggests it is in fact decreasing returns to scale. I postulate a
standard Cobb-Douglas production function in which there are lagged returns to investment
(fertilizer). Note that fertilizer is assumed to be a flow variable: Ft is equal to fertilizer
applied in period t only. However, fertilizer applied in period t-1 is allowed to continue to
have a direct effect on soil productivity.
-y is equal to the probability of reallocation, identical in every period; in the case of a
reallocation, lagged returns to fertilizer are lost. Accordingly, the production function and
value-added profits take the following form. The contemporaneous return to fertilizer will
be denoted ac, and the lagged return to fertilizer denoted aF-24
Y = AL N t t_ (1.25)
,rt = PY - P|St (1.26)
Assume further that the household optimally chooses F and Nt, fertilizer and labor
inputs, and that land cultivated Lt is a mechanical function of inputs chosen: i.e., when a
household optimally uses more inputs, it will cultivate more of its land allotment. I will
focus on analyzing the household's optimization problem in period t, assuming there was no
reallocation in the last period (t-1). For simplicity of notation, in the subsequent analysis
denote At = AtLiL FtI.*
Define o- as the return next period to this period's investment in the absence of a real-
location.
U+ - (1.27)
= aFAt+1LtFt F-FN+ Ntg (1.28)
The first-order condition governing optimal fertilizer and labor can then be written as follows.
24This model could easily be generalized to allow for lagged returns to all agricultural inputs. For simplicity,
I focus here on the exposition for the case in which only fertilizer has lagged returns.
2 If there was a reallocation in period t-1, then At = AtLt"L. This assumption does not affect the analysis
that follows.
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we ~ ~ a PaNtNN-1Wt PtNAtFtNt (1.29)
re Pec~t~i-1Nt Nrt PtacAtFt tFN + (1 -
0 = PtCeNAtFtcNtN t (1.30)
Ptac AtFtclNtN+ PF+lo N(  - rt
Denoting the right-hand side of (1.30) by Vi, the implicit derivative of fertilizer investment
with respect to the probability of reallocation can be calculated as = -9f. Again for
ease of notation, define A, and A2 :
A, = PaNAtFtcNIN-1 (1.31)
A2 = PtacAtFc-1N (N .2
The implicit derivative can then be calculated employing the following formula:
1"=7 (PtcAt~t- lNtN ± Pt~a(
~(A2Pa~actF~cNaN10'(F) = (2PaNacAtF (1.33)
- AkPtac(cc - 1)AtFc-2 NN
- APt+1(1 - 7)At+1ap(aF - 1)F F-2F+Nt+N)
Given that both the numerator and denominator are positive, the implicit derivative formula
yields that F'(-y) < 0. This is intuitive: optimal fertilizer investment declines when the
probability of reallocation increases.
Assuming that households know whether or not they will lose their plot at the end of the
year at the time they make their investments (i.e., -y is a dummy variable equal to zero or
one), optimal fertilizer investment with or without a reallocation can be specified as follows.
F t N Nt, while FtNR solves the following equation:
PtaNAtFtCO NlN-W
0- t Nt (1.34)
Pea AtFi-1Nta NPtac~~tact+IU rt
Define the difference in investment between the reallocation and the non-reallocation case
as follows.
AF FtNR- FtR (1.35)
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AF is increasing in aF, a comparative static that can be established again using the formula
for implicit differentiation. Note that FtR is independent of the returns to lagged investment,
while tFNR - . The denominator is positive, and the numerator can be written as
follows:
p)'(CiF) = - t+[At+1FF-lFt+ N'+C ± At+a F NFF-1(logE}| (1.36)
Accordingly, -FNR > 0 and thus AFt > 0. The investment gap between years with and
without reallocation is increasing in the returns to lagged fertilizer investment.
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LB Appendix: Dynamic panel estimation of the agri-
cultural production function
Following Blundell & Bond (2000), an AR(1) error structure is now imposed on the produc-
tion function.
yit= alg ± assit + annit + a5 fit + ap,fi,_1 + t ± (+O + Vit + mit)
vi= pi,-1 + eit
This model has a dynamic representation:
yit = allit - paili,t-1 + assit - passi,t-1 + annit - Panni,t-I
+afit + (a, - pof)fi,t_1 - pfi,t-2 + PYi,t-1
+(91(1 - p) + eit + mit - pmi,t_1)
The dynamic model can be rewritten as follows:
yit = 7rilit + 7r2li,t-1 + 7rasit + 7r4si,t-1 + 7ranit + Wr6ni,t-1
+r7fit +1 8fi,t-1 + 7r9fi,t- 2 ± 71OYi,t-1 ± -- ± (| + Wi)
(1.37)
(1.38)
(1.39)
(1.40)
subject to the following non-linear common factor restrictions,
7ri = -7r2/7rio
7r3 = -74/7ro
7 5 = -r 6 /rio
7r7 = -7 8 /lrio - Ir/ 2
(1.41)
(1.42)
(1.43)
(1.44)
as well as equalities in 7ri, 7r3 , 7r5 , 7r7 , 7r8 and rio.
Given consistent estimates of the unrestricted parameter vector 7r and var(7r), these re-
strictions can be tested and imposed using a minimum distance model to obtain the restricted
parameter vector.
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1.B.1 Estimating the unrestricted parameter vector
The unrestricted parameter vector is estimated using dynamic panel methods; the following
exposition largely follows Blundell & Bond (2000). A standard assumption on the initial
conditions (E[xuieit] = E[ximit] = 0 for t = 2... T) yields the following moment conditions.
E[xi,t_,, Awit] = 0 (1.45)
for s > 3 where wit - MA(1). This allows for the use of lagged levels of the variables as
instruments after the equation is first-differenced.
However, the resulting GMM estimator in first differences can have poor finite sample
properties when the instruments (lagged levels) are weak. Imposing additional conditions
on the correlation between the fixed effect and first-differenced variables allows for the gen-
eration of additional moment conditions that can be used to estimate the parameters. The
additional assumptions needed are as follows:
E[Axitgq] = 0 (1.46)
E[Ayit?i) = 0 (1.47)
The moment conditions thus implied can be written as follows, for s = 2 when wit
MA(1).
E[Axi,t_.,(i* + wit)] = 0 (1.48)
In other words, lagged first differences of the variables can be used as instruments in the
equations in levels. Both sets of moment conditions can be employed in a linear GMM
estimator using both first-differenced and levels equations; this is what Blundell-Bond deem
the system GMM estimator.
1.B.2 Estimating the minimum distance model
The minimum distance model entails minimizing the distance between the unrestricted pa-
rameter vector and the previously enumerated set of common factor restrictions g(fr).
f(#, g(fr)) = Hf8 - g(r) = 0 (1.49)
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where g(f) can be written as
71573
-14/710
75 - 76/710
~78 X10 - 59710X
78
710 
.,
The minimum distance estimator is given by the minimization of
D~i-) =f(#, g(r))'f [g(r)]-f(#, g(f)) (1.50)
where V[g(fr)] denotes the estimated variance-covariance matrix of g(fr), estimated using the
delta method. Minimization of D yields the following:
H = ( ' Z[g(fl]-i H)- 1 H' [g(r)] 1 g(r) (1.51)
with variance-covariance matrix
[] = (H' [g(-fr)] H)-1  (1.52)
1.B.3 Estimating by province and crop
Estimating and imposing the minimum distance restrictions in an equation including inter-
actions between the primary agricultural inputs and province and crop dummies imposes
too large a computational burden. Accordingly, in the results restricted to rice and wheat
producers, the model is estimated separately for each province-crop pair provided there are
adequate observations. In the full-sample specification, the results are estimated for each
crop-province pair for which there are adequate observations, and then for the remaining
pool of households in that province.
The bootstrap is implemented by bootstrapping with replacement at the household level
for each province-crop, estimating the agricultural production function for each province-
crop, and then estimating the mean return to lagged fertilizer in each village-year. 100
replications are employed.
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Chapter 2
Long-Run Impacts of Land
Regulation: Evidence from Tenancy
Reform in India
2.1 Introduction
The institutional arrangements that shape access to land are central to the functioning of
an agricultural economy. Given that a large fraction of the world's poor remain dependent
on agriculture, production relations in this sector have a first-order impact on aggregate
poverty. Moreover, a classic view formalized in Matsuyama (1992) contends that productivity
improvements in agriculture are a spur to industrial development because they increase the
demand for industrial goods. Accordingly, promoting the transfer of land to its highest-
return use has the potential to have a major impact on economic growth in developing
countries.
Institutions introduced or strengthened by colonial powers left a legacy of significant
concentration of land ownership and insecure tenure for tenants in much of the developing
world. In conjunction with imperfections in other key markets (e.g., the market for credit),
these inequalities continue to constrain long-run economic growth and, in particular, the
transfer of land towards high return activities.1 As increasing demand for land from the
industrial sector has clashed with often inefficient inherited institutions in many countries,
'See for example Pande & Udry (2006), Banerjee & Iyer (2005), Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001)
and Binswanger, Deininger & Feder (1995). Banerjee (2003) provides an overview of the importance of credit
market imperfections in development.
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most notably India and China, intense debates have emerged around whether and how
governments should regulate the terms on which land can be acquired from landowners and
tenants (Ghatak & Mookherjee 2011).
Given the potential mismatch between relatively stagnant institutions and rapidly evolv-
ing demand, government regulation of land transactions is, unsurprisingly, common. How-
ever, there is no guarantee that such regulation produces gains for all groups even if there is
greater overall efficiency. The complexity of designing partial reform in a second-best world
is a longstanding theme in the development literature (Stiglitz 1988). But in large part due
to data constraints, there is little solid empirical evidence on the long-run impact of regu-
lated land markets. This, in turn, limits our understanding of whether and how economic
actors use land markets to reduce or amplify the intended impact of regulation.
This paper explores the long-run effects of tenancy reforms using a unique natural ex-
periment in India which, following Independence, witnessed a wave of state-level reforms
(Appu 1996). The major period of reform in the four Southern Indian states examined here
(Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu) began shortly after Independence
and continued until the early 1970s. We employ village- and household-level data to trace
the impact of reforms which took place more than thirty years prior to our survey, allowing
us to examine a number of dimensions in which we could expect tenancy reform to have a
long-run impact.
Theoretically, landlords can choose between different ways of exploiting their land to
generate a return, including selling the land and investing in other assets. The attractiveness
of operating land when tenants have stronger rights depends on the extent to which landlords
can extract returns from doing so, while the ability to sell land depends on the capital market
opportunities of potential owner-cultivators. Tenancy reforms lower the returns of renting
land for landlords; thus it is logical to expect less use of tenancy and more land sales,
particularly to those with access to the credit market. This will lead, in turn, to a change
in the distribution of land ownership. If frictions in the land market allow landowners to
extract only part of the surplus created in a land sale, sales will occur only to relatively high
productivity individuals. Thus, by enabling more efficient land use, land sales will increase
labor demand and hence agricultural wage.
Tracing through these equilibrium effects complicates the overall welfare impact. Culti-
vators who remain as tenants will gain, but marginal tenants will lose out as they become
landless laborers. However, their opportunities in the labor market should improve. House-
holds with better capital market opportunities are more likely to end up as owner-cultivators.
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These are the predictions that we bring to the data.
Our identification strategy exploits the 1956 reorganization of state boundaries in South-
ern India, designed to transform the state units inherited from the British into linguistically
coherent states. The reorganization allocated sub-district administrative units called blocks
to states, on the basis of the population's linguistic composition. However, the need to form
states with contiguous territory sometimes led to blocks with similar linguistic and cultural
characteristics being assigned to different neighboring states. These blocks were analogous
both in historical experience and social structure - two factors which, as we describe in Sec-
tion 2.2, were significant determinants of land structure. The blocks, however, subsequently
experienced significantly different programs of land reform.
We undertook a multi-stage sampling and survey procedure to construct our sample. We
identified nine neighboring district pairs in the four Southern states. For each pair, blocks
were matched using a linguistic index based on census data on the proportion population
speaking each one of the eighteen languages reported spoken in the region. The eighteen best
matched pairs were chosen, and in 2002 we conducted household surveys in a random sample
of 259 villages spread across these blocks. In Section 2.4, we use 1951 data on village-level
landlessness to demonstrate similarity in initial landlessness across blocks in matched pairs.
Our analysis, therefore, exploits variation in land reform across block pairs matched
on linguistic characteristics to evaluate the impact of land reform. Accordingly, the key
identifying assumptions require that the assignment of different blocks to different states
along the border is quasi-random conditional on observable characteristics, and that the
channel through which state assignment affects rural land distribution is land reform. If
these assumptions hold, estimating the impact of land reform within these block pairs allows
for an unbiased estimate of the impact of land reform on economic outcomes.
In addition, we interact variation in land reform with households' presumed land own-
ership prior to the reform, proxied by their caste status. This interaction both tests the
key theoretical predictions about the differential impact of land reform on households with
different baseline characteristics, and allows for the estimation of causal effects of land re-
form under the weaker identification assumption of no systematic variation in between-caste
group differences across state borders.
The results suggest that tenancy reform reduced land inequality within villages, predom-
inantly by transferring land from upper caste landowners to middle caste tenants. However,
in line with the theory, tenancy reform also increased the number of landless Scheduled Caste
and Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) households, a group that presumably had poorer access to
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credit. Consistent with our model, we also observe higher agricultural wage after tenancy
reform.
Our findings contribute to a large literature on institutional persistence (see for example
?). While the relationship between institutional patterns and economic outcomes has been
widely analyzed, the focus on aggregate outcomes often makes it difficult to explore specific
mechanisms through which the two are linked. Detailed household survey data allows us to
examine changes in household landholdings and labor market behavior that are generated
by reforms.
Our paper also employs an innovative empirical strategy. While several recent papers
have exploited the random assignment of borders for institutional variation (Michalopoulos
& Papaioannou 2011), sampling blocks that are linguistically similar but not immediately
geographically adjacent allows us to address the concern raised by Bubb (2011) that there
is little de facto variation in property rights across state borders, even if there is de jure
variation.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides background on tenancy reform, a
brief review of the literature on the economic impact of land reform, and a description of the
natural experiment. Section 2.3 presents a theoretical framework used to generate predictions
about tenancy reform. Section 2.4 introduces the data and discusses the empirical strategy.
Section 2.5 provides the empirical results and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background
In this section we provide background on key points relevant to the analysis. First, we
describe land relations in India at Independence and the subsequent tenancy reforms that
we analyze. Next, we consider existing evidence on the effects of land reform. Finally, we
describe the language-based state reorganization that we exploit in this analysis.
2.2.1 Land relations in India
The social and economic structure of village India is intrinsically tied to the caste system.
Hindus, who make up over 80% of India's population, are born into a caste. Castes are
endogamous groups defined by closed marriage and kinship circles.
Historically, the caste system also defined household occupation with land-ownership
restricted among lower castes. Prior to British rule in India, inheritance determined land
rights and land sales were extremely rare. While the British introduced new forms of land
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taxation, these changes did not disrupt the caste-land relationship, and rather worked to
strengthen the correlation between landlessness and a low position in the caste hierarchy.
Two main forms of land taxation were introduced by British administrators. The first
was the zamindari system, under which revenue liability for a given jurisdiction was assigned
to a landlord who was empowered to collect revenue and enforce the payment of taxes.
Zamindars were essentially awarded property rights for a village or group of villages (Banerjee
& Iyer 2005). The second system was ryotwari, in which every registered landholder was
recognized as a proprietor with the right to sell or transfer the land, and assured of permanent
tenure as long as land revenue was paid. However, land taxes were high, and over time there
were a significant number of both distress land sales and land appropriations by moneylenders
when debt repayments were not made.
At Independence, India's large landowners were typically drawn from the upper castes.
There were two main categories of tenants. First, there were occupancy tenants who enjoyed
permanent heritable rights on land, security of tenure and could claim compensation from
landlords for any improvement on the land. These were typically the middle and lower castes
(often grouped as Other Backward Castes or OBCs). Second, tenants at will did not have
security of tenure and could be evicted at the will of the landlord. This class consisted of the
lowest castes and tribal households (grouped as Scheduled Castes and Tribes or SC/ST).
Quantitative and qualitative evidence collected in the early post-independence period
emphasized that lower castes were largely landless laborers, servants, or tenants for the
upper castes: e.g., in Tamil Nadu, 59% of the members of one upper caste were reported
to be either landlords or rich peasants, while only 4% of the untouchable caste were land-
lords (Srinivas 1966, Sharma 1984). This translated into widespread landlessness - by 1956
estimates suggest that roughly one in every third rural household was landless, with the
prevalence much higher among lower castes (Kumar 1962, Shah 2004).
Such statistics provided a significant impetus to land reform efforts in India post-Independence,
to which we now turn.2
2The design of land reform in developing countries has long been a major preoccupation of policymakers
and academics. A 1975 World Bank policy paper strongly supported redistributive land reform, with an
emphasis on transferring land to more productive users and promoting owner-operated farms. However,
implementation of these reforms has varied widely over the post-World War II period. While land reform
was relatively successful in much of Asia where land relations were characterized by tenants cultivating
landlord estates, in areas dominated by the hacienda system - in which tenants work on the landlord's farm
and in turn receive a small plot of their own - it was largely stymied (Deininger & Binswanger 1999).
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2.2.2 Land reform: Policy and existing evidence
In India, the constitution decreed that land policy was a state subject, and soon after Inde-
pendence states began enacting such reforms, largely passed between 1950 and 1972. This
wave of legislative activity included several major initiatives: the abolition of intermediaries,
the imposition of land ceilings, and tenancy reforms.
The first type of reform, abolition reforms, abolished the zamindari system. Following
the reforms, former tenants were now in a direct relationship with the state, rather than
with a feudal lord, but this afforded relatively few immediate benefits. Even worse, abolition
reforms often led to large-scale ejecting of "tenants-at-will, undertenants and sharecroppers."
Since the laws abolishing zamindari allowed for retention of land for personal cultivation,
many landholders responded by expelling tenants in order to increase this exempted area
(Appu 1996).
The second class of reform included legislation that placed a ceiling on legal landholdings.
Ceiling reforms, however, were typically weakened by provisions that set a high ceiling,
established a large number of exceptions to the stated limit on landholdings, and offered no
clear process by which to identify holders of surplus land or proceed against them (Rajan
1986, Radhakrishnan 1990).3 Moreover, land that was redistributed was often in small plots
and of poor quality, requiring substantial (and likely unaffordable) investments prior to
cultivation (Herring 1991).
The final set of reforms - tenancy provisions that regulate relationships between tenants
and landlords or, in some cases, render tenancy illegal - are widely identified as the best im-
plemented reforms, characterized by less manipulation and fewer administrative bottlenecks
(Eashvaraiah 1985, Herring 1991). However, even in this case, several authors note that
larger tenants are the primary beneficiaries of tenancy provisions and differential eviction of
informal tenants is common (Appu 1996).
The historical literature has elaborated extensively on the challenges encountered in im-
plementing tenancy reform. Eashvaraiah (1985) in his analysis of Andhra Pradesh argues
that the 1950 tenancy reform in effect created two classes of tenants, since those who were
already evicted to avoid previous reforms were not reinstated and remained landless. Simi-
larly, Pani (1983) argues that the implementation of land reform in Karnataka led to a large
number of former tenants becoming agricultural laborers. Das (2000) contends that land
reform resulted in tenants with substantial rights obtaining freehold occupation, while "in-
3Mearns (1999) argues that ceiling reforms achieved little because of the prevalence of loopholes and the
bribing of record keepers or falsification of land records; see also Herring (1970) and Bandyopadhyay (1986).
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ferior tillers," defined as inferior tenants, sharecroppers, contract farmers or paid laborers,
lose access to cultivable land entirely.
Thus there are several reasons to focus on tenancy reform in this analysis. First, the
previous literature generally suggests this was the only successful type of land reform, though
certainly not without challenges. Second, this emphasis is consistent with the recent re-
orientation of the broader land reform agenda towards a focus on the potential of land rental
markets, appropriately regulated, as a means to provide the poor with some access to land
(Deininger & Binswanger 1999).
Third, the design of tenancy laws implied that their impact would systematically vary
with a household's initial tenurial security and access to credit. In almost every state, tenancy
laws granted landowners rights of resumption for "personal cultivation", while tenants who
remained on non-resumable tenanted land were eligible for ownership rights. In setting the
land price, states either directly established a price or on occasion subsidized the market
price. The design of the legislation thus ensures that the impact of land reform will be
highly heterogeneous across pre-reform landownership status, which is closely linked to the
historic caste structure.
We conclude with a review of quantitative studies on land reform in India. Banerjee,
Gertler & Ghatak (2002) analyze Operation Barga, a program that encouraged tenancy
registration in West Bengal and find that it lead to significant increases in agricultural
productivity. However, Bardhan, Luca, Mookherjee & Pino (2011) find no clear evidence
of reductions in inequality. A broader literature uses state-level variation in land reform
to estimate its effect. Using cross-state evidence, Besley & Burgess (2000) find significant
correlations between land reform and poverty reduction, while Conning & Robinson (2007)
show that tenancy rates did fall as a result of land reform. Finally, Ghatak & Roy (2007)
argue that land reform has no significant impact on land inequality as measured by the Gini
coefficient.
There is also widespread evidence that, as we argue here, capital market imperfections
play an important role in determining the structure of land markets and the impact of policy
reforms on that structure. A basic empirical regularity indicative of the prevalence of these
imperfections is the persistence of large land plots despite the well-documented negative
land size-productivity relationship (Ray 1998).4 Other evidence supporting this hypothesis
includes the fact that the average land sale is a distress sale, thus creating a "market for
4 This suggests that capital market frictions prevent landowners from extracting the full surplus from the
sale of their land and thus inhibit sales that would otherwise be optimal.
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lemons" problem that inhibits efficient sales (Rosenzweig & Binswanger 1993). Finally, land
sale price often excludes the collateral value of land as buyers may have to mortgage land in
order to purchase it (Binswanger, Deininger & Feder 1993, Deininger & Binswanger 1999).
This leads potential buyers to undervalue the land, rendering the land market even thinner.
Finally, several recent studies examine the political economy of land reform. Mookherjee
& Bardhan (2010) find evidence at the local level in West Bengal that the intensity of polit-
ical competition (rather than party ideology) drives the incidence of land reform. Anderson,
Francois & Kotwal (2011) present evidence that even post-land reform, landowners benefit
from clientelist structures that they use to maintain political power and limit the implemen-
tation of policies that would redistribute income away from them. Similarly, for Mexico,
de Janvry, Gonzalez-Navarro & Sadoulet (2011) argue that the left-wing party favored par-
tial land reform over full land reform as it helped maintain a sufficiently large voter base of
relatively poor voters. By documenting the pattern of gainers and losers, our study provides
evidence that is useful in analyzing these political economy questions.
Against this background, we describe the institutional factors that we exploit in our
analysis.
2.2.3 State reorganization and tenancy reform in South India
At the founding of India in 1947, its administrative structure reflected the history of expan-
sion of the British East India Company and subsequently the British colonial government.
Southern India was comprised of five states. Hyderabad and Mysore had been princely
states under British rule, governed by local rulers with indirect colonial control via a British
resident.5 Travancore and Cochin were progressive princely states located on the southwest
coast. The remainder of South India was directly ruled under the Madras presidency. The
land tenure system in these states was a mix of Zamindari and Ryotwari, but the sub-district
administrative unit of a block typically had a single land tenure system. Our unit of analysis
is the block.
In the post-independence period, a movement grew to redraw state borders along lin-
guistic lines. Based on the recommendations of a national commission, South India was
divided into four linguistically unified states in 1956: Andhra Pradesh (AP), a largely Telugu-
speaking state, was created from Hyderabad and the Telugu-majority areas of the Madras
5Hyderabad had originated as the territory of a Mughal governor who established control over part of the
empire's territory in the Deccan plateau. Mysore emerged out of the defeat of the kingdom of Tipu Sultan
in the early 19th century.
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presidency. Karnataka (KA), intended to be predominantly Kannada-speaking, was created
by the merger of Mysore and Kannada-speaking areas of Hyderabad and the Madras and
Bombay presidencies. Kerala (KE), predominantly Mayalayam-speaking, encompassed the
princely states of Travancore and Cochin and parts of the Madras presidency. Tamil-majority
areas of the Madras presidency constituted the new state of Tamil Nadu (TN).
Districts were assigned to states primarily on the basis of the majority language spoken,
but also in order to fairly assign valuable cities and ports, reasoning that was explained in
great detail in the report produced by the commission (Government of India 1955). Figure
1 shows the borders of the new South Indian states overlaid on the previous state borders.
The state reorganization commission largely kept the sub-state administrative units of
districts and blocks unchanged, identifying configurations of linguistically similar and geo-
graphically contiguous districts that would form a state. In some cases, however, blocks were
reassigned across districts. Inevitably, on the borders of the new states, there were a number
of cases in which two blocks with similar climate, geography and linguistic composition were
separated into different states. Typically, these block pairs were previously part of the same
state and possessed a shared political and administrative history.
Our identification strategy exploits the presence of such block pairs, under the assumption
that shared history and linguistic (and caste) structure renders one block within the pair an
appropriate control group for the other. On the latter point, it is relevant that in South India
kinship structures and caste groups are defined within linguistic groups (Trautman 1981).
Accordingly, blocks with similar linguistic comparison may plausibly be considered to have
similar caste structures. Thus our sampling and survey strategy seeks to ensure that the
two key features that determined pre-reform land distribution, caste structure in the village
and political and administrative history, are held constant across the two blocks that are
matched into a pair (on this, also see Section 2.4).
Next, data on tenancy reform in Southern India before and after the states' reorganization
report is assembled from a variety of historical sources. Appendix Table 2.7 provides a
summary of the number of tenancy reforms before (Pre) and after the states' reorganization
(Post) in 1956 in the sampled districts, broken down by the number of each type of reform
(abolition, ceiling and tenancy). Appendix Table ?? lists the dates and provisions of tenancy
reforms by state. In general, tenancy reforms include measures that seek to enhance and
codify tenants' rights to use their lands in specific ways; measures to prohibit eviction or
the resumption of land use by the landlord; and in some states, legislation that grants full
ownership rights to tenants. As we discuss in Section 2.4, a count measure of tenancy reforms
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will be employed as the primary independent variable.
The tables show that Kerala undertook the most land reform, and by the end of the
period had prohibited tenancy. Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu both experienced inter-
mediate levels of land reform, and districts in Karnataka experienced the lowest cumulative
levels of land reform. In all four states, provisions on maximum rent and tenants' rights to
purchase land disincentivized tenancy arrangements (Appu 1996). In order for our identi-
fication strategy to generate accurate estimates of the impact of land reform on economic
outcomes, we need to impose the assumption that other policies generating large shifts in
rural landownership patterns do not meaningfully differ across states. Further discussion of
the identification assumptions for the primary analysis can be found in Section 2.4.2.
2.3 Conceptual framework
Tenancy reforms can best be conceptualized as strengthening the rights of tenants. To
capture the impact of this in theory, we develop a model in which landowners lack thte skill
to farm land directly and thus choose whether to sell or rent their land. We consider the
impact of a reform that allows tenants to capture a larger fraction of the surplus generated
by land. While this makes tenants better off, landowners may choose to sell more land, thus
altering patterns of land ownership, labor demand and wages.
2.3.1 Basics
There are three groups comprising a population: a measure 7r of landlords who owns all of
the land and two groups of potential cultivators. The landlords own a measure L < 1 of
land which we assume cannot be farmed directly, and land ownership is uniform among the
landlord class. The technology matches one unit of land to one cultivator. We normalize the
size of the group of cultivators to one.
The first group of cultivators, a fraction -y, have access to the capital market or some
other form of wealth so that they can offer to buy land. In our data, this group will mainly
comprise OBC households, but it could include some SC/ST households. The second group
of cultivators, a fraction of (1 - -y), cannot buy land but can be taken on as tenants.
Whether as a tenant or an owner, a cultivator can employ labor on the land to generate
output:
1
7-7
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where 77 < 1 and 0 E [2, 9 is an idiosyncratic productivity parameter which can be thought
of as a cultivator's ability or access to relevant human capital. For simplicity, we assume
that the distribution of ability is the same in each farmer group and denote this by G (9).
Labor can be hired in a competitive labor market at a wage of w. It is supplied by
cultivators who are neither tenants nor owners; there is always such a group since we have
assumed that L < 1.
Let:
Lr (0, w ) = arg m ax 0 1 - w e - - 1- w -7.
be the surplus generated by the land. Note that labor demand for a type 9 cultivator is
(w/O)~ .
We will suppose that the same surplus is generated by either landlords or tenants and
that the main issue is how institutions affect the distribution of this. In the event of selling
the land, we suppose that the tenant can raise sufficient capital to pledge a fraction # of
the surplus to the owner. Under tenancy, we suppose that the landlord can set the rent to
earn a fraction a of the surplus. A key ratio affecting the analysis is a/#, i.e. the relative
attractiveness of tenancy and selling. In an economy with highly imperfect capital markets
and where the landlord has power over tenants, we would expect a/# > 1.
2.3.2 Equilibrium
We are interested in two equilibrium decisions. First, the landlord decides how to divide his
land between parcels to sell and parcels to rent out. Second, the labor market equilibrium
generates the wage given this decision.
The landlord will decide how much land to rent out and how much to sell based on the
ability of the farmer. Let
5(x)= - =$x
as the level of productivity that makes a landlord indifferent between selling and renting to
a tenant of productivity level x. 6 If a/# > 1, then $(x) > x which implies that the marginal
cultivator who buys land will be more productive than the marginal tenant. So policies
which encourage land sales will tend to drive up overall agricultural productivity.
6 It is derived from
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The landlord will sell some land and rent some land. Since he is assumed to be unable
to directly farm any land, the least productive tenant who farms land, x, is defined from:
L = [1 - G (#x)] 7 + (1 - y)[1 - G (x)]. (2.1)
The first expression here is the land that is sold while the second is land that is rented. All
the most productive cultivators farm land and the least productive are laborers. Note that:
X 
_- g (#X) zy < 0. (2.2)a4 [-Yg (#z) # + (1 - -Y) g (z)] I
Observe also using (2.2) that a (#x) /8o# > 0. This says that the more that can extracted
from tenants relative to sellers, the lower the productivity of the marginal tenant that is given
land. The productivity gap between the marginal tenant and marginal owner cultivator also
increases. This is because there is a switch towards tenants and away from selling the land.
The equilibrium wage solves:
1 -L = -rw (0, w) dG (6) + (1 - -) -rw (0, w) dG (0) (2.3)
= w T-75, (#) , (2.4)
where 0 (#, x) = [ y J6 0 dG (0) + (1 - -y) f 0T1dG (0)] be a measure of the average pro-
ductivity of landlords and tenants. For future reference, observe that
dO (#, x) 00 (#, x) +0 (#, x) Ox
d#b # ± 0z ~ (2.5)
=- g0XgXY(-Y xz+ 1 [# - 1]> 0 as #>1.[-Yg (#z) # + (1 - 7Y) g (X)]
Whether average productivity rises or falls depends on whether the marginal tenant is more
or less productive than the marginal owner of land.
An equilibrium in the land and labor market is a pair (x* (#) w* (#)) which solves (2.1)
and (2.3). To explore the effects of tenancy reform, we are interested in how these depend
on #.
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2.3.3 Tenancy reform
We now consider what happens when there is a reform that makes tenancy less attractive.
We model this as a reduction in # due to a having fallen. In other words, tenancy reform
makes surplus extraction from tenants more difficult.
The model makes a number of predictions about the impact of this shift on landholding
and wages, summarized as follows.
Model Predictions: Suppose that tenancy reform reduces #. The model predicts the fol-
lowing equilibrium responses:
1. An increase in landholding among the sub-group of the population with better
capital market opportunities.
2. A reduction in tenancy.
3. An increase (decrease) in the agricultural wage if # > (< 1) 1.
All of these effects of tenancy reform follow intuitively from the analysis above. By
making tenancy less attractive, landlords sell more land to the group of cultivators who have
the resources to purchase land.
The impact on wages is ambiguous a priori and depends on the initial conditions. In
cases where the extractive power of landlords is strong then there will be a preference for
tenancy even when the marginal tenant is fairly unproductive. In such cases wages will
tend to rise with tenancy reform which reduces the power of landlords and encourages them
to sell land which finds its way into the hands of relatively more productive farmers. This
increases labor demand and hence wages. However, in cases where landlords are initially
weak then the opposite would be the case.
The model can be used to explore the impact of tenancy reform on land inequality. A
fraction
[1 [(1-) + yG (#x* (#))]
1 +7r
are landless among whom are tenants. A fraction r+, x*( of the
population owns land. This can be decomposed into a fraction of owner-cultivators:
y (1 - G (#x* (#)))
#C (#) 1+ T
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which is decreasing in 4. The size of the landlord group remains fixed at r and, assuming
that they sell land in equal numbers, their share of the land is:
[1 - y [1 - G (#x* (#))]]
7r
which is increasing in #.
Putting this together, it is straightforward to see that a reduction in # leads to a new
land distribution which Lorenz dominates the initial distribution. Hence, a wide variety of
inequality measures, such as the Gini coefficient, should show a reduction in land inequality
after tenancy reform.
To map the model further onto the data, note that we expect caste membership to map
crudely onto our two cultivator sub-groups. Specifically, suppose that y = 7SC/ST + 7OBC,
then we would expect that YOBC > TYSC/ST. While land ownership should rise in both
groups, we expect this to be a larger effect for OBCs. Moreover, reductions in tenancy
should be larger for the SC/ST group with a greater increase in participation as agricultural
laborers. Land inequality between castes may increase as result of tenancy reform since OBC
households will benefit disproportionately. Average income among the cultivator group J is:
pJ (#) = w* (#) [yjG (#x* (#)) + (1 - y) G (x* (#))]
+- [w* (#)] [YJ 9T1dG (0) + # (1 - y) O'-ndG (0)
The effect of a reduction in 4 is ambiguous in sign for each group when groups differ in -yj.
2.4 Data and empirical strategy
Our analysis makes use of multiple datasets. This section begins by describing the data and
then outlines and justifies the empirical strategy employed.
2.4.1 Data
Tenancy reform data
Section 2.2.3 provided background on tenancy reform in the states of interest. A complete
index of specific provisions enacted as part of tenancy reforms includes minimum terms of
lease; the right of purchase of nonresumable lands; the right to mortgage land for credit;
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mandatory recording of tenant names; limitations on the landlord's right of resumption;
caps on rent; temporary protection against eviction or prohibition of eviction; prohibition
of eviction for public trusts; the establishment of a system of processing land titles; the
extension of formal tenancy to more classes of tenants; and the extension of full ownership
rights to tenants.
Our primary definition of land reform follows Besley & Burgess (2000) and assumes that
each piece of legislation represents a separate land reform event, and therefore is presumed
to have an additional, cumulative impact on the distribution of land. We term this measure
Tenancy Index A. The assumption underlying construction of this index may be violated if
passage of additional legislation reflects simply the fact that earlier legislation was incomplete
or ineffective, or if some states enact land reform incrementally while others enact only a
few broad pieces of legislation.
To address this concern, we also report results for a second measure of tenancy reform
denoted Tenancy Index B. This measure directly indexes the provisions enacted within the
broad set enumerated above. Each district is assigned a dummy variable equal to one if the
district experienced this type of reform, and the total score for tenancy is equal to the sum
of these dummy variables.
Household and village survey
d Our sample includes nine boundary districts in the four Southern Indian states. Three
sets of two adjacent districts constituted three separate pairs, and three adjacent districts
(Kolar, Chittoor and Dharmapur) are compared pairwise, generating three additional pairs.
Thus in total, there are six pairs of districts with four in the same princely state prior to
1956. Within each district pair, blocks were matched on linguistic similarity using a linguistic
index based on 1991 census data on the proportion of the population speaking each one of
the eighteen languages reported spoken in the region (for further details, see Appendix).
The language match index sought to identify block pairs separated by the post-1956
state boundaries where the difference across blocks in proportion population speaking each
language is minimized. Within a district pair, the three independent (i.e., non-overlapping)
pairs of blocks that were linguistic best matches were selected yielding 18 matched pairs of
blocks (three pairs of blocks for each of six pairs of districts). The match quality indices
for these block pairs are, on average, one and a half standard deviations lower (i.e., a closer
match) than the mean.
The outcome variables were measured in a series of interlinked surveys conducted in the
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sampled villages in 2002. In each of a randomly selected 259 villages, twenty household sur-
veys were conducted, yielding a total sample of 5180 households. Households were randomly
selected, with the requirement that at least four households were SC/ST households. The
survey collects data on familial structure, occupation, landholdings, and assets, as well as
political knowledge and participation.
The second data set comprises data collected in 522 villages at a village-wide participatory
rural appraisal (PRA) meeting at which attendees were asked to provide information about
the caste and land structure in their villages, including the name of all castes represented
and whether they were SC/ST, the number of households that belong to each caste, and the
number of households falling into each one of a number of landowning categories. The same
meeting was also used to obtain information from villagers about prevailing agricultural and
construction wages. This methodology has previously been employed successfully in India
to obtain data about public goods and recent public investments (Duflo, Chattopadhyay,
Pande, Beaman & Topalova 2009).
The sampled villages are then linked to landholding data at the block and village level
drawn from the 1951 census. The 1951 census reported the number of households in several
land-owning/occupational categories (landlords, independent cultivators, tenants and land-
less laborers) by village, as well as data about literacy and the male and female population
in the village. We are able to match 302 of the 522 villages in our sample.
2.4.2 Identification strategy
To examine the impact of tenancy reform we estimate two main specifications:
Y, = P1R,,+ 2X,,+ ,+evp (2.6)
Yivp = P1Rvp ± j ,2RvpOivp + i33 pSivp + 40,ivp + 06, + 06Xp + +Yp  Eip (2.7)
Yv, denotes a inequality measure for village v in pair p and Yv, denotes an economic outcome
for household i in village v and block-pair p. Rv, is an index of land reform for village
v in block-pair p. Oj, and Si, are indicators for the household being OBC or SC/ST,
respectively, and X,, denotes village-level controls. All regressions include a block-pair fixed
effect y,.
For village-level regressions the standard errors would ideally be clustered at the level of
the princely state and the state, comprising seven clusters. As inference employing clustered
standard errors with a low number of clusters can be even more unreliable than inference
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using standard heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, we estimate the specifications of
interest without clustering and then re-estimate employing a wild bootstrap to bootstrap the
T-statistics within each princely state-state cluster, following Cameron, Gelbach & Miller
(2008).
The key identifying assumption is that, conditional on block-pair fixed effects, state
assignment affects landowning and cultivation via tenancy reform. The second specification
(2.7) requires a somewhat weaker identifying assumption, namely that state assignment
affects landownership patterns across caste groups only via tenancy reform.
In Table 2.1 we present two checks on this identification strategy. First, we examine
whether blocks that are matched according to linguistic closeness are more similar in pre-
reform land structure.7 To examine this, we employ the following procedure using the 1951
census data on village-level land structure: first, all possible matches between the sampled
villages are created. Matches between villages in the same state are dropped, leaving only
pairings across state lines. Some village pairs lie within the actual block pairs matched along
linguistic lines, and some do not. To test whether the average difference in the percentage
landless between villages in the matched block pairs is less than the average difference across
all possible pairs of villages we estimate:
Dif3 ,k = 3Samej,k ± p/.,,,k (2.8)
where Samej,k is an indicator variable equal to one when the villages are in a matched block-
pair and zero otherwise, and is a dummy variable for matches between the states of
village j and village k.
Column (1) Table 2.1 shows the results. On average, village pairs within matched blocked
pairs are more similar than those not in matched pairs, with the difference in landless pro-
portions about 11% less than the mean. Thus the matching process identifies block pairs
that are more similar in both language and land structure.
Second, we examine whether assignment to different regimes of post-1956 land reform
is uncorrelated with pre-period village characteristics within block-pairs: i.e., whether con-
ditioning on linguistic similarity village assignment to states was quasi-random. Here, we
estimate
Rvp = #x1951,vp ± 7p + cvp (2.9)
where x1951,vp denotes covariates measured at the village level prior to the reorganization in
7 1n addition to land similarity we are also interested in caste structure similarity. However, due to the
absence of micro-level caste data prior to the state reorganization, the test is restricted to land structure.
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the 1951 census. R, denotes the number of tenancy reforms in village v of pair p post-1956
and, throughout, we include block-pair fixed effects, denoted -,.
The 1951 census provides data on the number of households in the village in specific liveli-
hood classes, the number of literate men and women, and total population. Accordingly,
(2.9) is estimated employing as independent variables the proportion of agricultural house-
holds that are tenants; the proportion of the population that is literate; and the proportion
of the population that is engaged in agriculture.
The results are reported in Columns (2) through (7) of Table 2.1, employing both tenancy
measures A and B as the independent variable. The wild bootstrap p-values are reported in
brackets below the conventional standard errors. Columns (2) and (3) show no significant
correlation between the 1951 literacy rate and post-1956 reform history. In Columns (4) and
(5), there is some evidence of a negative correlation between the proportion of the population
working in agriculture and subsequent land reform, significant using tenancy measure B.
Given the nature of land reform, whether this correlation holds for proportion of the
agricultural population who are tenants is of most concern. However, columns (5) and (6)
suggest that 1951 tenancy patterns in a village are not predictive of assignment to states
with different subsequent land reform histories.8 This suggests that the assignment of blocks
to states was not intended to create a state more amenable to any particular land reform
agenda, and within block pairs matched on the basis of linguistic and land structure, village
assignment across states can be considered quasi-random. That said, throughout we report
regressions with the 1951 demographic variable controls.
Finally, in all cases the pair fixed effects have significant explanatory power (we report the
p-value for their joint significance in the tables), demonstrating that within-pair comparisons
do help to control for unobserved heterogeneity across blocks.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Land ownership by caste group
We start by using household data to examine the impact of land reform on differential land
ownership by caste group. We estimate regressions of the form given by equation (2.7). The
primary coefficients of interest are #2 and #3, capturing the heterogeneity of the effect of land
reform across caste groups; upper caste households are the omitted base category. Standard
8Similarly, we observe no significant correlation for the other categories reported for the agricultural
population (e.g., landlords, own-cultivators and landless laborers).
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errors are clustered at the level of state-princely state-caste group, which is the level at
which the interaction terms RVOiv, and RvSiv, vary. The outcome variables of interest
are dummy variables for whether a household owns or leases land, and dummy variables
capturing whether the primary source of income for the household is own-cultivation or
agricultural labor.
Column (1) in Table 2.2 indicates that OBC households experience a significant increase
in the probability that they own land as a result of tenancy reform, while SC/ST households
show a significant decrease. Using the Panel A estimates at the mean of tenancy reform,
the relative increase in the probability of OBC households owning land would be around 13
percentage points on a base probability of 60%. (The implied magnitude of the effect using
Panel B estimates is nearly twice as large, though noisily estimated.) The relative decrease
in the probability SC/ST households own land is around 20 percentage points on a base
probability of 45%. Column (2) suggests no significant impact on the level of land leased,
though the point estimate is, as predicted by theory, negative.
The coefficients on the dummy variables for the primary source of household income
reported in columns (3) and (4) reinforce the finding of reduced tenancy for all social groups
but differential impacts on land ownership. Column (3) shows that tenancy reform leads
to relatively greater owner-cultivation among OBC households; using Panel A estimates, we
observe an increase in probability of 9 points on a base probability of 31%. In contrast,
owner-cultivation among upper caste and SC/ST households declines.
Column (4) shows that while OBC households are less likely to be dependent on agri-
cultural labor after a tenancy reform, the probability that SC/ST households are dependent
on agricultural labor increases by 15 percentage points on a base probability of 72% at the
mean, for a proportional effect of 21% (Panel A estimates). There is a strong correlation be-
tween landlessness and dependence on agricultural labor as primary occupation; thus these
coefficients capture the same underlying phenomenon of shifts in landlessness for SC/ST
households, while employing different data.
In Panel B, which uses Tenancy Index B (calculated by indexing the number of separate
provisions implemented) as the independent variable we observe a consistent pattern of
coefficients. The absence of significant differences between the coefficients estimated in the
two sets of regressions suggests that the observed pattern is not an artifact of the construction
of tenancy reform variable.
These results reinforce the importance of examining the heterogeneous impact of tenancy
reform at the household level, and suggest the effects plausibly depend on the extent to
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which potential cultivators can benefit from the possibility of becoming landowners as reform
reduces the attractiveness of tenancy to landlords. An important part of measuring that is
examining the impacts on agricultural productivity, to which we now turn.
2.5.2 Labor demand and wages
Our conceptual model predicts that tenancy reform may transfer land to more productive
farmers, in which case overall labor demand and wages will increase especially where land-
lords initially have strong bargaining power. We now examine these two predictions.
Our first measure of labor demand is propensity of a household to engage in any paid
agricultural labor. Households who do not report agricultural labor as their principal occu-
pation may still provide agricultural labor if labor demand, and wages, are sufficiently high.
In column (5) we see that tenancy reform increased participation in paid agricultural labor
for all households, with the impacts largest for SC/ST households. (The impact on upper
caste and OBC households is similar.) At the mean level of tenancy reform, the relative
increase in the probability of SC/ST participation is around 17 percentage points on a base
probability of 31%, a proportional effect of slightly over 50%. While larger in magnitude,
this effect is consistent with the prior results and suggests that even households that did not
report agricultural labor as their primary occupation were more likely to participate in the
agricultural labor market post-reform.
In columns (6) and (7) we directly examine the impact on village agricultural wages,
reporting specifications without and with trimming of the wage variable. The specification
of interest is equation (2.6), and bootstrapped p-value are reported in brackets below the
conventional standard error.
The results show that the censored measure of the daily agricultural wage increases by
about 6% with each episode of land reform, or 42% at the mean level of land reform. An
increase in the wage is consistent with the predictions of the model if < > 1, and also
consistent with the results reported by Besley & Burgess (2000). In addition, the sizeable
magnitude of the effect is in line with previous literature: Banerjee, Gertler & Ghatak (2002)
estimate a positive effect of land reform on productivity of between 50% and 60%, implying
an increase of comparable magnitude in the agricultural wage if the rural labor market is
efficient.9
'As an additional robustness check, we estimate the coefficient on the interaction of tenancy reform and
the pre-reform proportion of the population who are tenants, a proxy for the relative extractive power of
landlords. Theory predicts that the wage effect should be larger where the extractive power of landlords is
greater. The estimated interaction effect is positive, as predicted, and close to significant employing the wild
82
2.5.3 Overall land inequality
Next we examine whether, as predicted by the model, tenancy reform reduced overall land
inequality. To do so, we make use of data on land distribution collected in participatory
rural appraisal (PRA) meetings. These data are potentially noisier than household data but
provide a valuable, supplementary account of shifts in overall land distribution.
In the PRA meeting, assembled villagers were asked to name for each caste the number
of households that held no land, between 0 and 1 acres of land, 1 to 5 acres, 5 to 10 acres,
10 to 25 acres, or 25 or more acres. To calculate measures of inequality in landholdings, we
assume that each household in a given category possessed the mean amount of land (e.g., a
household holding between 1 and 5 acres is assumed to hold 3 acres).'0 The measures we
examine include the Gini coefficient, the generalized entropy measure of inequality with a
equal to 1, the ratios of total land held by percentiles 90/10 and percentiles 75/25, and the
proportion of landless households.
Equation (2.6) is estimated again with both conventional heteroskedasticity-robust stan-
dard errors and wild bootstrap p-values reported in brackets. The results in Table 2.3 show
that tenancy reform generally reduces overall inequality in land distribution, and the impact
is substantial in magnitude." First and possibly most important, there is a significant de-
cline in the proportion of landless households that corresponds to a relative effect of around
10% at the mean level of tenancy reform. In addition, the Panel A estimates show a signifi-
cant decline in the Gini coefficient of around 12%; a decrease in the Gini coefficient of this
magnitude would move a village from the median level of inequality across all villages to the
25th percentile.
We observe even larger, though noisily estimated, reductions in the GE(1) measure of
land inequality, around 20% at the mean level of tenancy in Panel A. A decline in the 90/10
ratio of around 20% at the mean level of tenancy is close to significant, and the decline in
the 75/25 ratio is even larger (40%) and statistically significant. We observe no significant
decline in between caste-group inequality.
Taken together, these results suggest an impact of tenancy reform which is consistent
with the theoretical model laid out in the last section. There is a fall in overall inequality,
bootstrap p-value. Results are not reported but available by request.
10As our variables assume no dispersion within landholding categories they likely represent a lower bound
on the true level of inequality. See Appendix for definitions of all measures.
"Estimating all the major results presented here with total reform as the independent variable results
in coefficients of roughly equal magnitude, suggesting that abolition and ceiling reforms had no additional
impact on village-level measures of inequality.
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with land ownership increasing among OBC households and landlessness among SC/ST
households. On the productivity front, we observe increases in wages and overall labor
supply, with labor increases much higher for SC/ST households.
2.5.4 Robustness checks
Placebo tests A key challenge for the identification strategy is that tenancy reform may
proxy for other state-level policies, and particularly for policies that differentially affect
caste groups, benefiting middle castes at the expense of SC/ST households. Undeniably,
the four states of interest did implement a variety of other different policies in this period.
To provide some evidence about this variation, two regressions are estimated measuring the
effect of assignment to a state with higher or lower levels of land reform on various measures
of village- and household-level provision of public goods, and the interaction between land
reform and caste dummies. For expositional ease, we only report results for Tenancy Index
A.12
We start by examining village-level public good provision:
G,,= B1 Rv + 2 Rv x Prvp ±/3sPrp + 1+ e p (2.10)
where G, is a dummy for whether the local government, denoted the gram panchayat or
GP, provides a certain public good in the village and Rp, x Pr, is an interaction term with
the proportion of SC/ST households in the village, denoted Prop. Block-pair fixed effects -Y,
are again employed, and standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.13
The results are shown in Columns (1) through (4) of Table 2.4. We observe no signifi-
cant coefficient on either total reform or the interaction between reform and the proportion
SC/ST, with the exception of a positive and marginally significant coefficient on the proba-
bility that the panchayat provides funds for repairs of the village school. This suggests that
differential provision of public goods to villages with a higher or lower proportion of SC/ST
households in states with more or less land reform is not a source of bias.
Next, we estimate the following equation at the household level:
Giv,= 31Rp + 02Rp x 0, ±3 3Rvp x Sivp +040ivp+ 35Si + -y+ ei , (2.11)
"The results are similar for Tenancy Reform B.
13These standard errors should also be estimated using a wild bootstrap. However, the objective in this
test is to test for the presence of a null effect; accordingly, using standard errors that are biased toward zero
is a more stringent test of this assumption.
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where Gi, is a dummy for the provision of governmental assistance to that household or the
colony in which the household resides. Analogous to the main specifications, this equation
is estimated with block-pair fixed effects and interaction terms for caste group. Standard
errors are clustered at the state-princely state-caste group level.
The results are shown in Columns (5) through (7) , using as the dependent variable a
dummy for whether the household received government aid for construction or electricity,
whether the colony received infrastructure provided by the government, and whether the
household is eligible for a BPL card. The results show a coefficient on the interaction
between SC/ST and total reform that is positive and sometimes significant: in other words,
SC/ST households are more likely to receive government assistance in states that have more
land reform.
These results indicate that insofar as differential provision of public goods or governmen-
tal assistance in states with more or less reform introduces bias to our results, the bias seems
to be towards finding a positive effect on the welfare for SC/ST households. This could also
be interpreted as a corollary of the increased landlessness for SC/ST households rendering
them eligible for such assistance.
Alternative specifications A final set of robustness checks re-estimates the primary
equation of interest (2.7) employing an index of total land reform, rather than tenancy,
as the independent variable. The objective of this regression is to evaluate whether the
observed pattern of effects for tenancy reform is also evident for overall land reform.
The results are shown in Table 2.5, and the coefficients are entirely consistent with
the previous results. In fact, there are no significant differences between the coefficients
estimated using tenancy reform and total reform. This suggests that as concluded by the
previous qualitative literature, tenancy reforms are the only measures that are effective in
altering land ownership patterns. In fact, the estimated impacts of tenancy legislation and
all land reform legislation are statistically indistinguishable.
2.6 Conclusion
Poor rural economies are second-best in many ways. It is no surprise, therefore, that tracing
the impact of a single dimension of reform can be complex. The analysis in this paper has
exploited a natural experiment due to the 1956 state reorganizations in India to evaluate the
impact of tenancy reform at the village and household level over a long time horizon.
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While tenancy reforms were implemented with the goal of strengthening the position of
tenants, several equilibrium responses need to be considered. In this context, the reforms did
produce significant and highly persistent shifts in land distribution. However, the benefits
were lopsided and favored relatively wealthy tenants, while SC/ST households saw a decrease
in land holdings and generally became more reliant on agricultural labor.
On the other hand, there is evidence of a large increase in agricultural wages due to an
increase in demand for hired labor. This phenomenon could be due either to large landholders
no longer relying on tenancy and/or a shift in the labor supply curve. Thus while the welfare
impacts of tenancy reforms were substantial and long-lasting, their impact was heterogeneous
between types of cultivators. These results can best be understood through the lens of a
fairly standard model where owners of land are seeking the best opportunities for exploiting
their land and there is a reduction in landlords' ability to extract surplus from tenants due
to the reform.
The question of how best to regulate the land market is still a pressing one in many
developing economies. Mexico has embarked on major experiments in rural land titling
over the last decade (de Janvry, Gonzalez-Navarro & Sadoulet 2011). Rural land rights
remain extremely limited in China, where the role of property rights in rural development is
hotly contested and has become an increasing source of political unrest. In addition, many
other developing countries face challenges in how to appropriately negotiate compensation
for rural landowners when industrialization requires the purchase or expropriation of land
(Bardhan 2011). In all such cases, it is essential to understand in detail, as we have done
here, the equilibrium responses to reform and the way that these responses create gainers
and losers. This can only be done employing a sufficiently long time horizon over which the
full effects of reform become visible.
In a broad sense, our findings offer a stark reminder of the hazards of piecemeal policy
reform in a second-best world. If tenancy persists in part due to a lack of credit market
opportunities to become an owner-cultivator, then increasing the power of tenants may
result in some tenants being forced to become landless laborers; the ultimate welfare impact
for these tenants will depend on the strength of factor market shifts in equilibrium, primarily
the wage response. The complexity of these general equilibrium effects should contribute to
a recognition by policymakers that, while short-run political imperatives may provide the
impetus for reform, the long-run economic changes are what matter for development.
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2.7 Figures and tables
Figure 2-1: Map of sample districts
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Table 2.1: Quasi-random assignment of villages to states
All block pairs
A
(2)
Index
B
(3)(1)
-.027
(.o10)***
Prop. literate 2.328
(1.369)
[.933]
of post-1956 tenancy
A B
(4) (5)
.883
(.581)
[.724]
Prop. agricultural
Prop. tenants
Joint p-value pair FE
Obs. 10308
.000 .000
288 288
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. The
first column tests whether block-pairs matched on a measure of linguistic closeness also have similar land
structures; the regression included state fixed effects, and standard errors with two-way clustering at the
level of the block and the paired block. Columns (2) through (4) regress an index of tenancy reform
post-independence on demographic variables reported in the 1951 census, including block-pair fixed effects;
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported as well as wild-bootstrap p-values reported in
brackets. The independent variables are the proportion of the agricultural population that is a tenant, the
proportion of the overall population that is literate and the proportion of the overall population engaged in
agriculture.
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Same pair
reform
A
(6)
B
(7)
-3.267
(.655)
[.170]
-1.247
(.287)
[.000***
.000
272
-3.562
(1.130)
[.733]
.000
284
.000
272
-1.513
(.488)
[.487]
.000
284
Table 2.2: Impact of land reform on land ownership
Land dummy Leased dummy Own cult. Agri. labor Agri. labor (ind.) Wage Wage trim
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Tenancy Index A
Tenancy reform -.008 -.0006 -. 016 .010 .008 4.050 2.711
(.006) (.004) (.006)** (.006) (.002)*** (.414) (.028)
[.0751* [.050]**
SC/ST x Tenancy -.028 -. 002 .006 .012 .017
(.015)* (.002) (.008) (.006)* (.002)***
OBC x Tenancy .019 -. 003 .029 -.023 .001
(.009)** (.002) (.008)*** (.009)** (.002)
SC/ST -. 060 .007 -.348 .372 .112
(.077) (.007) (.041)*** (.033)*** (.013)***
OBC -. 227 -. 012 -.363 .373 .074
(.091)** (.025) (.076)*** (.086)*** (.031)**
Joint p-value pair FE 0 0 0 4.720e-57 1.22e-163 0 0
Panel B: Tenancy Index B
Tenancy reform -.023 .003 -.035 .028 .015 5.211 3.424
(.011)** (.007) (.009)*** (.010)*** (.004)*** (.935) (.060)
[.124] [.129]
SC/ST x Tenancy -.068 -.005 .002 .021 .028
(.021)*** (.004) (.014) (.010)** (.004)***
OBC x Tenancy .035 .013 .063 -.070 -.012
(.037) (.012) (.031)** (.037)* (.007)***
SC/ST .155 .023 -. 332 .325 .048
(.094)* (.016) (.064)*** (.048)*** (.034)
OBC -.310 -. 126 -.556 .649 .164
(.257) (.078) (.219)** (.254)** (.029)*
Joint p-value pair FE 0 0 0 3.55e-11 0 5.741e-40 0
Mean .607 .097 .377 .438 .166 60.563 55.987
Obs. 2822 1940 2822 2822 15144 2867 2867
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the state-princely state-caste group level and reported in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance at
1, 5 and 10 percent levels. Wild bootstrap p-values are reported in brackets for outcomes measured at the village level. All regressions
include block pair fixed effects. The dependent variables in Columns (1) through (4) are reported at the household level: a dummy for owning
land, a dummy for leasing land, a dummy for being primarily dependent on own cultivation, and a dummy for being primarily dependent on
agricultural labor. A large number of households gave no response to the question on leasing, leading to a large number of missing variables
in that regression. Column (5) is an individual-level dummy denoting participation in non-agricultural labor, and Column (6) and (7) report
the wage. Pre-reform controls included are the proportion of the agricultural population that are tenants, the proportion of the total
population that is literate, and the proportion of the total population engaged in agriculture.
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Table 2.3: Impact of land reform on inequality in land distribution
Prop. landless Gini GE(1) 90/10 75/25 BC(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Tenancy Index A
Tenancy reform -.005 -.009 -.024 -.686 -.661 -.012
(.006) (.004) (.009) (.953) (.400) (.006)
[.015]** [.020]** [.751] [.203] [.020]** [.761]
Joint p-value pair FE 2.130e-07 4.107e-08 7.022e-07 .000 .006 3.722e-18
Panel B: Tenancy Index B
Alternate measure -.002 -.012 -.030 -1.173 -1.439 -. 009
(.010) (.007) (.015) (1.719) (.688) (.010)
[.095]* [.040]** [.532] [.174] [.219] [.592]
Joint p-value pair FE 2.565e-06 3.840e-07 2.164e-07 .000 .015 2.463e-18
Mean .336 .527 .620 34.493 13.048 .211
Obs. 302 302 302 302 302 302
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
employing conventional standard errors. Wild bootstrap p-values are reported in brackets. All regressions
include block-pair fixed effects and controls for the pre-reform measures of the proportion of the
agricultural population that are tenants, the proportion of the total population that is literate, and the
proportion of the total population engaged in agriculture. Outcome variables are the Gini coefficient,
GE(1) coefficient, 90-10 ratio, 75-25 ratio, and between-caste GE(1) ratio in land inequality, and the
proportion of the population that is landless.
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Table 2.4: Placebo tests
School Center Health Health Hh infra. Colony infra. BPL card
Repair Repair Salaries Materials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tenancy -.010 .008 -.007 -. 005
(.016) (.012) (.005) (.005)
Tenancy x SC/ST prop. .030 -.031 .006 .006
(.041) (.023) (.005) (.006)
Tenancy -. 011 .043 .007
(.002)*** (.006)*** (.010)
Tenancy x SC/ST .011 .009 .022
(.003)*** (.006)* (.009)**
Tenancy x OBC .007 -.027 .015
(.005) (.025) (.016)
SC/ST .095 -.052 .096
(.013)*** (.025)** (.076)
OBC -.042 .223 -.126
(.050) (.169) (.150)
Obs. 302 302 302 302 2822 2426 2822
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; regressions including clustering are at the state-princely
state-caste group level. All regressions include block-pair fixed effects. Asterisks indicate significance at 1,
5 and 10 percent levels. In Columns (1)-(4), the dependent variables are dummies for whether the
panchayat provided any funds toward the specified educational or health public good, and SC/ST prop.
int. is an interaction between the proportion of the village population that is SC/ST and the tenancy
variable. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. In Columns (5)-(7), the dependent variables are
dummies for whether a household received assistance in improving their home from a public assistance
scheme; whether the colony in which the household lives received such assistance; and whether the
household is eligible for a BPL card.
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Table 2.5: Impact of total land reform
Total reform
Land dummy
(1)
-.009
(.005)*
SC/ST x Total reform
OBC x Total reform
SC/ST
OBC
Joint p-value pair FE
Mean
Obs.
-.037
(.015)**
.016
(.015)
.099
(.105)
-. 255
(.179)
0
.607
2822
Leased dummy
(2)
-. 001
(.004)
-.0004
(.003)
-.007
(.004)
.003
(.017)
.037
(.047)
0
.097
1940
Own cult.
(3)
-.019
(.006)***
.005
(.008)
.031
(.013)**
-.360
(.059)***
-.470
(.149)***
0
.377
2822
Agri. labor
(4)
.012
(.006)**
.014
(.006)**
-.024
(.013)*
.322
(.047)***
.454
(.159)***
5.51e-142
.438
2822
Agri. labor (ind.)
(5)
.009
(.002)***
.017
(.002)***
.005
(.003)
.060
(.010)***
.023
(.043)
2.14e-137
.166
15144
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the princely state-state-caste group level and reported in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance at
1, 5 and 10 percent levels. Wild bootstrap p-values are reported in brackets for outcomes measured at the village level. All regressions
include block-pair fixed effects. The dependent variables in Columns (1) through (4) are reported at the household level: a dummy for owning
land, a dummy for leasing land, a dummy for being primarily dependent on own cultivation, and a dummy for being primarily dependent on
agricultural labor. A large number of households gave no response to the question on leasing, leading to a large number of missing variables
in that regression. Column (5) is an individual-level dummy denoting participation in non-agricultural labor, and Column (6) and (7) report
the wage. Pre-reform controls included are the proportion of the agricultural population that are tenants, the proportion of the total
population that is literate, and the proportion of the total population engaged in agriculture.
Wage
(6)
4.032
(.432)
[.283]
0
60.563
2867
Wage trim
(7)
2.665
(.029)
[.269]
0
55.987
2867
2.A Appendix: Sampling methods
We selected four pairs of districts formerly in the same princely state that were incorporated
into two different states. Bidar and Medak in Hyderabad were incorporated into Karnataka
and Andhra Pradesh, respectively. In the Madras presidency, there are three such pairs:
South Kanara (Karnataka) and Kasaragod (Kerala), Pallakad (Kerala) and Coimbatore
(Tamil Nadu), and Dharmapuri (Tamil Nadu) and Chittoor (Andhra Pradesh).
Given that Mysore was completely incorporated into Karnataka, there are no district-
pairs in which both districts were formerly part of Mysore state. However, Kolar district in
Mysore / Karnataka was also surveyed, and matched on the basis of language, as detailed
below, with Chittoor district in Andhra Pradesh and Dharmapuri in Tamil Nadu. All three
districts form a contiguous geographic region, and they are matched pair-wise to generate
three additional district pairs.
In order to select the block pairs employed in this analysis, blocks within the paired
districts were matched on the basis of linguistic compatibility. For each block pair of block
i and block j, a measure of linguistic compatibility Li(vi, vy) was constructed using the
following formula. Pli denotes the proportion of the population in block i speaking a given
language, and Ni denotes the population in a given block. Thus Li equals the sum of the
difference in the proportion of population speaking each language across the two blocks, each
weighted by the proportion of the population that speaks that language in both blocks taken
as a whole. The minimum possible value of the index of linguistic compatibility, indicating
the best possible match, is zero; the maximum is one.
18 Pi * Ni + Pi_ * N-Li(vi,vj) = (Pi - P13) Ni + N (2.12)
For each district pair, the set of all possible block pairs is ranked and the top three
unique pairs are chosen. Table 2.6 shows summary statistics for the quality of match for
all possible block pairs for each pair of districts. On average, block pairs show the highest
degree of linguistic compatibility across Kolar and Chittoor districts, and the lowest degree of
compatibility in Coimbatore and Palakkad districts. The other four district pairs have similar
levels of language matching. The high quality of the matches between Kolar and Chittoor
and Kolar and Dharmapuri districts indicates that despite the fact that these district pairs
14 The languages reported are Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Marathi,
Mayalayarn, Manipuri, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu.
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were not previously part of the same princely state, their ethnolinguistic composition is
comparable.
Table 2.6: Linguistic compatibility across district-pairs
District pair Mean Li Median Li Std. dev.
Bidar-Medak 0.47 0.46 0.09
Chittoor-Dharmapuri 0.58 0.65 0.20
Dakasinna-Kasaragod 0.47 0.43 0.21
Coimbatore-Palakkad 0.74 0.73 0.13
Chittoor-Kolar 0.28 0.27 0.16
Dharmapuri-Kolar 0.52 0.57 0.19
Blocks are divided into village government units or gram panchayats (GPs), consisting
of one to six villages. In the states of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka, six
gram panchayats were randomly sampled from each block selected. Gram panchayats in
Kerala are larger than those in other states, and thus three GPs were sampled in each block
in Kerala. All villages in each GP were sampled in AP, TN and KA if the GP had three
or fewer villages; if there were more than three villages, then the village that was the home
of the president of the gram panchayat was sampled in addition to two other randomly
selected villages. (For the purposes of the sampling frame, villages with a population of less
than 200 were excluded; all hamlets with a population over 200 are considered independent
villages.) In Kerala, villages are again much larger and thus wards, the subunit of villages,
were directly sampled. Six wards in each GP were randomly selected. This generates a total
sample of 527 villages.
2.B Appendix: Inequality measures
The Gini measure is defined as follows, where 1i denotes the land owned by household i, ri
is the ranking of household i according to land holdings among all households in the village,
1 is mean land held in a village and n is the total number of households:
1 _2AnGini = 1+ n -2 (n - ri +1)(li) (2.13)
i=1
The general entropy measures with a=1 and a=2 are calculated using the following
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GE(a) = a(a - 1)
equations:
11 (2.14)
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2.C Appendix: Land reform in Southern India
Table 2.7: Summary statistics on land reform
State District Total reform Total reform Abolition Ceiling Tenancy
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
KA Bidar 6 3 3 1 0 2 3 2
AP Medak 6 6 3 1 0 2 3 3
AP Chittoor 5 6 0 1 0 2 5 3
TN Dharmapuri 5 7 0 1 0 2 5 4
KA Dakasina Kannada 5 3 0 1 0 2 5 2
KE Kasaragod 5 10 0 2 0 1 5 9
TN Coimbatore 5 7 0 1 0 2 5 4
KE Palakkad 5 10 0 2 0 1 5 9
KA Kolar 3 3 2 1 3 2 1 *2
Note: the total number of reforms for Karnataka and Kerala, all post-1956, differs from the sum of the
categories given that they incorporate legislation that can be jointly categorized. For Karnataka, the 1961
and 1974 acts include both tenancy reforms and land ceilings. For Kerala, the 1969 Kerala Land Reforms
Act includes all three types of provisions.
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Table 2.8: Land reform: Hyderabad
Description
1950 Telegana Agency
Tenancy and
Agricultural
Lands Act
1954 Amendment of
Telegana Agency
Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act
1956 Tenancy Act
(amended 1974)
Tenants received protected tenancy status;
tenants to have minimum terms of lease;
right of purchase of nonresumable lands;
transfer of ownership to protected tenants
in respect of nonresumable lands;
as a result 13,611 protected tenants declared owners.15
Also gave tenants ability to mortgage rented land for credit. 16
Limits a landlord's right of resumption. 17
Tenancy continues up to 2/3 of ceiling area;
law does not provide for conferment of ownership rights
on tenants except through right to purchase;
confers continuous right of resumption on landowners.18
97
Year Title Type
Tenancy
Tenancy
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Table 2.9: Land reform: Madras Presidency
Description
1929 Malabar Tenancy Act
1954 The Malabar Tenancy
Amendment Act
1955 The Madras
Cultivating Tenants
Protection Act
1956 The Madras
Cultivating Tenants
(Payment of Fair Rent) Act
Confers a qualified fixity of tenure on cultivation
and a right to demand a renewal of lease.
Also prescribed rates of "fair" rent.
Since this act only took effect in the Malabar region
of Madras Presidency, in our sample
it only applies to Palakkad district.19
Prohibits eviction of tenants who have had
land possession for 6 years; lowered the
amount of maximum rent that could be paid.20
Prohibits any cultivating tenant from being evicted,
except in the case of non-payment,
but allows for resumption of up to one-half land
if land leased out to tenant. 21
Abolishes usury and rack-renting; 22
Fixes the percentage of produce
that can be charged as rent. 23
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Tenancy
Tenancy
Tenancy
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Table 2.10: Land reform: Mysore
Year Title Description Type
1952 Mysore Tenancy Act Restricted rent to 1/3 of crop; granted Tenancy
(Mysore Act XIII of 1952) permanent tenancy rights to those who had
occupied the land for 12 years or more.
Also provided for the eviction of
tenants for non-payment of rent and for
resumption for self cultivation by landlord. 24
Table 2.11: Land reform: Karnataka
Year Title Description Type
1961 Land Reforms Act Provides fixed tenure subject to landlord's right Tenancy,
Amended 32 times (1965-2001) to resume one-half leased area; Ceiling
grants tenants optional right to purchase land
on payment of 15-20 times the net rent;
imposition of ceiling on land holders. 25
1974 The Mysore Land Reforms Imposition of ceiling on landholdings Tenancy,
Amendment Act of 4.05-21.85 hectares (after 1972); Ceiling
removal of all but one of the exemptions
from tenancy regulations; 26 reduces the
landlord's right of resumption.27
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Table 2.12: Land reform: Andhra Pradesh
Description
1957 The Andhra Tenancy Act
1971 Andhra Pradesh
Record of Rights
in Land Act
1974 Amendment of Tenancy Act
A stop-gap measure to stay evictions
of tenants in the Andhra area
until new state-wide legislation could be drafted. 8
In our sample this act, and its amendment
(listed below), only applies to Chittoor.
Provides for the recording of names of
all occupants and tenants.29
Tenancy
Tenancy
Applied the 1956 tenancy laws to the whole state; Tenancy
reduced the maximum rent tenants paid;
limits a landlord's right of resumption.30
(In our sample this amendment
only applies to Chittoor.)
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Table 2.13: Land reform: Kerala
1957 Kerala Stay of Eviction Act
1963 Kerala Land Reforms Act
1963 Kerala Tenants and
Kudikidappukars
Protection Act
1966 The Kerala Prevention
of Eviction Act
(Kerala Act 12 of 1966)
1968 The Kerala Records
of Rights Acts
1969 The Kerala Land Reforms
Amendment Act
(Kerala Act 35 of 1969)
1972 The Kerala Land Reforms
Amendment Act
(Kerala Act 17 of 1972)
1976 The Kanam Tenancy Abolition Act
(Kerala Act 16 of 1976)
1989 The Kerala Land Reforms
Amendment Act
Provides temporary protection to tenants,
kudikidappukars and persons cultivating
land on minor sub tenures.31
Concedes tenants right to purchase
land from landowners.3 2
Amended 9 times (1969-1989)
Provides temporary protection to tenants
in the matter of eviction.33
and recovering of arrears of rent.
Protected tenants against eviction;
stopped recovery of rent arrears"
from before April 1966.
Establishes records of land/tenancy rights.a 
Conferment of full ownership rights on tenants;
2.5 million tenants could become land owners;
right of resumption expires;
imposition of ceiling on land holdings
of 6.07-15.18 hectares (1960-1972)
and of 4.86-6.07 hectares (after 1972);
abolition of intermediary rights.
36
Changes the way the government processed
land-titles; requires that
statements be filed by large land holders.
37
Abolishes a form of intermediary. 3 8
Extends the benefits of tenancy and
security of tenure to two
more classes of tenants.
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Tenancy
Tenancy
Tenancy
Tenancy
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Abolition,
Ceiling
Tenancy
Tenancy
Tenancy
Table 2.14: Land reform: Tamil Nadu
1961 Madras Public
Trusts Regulation
of Administration
of Agricultural Lands Act
1969 Agricultural Land-Records of Tenancy
Right Act
1971 Occupants of Kudiyiruppu Act
1995 Amendment to the
Tamil Nadu Cultivating
Tenants Protection Act
Provides that no public trust can evict
its cultivating tenants. 39
Limits the amount of land a public trust
can personally cultivate.40
Provides for preparation and maintenance of
complete record of tenancy rights.
Provides for acquisition and conferment
of ownership right on agriculturists,
agricultural laborers, and rural artisans.42
Provides former cultivating tenants
who had possession of land on Dec 1, 1953 the right
to resume that land on the same term as held in 1953.4
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Chapter 3
Sibling Rivalry: Ability and
Intrahousehold Allocation in Gansu
Province, China
3.1 Introduction
For decades, social scientists have analyzed the decisions households make about human cap-
ital accumulation and the implications of these decisions for individual economic outcomes.
Given that the majority of education occurs in childhood, it is particularly important to
understand the choices that parents make about education on behalf of their children. In
multichild families, this entails not only identifying resources for education in the form of
money or parental time, but allocating those resources among multiple children. The process
by which these decisions are made remains poorly understood.
This paper provides evidence about the parental allocation of resources for education
among children of varying endowments in a low-resource setting in rural China. The research
question of interest is whether parents employ a compensatory or a reinforcing strategy in
responding to innate variations in health and robustness among their children. However,
direct estimation of the relationship between parental behavior and relative health or ability
poses serious challenges. Any measurement of child characteristics will inevitably include a
component of endogenous parental nurturing, and thus a parental preference may manifest
itself in both better health for a given child and in overtly preferential treatment of the
same child. This generates spurious evidence of a positive relationship between a child's
endowment and parental investments.
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The principal methodological contribution of this paper is to address the endogeneity
of children's measured endowment by employing as an instrument a measure of exogenous
variation in resource availability correlated with physical health. The instrument used is
rainfall and grain yield in infancy for each child, an index of nutritional availability during a
critical period of childhood development that substantially determines physical endowment.
There is a broad consensus in the existing medical literature that malnutrition in the first
years of life, particularly during the prenatal period and between birth and age three, has a
substantial negative impact on physical and cognitive development (Pollitt, Gorman, Engle,
Rivera & Martorell 1999, Grantham-McGregor & Ani 2001). Shocks to a child's nutritional
intake in this period are correlated with endowment, but exogenous to other intrahousehold
decision-making processes given the use of household fixed effects that absorb shocks to the
household's overall budget constraint.
The results show a clear pattern of spending allocations favoring the child with lower
endowment, consistent with a parental preference for equality that seeks to compensate for
variation in endowment induced by early childhood environmental shocks. This pattern of
preferential allocations holds across multiple measures of expenditure, and is robust to the
inclusion of gender and sibling parity. In this context, educational spending seems to be
employed as a tool to neutralize differences in endowment that would a priori be correlated
with differences in expected income between children.
Previous literature examining intrahousehold allocation of resources to offspring has
largely focused on the question of differential allocation to male versus female children, with
a substantial literature establishing a pattern of preferential allocations to male children in
both South and East Asia (Hazarika 2000, Behrman & Deolalikar 1990, Ono 2004). Other
studies have examined the impact of the sex ratio of siblings on a child's education, finding
that a child with more sisters has better health and education outcomes than one with more
brothers (Garg & Morduch 1998, Morduch 2000), though the inverse relationship appears
to hold in the United States (Butcher & Case 1994). A separate literature has focused on
the relationship between birth order and the intrafamily distribution of resources (Parish &
Willis 1993, Tenikue & Verheyden 2007, Bommiere & Lambert 2004).
A smaller literature has analyzed whether or not parents have a general preference for
equality among their children. An early paper by Griliches presented evidence that parents
attempted to limit intrafamily equality and attenuate preexisting differences in endowment,
noting that the effect of IQ on schooling is significantly lower within families (Griliches 1979).
Behrman, Pollak & Taubman (1982) examine familial allocations using twin data from the
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U.S. and reject the pure investment model in which parents care only about the total return
to educational expenditure, employing functional form assumptions on the parental welfare
function. Using developing country data, Rosenzweig & Wolpin (1988) find that parents
in Colombia attempt to compensate for the disadvantages suffered by children with lower
weight at birth by a longer interval prior to the birth of the next child, though there is
contravening evidence that healthier children are more often breastfed. Behrman (1988)
finds evidence in India of a pro-male bias as well as parental inequality aversion, though
such aversion declines in the lean season.
Two more recent papers analyzing the response of parental human capital investments to
children's variation in endowments found that parents exhibit reinforcing behavior. Rosen-
zweig & Zhang (2009) find that parents exhibit higher educational expenditure for children of
higher birth weight in China. They do not address the potential endogeneity of birth weight
for siblings born as singletons, but find parallel results for twin pairs for which endogenous
determination of birth weight can be ruled out. It is possible that these results cannot be
easily extrapolated to non-twin siblings given that twins presumably compete more directly
for parental resources and time than non-twins. Conti, Heckman, Yi & Zhang (2010) also
employ data from China to estimate a structural model of parental resource allocation given
multidimensional child endowments and find evidence of compensating investment in health
but reinforcing investment in education. Their identification strategy relies on the assump-
tion that early health shocks, defined as a reported episode of serious disease, occur randomly
within twin pairs.
This paper makes several new contributions to the existing literature on parental intra-
household allocation. It is the first study to estimate the response of parental allocations to
quasi-exogenous variation in endowment without relying on the use of twin pairs, and the
first to employ climatic shocks in infancy in an identification strategy to address the poten-
tial endogeneity of a child's endowment. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines
the theoretical framework for analyzing intrahousehold allocation. Section 3 presents the
data. Sections 4 and 5 present the main empirical results and robustness checks. Section 6
analyzes the relative effectiveness of educational expenditure for children of different endow-
ment, testing the hypothesis that parental allocation decisions are driven by the desire to
maximize returns to educational spending. The final section concludes.
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3.2 Modeling intrahousehold allocation of education
In order to provide a conceptual framework for the empirical analysis, this section outlines a
simple model of parental decision-making. Assume that parents have two children and obtain
utility from the welfare of each child as measured by his or her expected lifetime income.
The parental utility function is a weighted sum of total income earned by both children and
income earned by the poorer child, with the latter term capturing a parental preference for
equality. The parameters 0, and 04 index the relative importance to parental utility of total
income accruing to their family and the income accruing to the worst-off child, respectively.
U2 = Oa(Y1 + Y2 ) + Optmin {Y1 , Y2} (3.1)
Parents determine their children's expected lifetime earnings by allocating funds for edu-
cation, provided at a price Pe presumed to be equal across children. Income is assumed to be
an additively separable function of both education and endowment (denoted W) increasing
in both arguments, such that '9a = 0, 2 > 0 and O > 0.
Y = f(Ei) + g(W) (3.2)
In this framework, the parents' optimization problem conditional on previous investments
can be written as follows:
max U(Y(E 1 , W1 ), Y2 (E2, W2)) s.t. (3.3)
(E1 + E2 )Pe < W (3.4)
Y = f(Ei, W) (3.5)
Ej > (3.6)
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3.2.1 Parental allocations in an investment model
Assume that Op = 0 and thus parents seek to maximize only total income earned by both
children. The solution is described by the following first-order conditions.
=- A + 0 (3.7)
=Y2 - A + p2 0 (3.8)
YE2
W - E1 - E 2 > 0,A > 0 (3.9)
Ei > 0, p1 2 0 (3.10)
E2  0, p2 > 0 (3.11)
Given the assumption that Y is strictly increasing in Ei, the budget constraint will always
be binding; the non-negativity constraints may, however, be binding. If pi > 0 and Y = 0,
then E = 0. From (3.7) and (3.8), 21> 01, with Ej > Ej = 0. Thus corner solutions
obtain when returns to education are convex, and one randomly chosen child receives all the
education.
If the condition for a corner solution is not satisfied, the interior solution is defined by the
first-order condition 9 = 2, and this holds only when returns to education are concave.
Given the assumption that returns to education are equal across children, optimization given
concave returns entails equal allocations of education. If returns to education are linear, any
allocation of education equalizes returns and satisfies the condition for optimality.
3.2.2 Parental allocations in an equality-preferring model
Now assume that G, = 0 and parents seek only to maximize income earned by the poorer
child. Utility is maximized where Y = Y2 . If the children are equally able, E1 = E 2 . If child
1 is assumed to be more able, satisfaction of the condition of equality in incomes requires
E 2 > E 1 in order to counterbalance the higher expected income of the more able child.
3.2.3 Parental allocations in a hybrid model
Now assume that 0, > 0 and Op > 0. In this case, the outcome is indeterminate. The interior
solution, if it exists, is defined by the following first-order condition.
Oaf'(E1 ) = (Oa + )f'(E2) (3.12)
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Here, E1 is the allocation of education to the child with the greater endowment. There
is also a corner solution in which all education is provided to a single child. The optimality
of either solution is determined by the degree of convexity in returns to education and the
relative magnitudes of the 0 parameters indexing the preference for maximizing aggregate
income versus equalizing income between the two children.
In the stylized modeling framework used here, a parental utility function that maximizes
total income is consistent with full specialization in one child or equal allocations to both,
while a pure parental preference for equality entails allocating more education to the child
with the lower endowment. Intermediate preferences between the two extreme cases are
compatible with a range of different allocations.
3.3 Data: Gansu Survey of Children and Families
The data set employed in this analysis is the Gansu Survey of Children and families (GSCF),
a panel, multi-level study of rural children's welfare outcomes conducted in Gansu province,
China. The first wave, conducted in 2000, surveyed a representative sample of 2000 children
in 20 rural counties aged 9-12 as well as their mothers, household heads, teachers, principals,
and village leaders. The second wave, implemented in 2004, supplemented the first wave
with a sample of the younger siblings and fathers of the target children.
Gansu, located in northwest China, is one of the poorest and most rural provinces in
China. In 2005, per capita income in rural areas was 1979.88 yuan, or less than $250;
this was the second-lowest level of rural per capital income in China. 70% of the provincial
population lived in rural areas (National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC 2006). Fertility rates
are relatively low, with the average size of a family household 3.97 persons (UNESCAP 2002).
The decline in fertility has generated an extremely high male-to-female sex ratio as traditional
preferences for a son have led to increased sex-selective abortion, female abandonment and
the underreporting of girls. The sex ratio in Gansu in 2000 was 111.2, close to the national
average of 113.6 (Banister 2004).
This analysis will focus on a subsample of the families in the survey: those with two
observed children. Here, the child aged 9-12 identified in the first round of the survey is
referred to as the index child; in families where the index child had a younger sibling of
school age, that child was surveyed in the second round. If these two children are the only
children in the household, this constitutes a complete survey of parental allocations and
child endowment, and these households are included in the analysis. Such complete data is
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available on 579 families, and they constitute the relevant subsample. 1
Panel A of Table 3.1 compares the demographic characteristics of the subsample and the
overall sample; no statistically significant difference is apparent in net income, per capita
income, or parental education. The only significant difference between the two samples is in
parental age: parents in the subsample are younger, reflecting the exclusion of households
with larger numbers of children who will generally be headed by older parents.
The dependent variable of interest is educational expenditure per child per semester,
reported by the mother in six categories: tuition, educational supplies, food consumed in
school, transportation and housing, tutoring and other fees. In the Chinese educational
context, supplies, tutoring, and other fees correspond to expenditure undertaken by the
household to improve a child's academic performance, independent of the school attended.
Expenses for transportation, housing and food, on the other hand, may also vary in accor-
dance with the choice of school, and particularly the choice to have a child board at school
or not. Discretionary expenditure is defined as the sum of all expenditure excluding tuition.
Summary statistics for average expenditure per child for the subsample of families analyzed
can be found in panel B of Table 3.1. Total educational expenditure averages slightly less
than 300 yuan per child per semester, suggesting a total of 1160 yuan for two children over
a year. This indicates that an average of 15% of mean household income is allocated to
educational expenses.
The measurement of the child's endowment is height-for-age, normalized to a Z-score
using the World Health Organization growth charts for children of ages 2-18. Height-for-age
is widely used in the literature as a measure of endowment and a summary indicator of
physical robustness, and it is correlated with a range of physical and cognitive indicators
(World Health Organization 1995, Grantham-McGregor, Cheung, Cueto, Glewwe, Richter &
Strupp 2007). At the same time, evidence suggests it largely reflects the history of nutrition
or health prior to age three, as after this age catch-up for a child stunted in infancy is limited
(Martorell 1999, Alderman, Hoddinott & Kinsey 2006). Accordingly, a robust relationship
between height-for-age and early childhood shocks is expected. Summary statistics on height-
for-age in the sample and the subsample are also shown in Table 3.1.
The primary data is supplemented by climatic data for Gansu. Grain yield data pre-
1The average number of children in households in this sample is 2.2. While the One-Child Policy was in
effect during the period in which these children were born, many rural households could nonetheless have
two children legally under various exemptions to the policy (Baochang, Feng, Zhigang & Erli 2007). Other
households may simply have defied the rules. It is not possible using this dataset to accurately identify for
each household whether it was in technical compliance with the policy.
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1996 is from data tabulated by the Ministry of Agriculture; grain yield post-1996 is drawn
from annual editions of the Rural Chinese Statistical Yearbook. Grain yield is measured
annually at the county level in tons per hectare. Rainfall data is from the data collected by
the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center and is measured in mean millimeters per
month. Data at the station level is interpolated to generate county-level measures using the
inverse distance weighting method.2
3.4 Empirical evidence
3.4.1 Ordinary least squares
The primary relationship of interest in this analysis is equation (3.13), where the dependent
variable is reported household expenditure on the education of child i in grade level g,
household h and born in year t, denoted Eight. The independent variable is endowment as
measured by height-for-age, denoted Hight. 9h is a household fixed effect that absorbs any
household-level heterogeneity in the propensity for educational spending, and Ag is a grade
fixed effect that absorbs variation by grade in expenditure.
Because the subsample is composed of two-child families, a household fixed effects speci-
fication is equivalent to estimation of the equation in first differences across the two children.
Yt,eIe,. is a year-of-birth dummy for the elder child in each household, which serves to nor-
malize the difference in height-for-age between the children relative to the mean difference
among all households with a first child born in the same year. Eight is a child-specific error
term. Standard errors are clustered by county and the year of birth of the second child, to
allow for arbitrary correlation in the difference in height-for-age across different households
in the same county and with a second child born in the same year. The equation of interest
is thus the following:
Eight = M3Hight + 77h + Ag + 7t,elier + eight (3.13)
The equation is estimated for each of the six categories of educational expenditure, as
well as for total discretionary expenditure and a dummy dependent variable for enrollment.
The results, shown in Table 3.2, are insignificant. However, there is the potential for bias
in these results if endowment measured at the age of primary school already embodies a
2 Using this method, each county's measurement is calculated as the weighted average of measurements
at stations within 100 kilometers of distance; the weights are equal to the distance between the station and
the county divided by the sum of distances.
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significant component of prior parental investment. The child who has already been the
target of greater parental investment will appear to have a greater endowment, and, if there
is some serial correlation in parental behavior, is likely to continue to receive more substantial
investments. This will generate an upward bias in the estimated coefficients. Eliminating
this bias is the goal of the identification strategy.
3.4.2 First stage across households
The key to identification in this case is the use of a climatic, and thus nutritional, shock
that is correlated with the relative endowment of the two children. The climatic measures
of interest are grain yield and rainfall. Accordingly, the first stage to be estimated is the
following, where Sight denotes the climatic shock for child i and -y is again a year-of-birth
fixed effect.
Hight = /Sight + -Yt ± Eight (3.14)
Due to soil erosion and a pattern of heavy rainfall during the harvest months (June and July)
that is highly damaging, rainfall in this region is generally negatively correlated with grain
yield (Cook, Fengrui & Huilan 2000), a relationship that is evident in the data employed
here. Given this negative correlation, it is expected that rainfall will have an impact on early
child nutrition and thus height-for-age that is the opposite of the effect for grain yield.
Table 3.3 presents the coefficients for the first stage, regressing height-for-age on climatic
shocks in utero (defined as the calendar year prior to the year of birth) and in infancy (defined
as the year of birth).3 The first panel displays results employing rainfall as a measure of
climatic shocks, and the second panel presents results employing grain yield. The first and
second columns show the results of regressing height-for-age in the entire sample of children
measured. Columns 3 through 6 show parallel regressions for a sample limited to the older
child (child 1) and the younger child (child 2) in two-child households, to confirm that the
relationship holds for both subsamples.
All specifications are estimated both with and without year-of-birth fixed effects and
employing two-way clustering by county and year, allowing for both serial and spatial corre-
3 Given that grain yield is reported only by year, it is not possible to adjust estimates of grain yield in
infancy to account for variation in the month of birth. However, rainfall is reported monthly, and accordingly
estimates of rainfall in the first twelve months of life as well as the nine months of gestation can be generated
employing the reported month of birth. Using these alternate measures leads to no significant changes in
the first stage coefficients.
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lation. Though the instrument employed in the subsequent analysis will be climatic shocks
in infancy as this relationship is more robust, the first stage for both set of shocks is shown
to demonstrate the consistent pattern of such effects over the critical period of cognitive and
physical development.
The results show coefficients on rainfall that are negative and significant, a result con-
sistent with the negative impact of rainfall on grain yield already analyzed. The coefficients
on grain yield are positive and significant, as expected: higher grain yield corresponds to
greater nutritional availability in infancy, resulting in greater height-for-age and increased
cognitive ability.
It is also informative to analyze whether the relationship between climatic shocks and
endowment is similar for both the first-born and second-born children. As evident in Table
3.3, the first stage employing grain yield is positive and narrowly insignificant for the first
child, and then much larger and highly significant for the second child. This reflects a sharp
climatic shift that occurred in a subset of the sample counties lying in the Heihe river basin.
Though these counties were consistently characterized by much higher mean grain yield
over this period, they also experienced very sharp increases in yield post-1990 following the
reversal of a previous process of desertification. This generates a much more robust first stage
among children born post-1990. In the case of rainfall, the hypothesis of differing coefficients
between the older and younger siblings can be rejected when a full set of cohort fixed effects
are included. The hypothesis of different coefficients in the first stage for male and female
children among either the older or younger siblings can be rejected for both instruments.
3.4.3 First stage with household fixed effects
Shifting the focus to a fixed-household, sibling-difference framework, Column (1) of Table
3.4 displays the results from the first stage estimated with household fixed effects and year-
of-birth fixed effects for the older child, analogous to the ordinary least squares specification.
Standard errors are clustered by county and the year of birth of the second child. The
equation of interest is the following:
Hight = PSight ±-r - Yt,elder ± Eight (3.15)
The results show a positive and significant correlation between the within-household differ-
ence in grain yield in the county and year of birth and the observed difference in height-
for-age. Similarly, there is a negative and significant relationship between the difference
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in rainfall and the difference in height-for-age. When a child is born in a year with rela-
tively favorable climatic shocks compared to his or her sibling, this child is observed to have
relatively greater height-for-age.
As a robustness check, I also examine whether there is evidence of cross-dependence of
shocks: controlling for his or her own shocks in infancy, the exclusion restriction requires
that there is no dependence of one sibling's height-for-age on shocks experienced during the
infancy of the other sibling. For example, one major threat to the identification strategy
would be reallocation of resources by households in response to an adverse event: e.g.,
following the birth of the second child, households could preferentially direct resources to
either the first or the second child when a negative shock occurs. This would be evident in a
significant relationship between the older child's height and the shock to the younger child.
In order to test for this form of cross-dependence, I estimate the following equation,
where Sight denotes the climatic shock for sibling j and year-of-birth fixed effects are again
included.
Hight = #1Sigt ± #2Sjght + 'Yt,elder ± fight (3.16)
I estimate this equation separately for first-born children and second-born children; columns
2 and 3 of Table 3.4 report the results, suggesting that there is no relationship between
endowment and the climatic shocks experienced during a sibling's infancy. This evidence
indicates that the primary channel for the impact of early childhood shocks on height-for-
age is via the effect on a child's own physical development, not a household-level mechanism
that would induce cross-dependence of one sibling's outcome on another's shock. Given the
absence of any such mechanism, the identification strategy remains plausible.
The magnitude of the coefficients indicates that a one standard deviation increase in
grain yield in the county in the year of birth for the older sibling, holding the younger
sibling's shock constant, will increase the difference in height-for-age between them by .153.
This is equivalent to 13% of the mean height-for-age in levels, and about 200% of the mean
difference in height-for-age. In other words, the mean difference in height between the older
and younger siblings would be eliminated if there were a counterfactual increase in grain
yield in the older child's year of birth corresponding to one half of the year-on-year standard
deviation in that county. Using the first stage in rainfall, a one standard deviation increase
in rainfall for the older child will increase the difference in height for age by .22, a marginally
larger effect. The similarity in these estimates suggests they reflect the same fundamental
relationship between climatic shocks and nutrition.
The F-statistics in the first stage suggest that rainfall has considerably greater predictive
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power than grain yield. This could be due to mismeasurement in official grain yield statis-
tics, or an imperfect correlation between grain yield and the returns on other crops or other
household income-generating activities. While there is little risk of bias due to weak instru-
ments in the regressions employing rainfall, the results employing grain yield may suffer from
limited precision due to the weaker first stage.
3.4.4 Reduced form and two-stage least squares
Table 3.5 shows the reduced form results of regressing the dependent variables on the climatic
shocks. The equation estimated is the following, where again 77h, Ag and yt,eie, denote
household fixed effects, grade fixed effects and year-of-birth fixed effects for the older sibling.
Eight = #Sight ± 77h ± Ag ± 'Yt,elder ± Eight (3.17)
The first rows in Panel A and Panel B show the results for the preferred basic specification
including year of birth fixed effects for the elder child; standard errors are again clustered
by county and the year of birth of the second child. The second row shows the same effects
with grade fixed effects included, and the third and fourth row of each panel converts four
spending categories (transport/housing, food, tutoring and other) to dummy variables, given
that a large number of zeros are observed in those categories. The results show a significant
and positive relationship for rainfall shocks, and a significant and negative relationship for
grain yield shocks: in both cases, educational spending favors the child who has been subject
to a negative shock in infancy.
In the instrumental variables specification, equation (3.13) (reproduced here) is estimated
employing the climatic shocks as an instrument for height-for-age Hight. Results are again
reported with and without grade fixed effects.
Eight = M3Hight ± 77h ± Ag + yt,elder ± Eight
The results reported in Table 3.6 are clear and consistent. In Panel A, the coefficient on
height-for-age is negative and significant, indicating that children with a greater endowment
receive less educational expenditure, for discretionary expenditure, transportation/housing
and food in the preferred expenditure employing grade fixed effects. In Panel B, the point
estimates are larger but imprecisely estimated. However, discretionary expenditure, food
and tutoring are close to significant at conventional levels even employing grade fixed effects
(p-values between .1 and .15).
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The only significant impact on enrollment is found employing rainfall as an instrument
in absence of grade fixed effects, suggesting that children with greater height-for-age are
less likely to be enrolled in school. However, this effect disappears when grade fixed effects
are added, suggesting that this reflects differences in probability of enrollment across grades
(particularly, a lower probability of enrollment at older ages), rather than any systematic
within-grade difference. 4
The inclusion of grade fixed effects may be troubling given the potential objection that
grade level in itself represents an outcome reflective of past parental investment: children
who have already benefited from greater parental investments may have advanced to a higher
grade level. The extremely low magnitude of the coefficient on enrollment, however, suggests
that the enrollment decision is not a significant margin of parental decision-making that
would induce large endowment-based variation in grade level. There is little evidence to
indicate that the inclusion of grade fixed effects biases the conclusions, particularly in light
of the consistency of the results.
To interpret the magnitude of the coefficients, consider that the average difference in
height-for-age between siblings is -.07 of a standard deviation. The estimates using rainfall
suggest that in response to such a difference, parents would redirect 7% of mean individual
discretionary expenditure toward the weaker child; the estimates using grain yield indicate
that parents would redirect 22% of expenditure. 5 Though relatively small in a given semester,
such differences in expenditure are evident across sibling pairs in a variety of grade levels,
suggesting that the cumulative impact if parents persist in such compensatory behavior could
be large.
The difference in magnitude between the estimates using the two shocks is unsurpris-
ing given the evidence previously presented about geographical variation in the first stage
relationship between climatic shocks and height-for-age. The complier households in an
instrumental variable specification employing grain yield, those in which a difference in en-
dowment between the two children is induced by shifts in relative grain yield in their birth
years, are disproportionately drawn from the river-basin counties experiencing dramatic in-
creases in yield. These counties were already characterized by higher agricultural yields and
thus greater income. The estimated response in educational spending is thus much larger.
The coefficient on grain yield corresponds to a 9% shift employing discretionary spending
'Overall rates of school enrollment in this population are extremely high. 98% of second-born children
are reported enrolled in school and 91% of first-born children remain enrolled in school, with some dropout
at older ages.
5These estimates correspond to the coefficients estimated in the absence of grade fixed effects.
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in the river basin counties as the reference mean, an effect of magnitude comparable to the
estimated effect using rainfall.
This evidence suggests the hypothesis that parental allocations of education are inde-
pendent of children's endowment can be rejected. Parental allocations favor the child with
lower endowment, though the hypothesis of full specialization in either child can also be re-
jected. In the modeling framework outlined, the observed pattern of parental allocations of
educational expenditure is consistent with a parental preference for equality among children.
This requires the use of education as a compensatory device for differences in endowment,
as observed in the greater allocations to children with lower observed height-for-age.
In this dataset, there are only two other types of parental investments that are reported
disaggregated by child. The first is medical attention (more specifically, the number of visits
to a doctor), analyzed in the robustness checks below; the second is time spent by the mother
assisting each child with his or her homework. In 80% of households, the mother reports
spending no time assisting with homework for either child. Accordingly, the dependent
variable of interest is defined as a dummy equal to one if the mother spends any time assisting
a child with homework. There is weak evidence in the two-stage least squares specification
with household fixed effects of the same pattern in which investment of maternal time favors
the weaker child, but the results are not statistically significant at standard levels.
3.5 Robustness checks
3.5.1 Sibling parity effects
Given the difference in mean height-for-age between the older and the younger children, one
potential concern is that height-for-age may simply proxy for birth order, and that a pattern
of expenditure favoring the weaker child may reflect a pattern of expenditure favoring the
first-born child. It is not possible to test for sibling parity effects directly using the household
fixed effects specification. In order to address this point, the main equation (3.13) could be
re-estimated in a cross-section, thereby eliminating the household fixed effects, and including
both own height and sibling's height as independent variables. Hjght denotes the sibling's
height; both measures of height are instrumented with the respective shocks in infancy. pc
denotes a county fixed effect, and (h denotes the household-specific error component.
Eight = /lHight + 82Hight + WPight + 7ft ± Pc + Ch + ight (3.18)
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In order to estimate unbiased coefficients on Hi and Hj, this equation requires a stronger
exclusion restriction than the household fixed effects specification: the climatic shock em-
ployed to instrument for each sibling's height must be orthogonal not only to the unobserved
residual for that child, but also to the residual for the household. In particular, climatic
shocks must have no impact on the household's overall budget constraint conditional on
county and year fixed effects. However, the cross-sectional specification has the advantage
of allowing the direct implementation of a test for the presence of sibling parity effects by
including a dummy variable for sibling parity, denoted Pight. If height-for-age is merely an
imperfect proxy for sibling parity, only parity will be a significant predictor of expenditure,
and height-for-age should be rendered insignificant.
The results of estimating (3.18) are shown in Table 3.7, employing rainfall as an instru-
ment in Panel A and grain yield in Panel B; all specifications include both year-of-birth and
grade level dummies. Standard errors in this case are clustered by county and the year of
birth of the sibling. The results are largely consistent with the previous specification despite
the known source of bias. Own height is generally insignificant, and sibling height is positive
and significant for five categories of expenditure, indicating that educational expenditure
increases when a child has lower height-for-age than his or her sibling. More importantly,
the uniform insignificance of the parity dummy suggests that there is no significant variation
in expenditure as a product of birth order. The only exception is a negative coefficient on
sibling parity in Column (3) of Panel B.
Additional tests can be implemented by employing the data on medical expenditure
previously described. Data on medical expenditure on children is available from two sources.
First, the mother reports the number of visits to a doctor or to a clinic or hospital for each
child, as well as the number of medical episodes and days of school missed due to sickness for
each child. Second, the head of household (normally the father) separately reports medical
expenses for each child and the number of days ill over the last month.
In order to test the hypothesis of sibling parity, parental reports of expenditure on a child's
health (doctor visits, clinic visits and medical expenditure), denoted Eiht, are regressed on
the indicator of medical necessity reported by that parent Miht. For the mother's reports,
this is medical episodes or days of school missed due to illness; for the father's reports, this
is days ill over the past month. Sibling parity Piht is also included, along with year-of-birth
fixed effects 7Tt.
Eiht = O1Miht ± f32Piht ± 7t ± Eiht (3.19)
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Table 3.8 shows these results, and, again, sibling parity is found to be uniformly insignif-
icant, indicating no pattern of systematic favoritism by birth order.6 The fact that this is
corroborated by reports from both parents is encouraging, as one might hypothesize that if
one parent systematically favors the older or younger child, he or she might over-report his
or her episodes of illness in order to justify additional expenditure on that child. This would
generate upward bias on the estimated coefficient on Miht, and potentially obscure a pattern
of favoritism by sibling parity. However, the coincidence of the estimated results from both
parents suggests that reporting bias is unlikely to be a factor biasing the results.
3.5.2 Gender effects
A second potential confounding factor is gender. Given the evidence from other sources
of gender bias in household decision-making in China, the effect of gender on parental al-
locations may outweigh any observed effect for endowment. On the other hand, simply
controlling for gender is unlikely to be satisfactory. Given the abundant anthropological
and demographic evidence on abortion, abandonment, or underreporting of female children
in China (Coale & Banister 1994, Qian 1997), it is implausible to assume that the gender
of both children can be assumed to be random. Households with different gender balances
among their children are likely to differ materially along other observable and unobservable
dimensions.
However, in this case, the gender of the first child is a plausibly exogenous observation,
as anthropological evidence indicates that selection for gender occurs principally in births
subsequent to a first-born daughter and that selective abortion prior to the birth of a first
child is unusual (Baochang et al. 2007, Banister 2004). The evidence in this sample is consis-
tent with this hypothesis. The sex ratio for the first child in this sample is not significantly
different from .5, while for the second-born child, the sex ratio is highly imbalanced.
The observations on the gender of the first and second child are thus assumed to constitute
one exogenous observation (the gender of the first child) and one endogenous observation
(the gender of the second child). In a family fixed-effects framework such as that employed
here, the relevant dependent variable is the difference in gender between the children, which
is likewise endogenous. However, the gender of the first child is an appropriate instrument if
the assumption of exogeneity is plausible. The main equation of interest is again estimated
6There is little evidence that medical expenditure follows a compensatory pattern based on height-for-age
after controlling for the number of acute medical episodes experienced by each child. While the estimated
coefficient is negative and thus consistent with prior analysis, it is not statistically significant.
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employing climatic shocks as instruments, and using the gender of the first child as an
instrument for the difference in gender, yielding the following estimating equation.
Eight = #1Hight + #2Gight ± -h ± Ag -Yt,eIder ± Eight (3.20)
The estimation results are shown in Table 3.9. The coefficient on endowment is again
significant and negative for discretionary expenditure. Gender, perhaps surprisingly, proves
to be uniformly insignificant with the exception of a positive coefficient on enrollment in the
specifications lacking grade fixed effects and on tuition when employing grain yield. How-
ever, this effect disappears when grade fixed effects are added. Conditional on endowment,
discretionary allocations of educational funding between boys and girls appear to be similar.
There is only minimal evidence of preferential allocations to male children.
3.5.3 Selection bias
Selection into the sample of two-child families observed in this analysis would also constitute
a violation of the exclusion restriction. If families with certain characteristics are more or less
liekly to suffer an adverse mortality event as the result of the same climatic shock, then the
pattern of shocks may affect the ultimate pattern of allocations by determining the surviving
number of children, and hence inclusion or exclusion in the sample.
Due to the absence of complete data on retrospective familial mortality, it is not possible
to directly examine child mortality as a function of varying climatic shocks. An alternative
strategy to test for selection effects exploits the presence of extremely severe climatic shocks
that are most likely to be associated with increased mortality. If there is selective survival
among children born in those years, this would be expected to produce an attenuation toward
zero in an otherwise negative relationship between climatic shocks and child mortality. This
reflects the fact that surviving children, while weakened by adverse conditions in infancy,
are nonetheless likely to be genetically more robust and thus have a propensity toward
greater health. On the other hand, if selection via differential mortality is not an important
phenomenon, there should not be an attenuation of the relationship between shocks and
health outcomes as the severity of the shock increases.
To test this hypothesis, height-for-age in the pooled sample of older and younger siblings is
regressed on the climatic shock variable and four dummy variables indexing negative shocks
of different severity in the first year of life. A severe shock is defined as a year in which
rainfall (grain yield) in that county was above (below) the 10th percentile over all counties
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in the years of interest; a negative shock is a year in which rainfall (grain yield) was above
(below) the 25th percentile. The regressions are estimated with cohort fixed effects and
county-year clustering. If selective mortality is a significant phenomenon, the coefficients on
these dummies are expected to be significant and positive: the relationship between rainfall
and height-for-age is less negative for households experiencing a particularly severe shock.
The results, shown in Table 3.10, show coefficients on the dummy variables that are uni-
formly insignificant. This indicates that there is no attenuation in the relationship between
climate shocks and height-for-age for extremely severe shocks. Selective mortality thus ap-
pears to be minimal, and selection into the observed subsample of two-children family is
unlikely to be a major source of bias.
3.6 Returns to educational expenditure and endow-
ment
These results raise the question of whether the observed pattern favoring the weaker child ex-
hibited is a compensatory response intended to provide consumption-like educational benefits
to children with lower endowments, or whether this allocation strategy reflects differential
returns to educational expenditure for children of differing levels of endowment. If, for exam-
ple, educational expenditure has higher returns for the child with a lower endowment, then
the observed strategy could be interpreted as maximizing returns to educational investment.
In order to test this hypothesis, the panel data of observations on the older sibling is
employed to evaluate gains in academic attainment over time as a function of height-for-
age, again instrumented with climatic shocks, educational expenditure and the interaction
between the two. The equation of interest is (3.21), where ATight denotes the gain in academic
skills as measured by the difference in scores in the first and second survey waves on grade-
specific academic tests in Chinese and mathematics. Eight denotes educational expenditure,
also interacted with height-for-age. TI, the test score on the first round, is included as an
independent variable, though not reported, in order to account for mean reversion. The test
scores are normalized by grade to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
ATight = 31 Hight + /3 Eight + /3 3Hight X Eight + 04TVht ± t + h ± ight (3.21)
Because the younger sibling was not included in the first wave of testing due to their
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extremely young age, this equation can only be estimated in the cross-section without house-
hold fixed effects. This, again, raises the concern of income effects that violate the exclusion
restriction. The year-of-birth dummies will partially absorb the effect of climatic shocks on
income. However, the residual variation in income will lead to upward bias in #1, as those
children with higher height-for-age are likely to be from households with higher income and
thus higher educational expenditure.
The endogeneity of expenditure is another source of bias in this equation: households
that spend more on education are likely to encourage educational achievement in other ways,
creating upward bias in #2. Given the evidence presented on the importance of compensating
behavior, it is a reasonable prior to expect downward bias on #3 as well. Households that have
higher educational spending and value education are expected to also be more effective in
encouraging catch-up by children with a weaker endowment, and this will generate spurious
evidence of higher returns to educational spending on those children.
Despite this source of bias, however, the results in Table 3.11 show that the interaction
effect is generally insignificant, though it is positive and highly significant for tutoring in
specifications employing both grain yield and rainfall, and positive and marginally significant
for total expenditure and discretionary expenditure for specifications employing grain yield.
This indicates that while there is little variation in the relative effectiveness of educational
expenditure for children of different endowments, the interaction effect is positive when it
is significant. Returns to at least one type of educational expenditure are increasing in
endowment, and these results may be biased downwards (i.e., the true effect may be even
larger). For this reason, the hypothesis that parents preferentially direct expenditure to
children of lower endowments in order to maximize the total returns on their educational
spending seems implausible.
Additional evidence on this point can be provided by restricting the sample to families
whose two children include at least one girl. In this case, it is arguably less plausible that
households are seeking simply to maximize the return on their educational investment in
terms of scholastic achievement and ultimate income-generating potential, given the lower
rates of female labor force participation. While the estimated coefficients in this specification
are less precise, perhaps unsurprising given the smaller size of the relevant subsample, they
remain close to significant at conventional levels (p-values between .1 and .2) and of com-
parable magnitude; the hypothesis that the effects are identical cannot be rejected.7 This is
consistent with the previous evidence that the observed pattern of educational expenditure
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7Tabulations available on request.
does not reflect a strategy to maximize returns to expenditure.
3.7 Conclusion
In the previous literature on intrahousehold allocation, the question of the presence or ab-
sence of family aversion to inequality has received extensive analytical attention. However,
little evidence has been presented regarding the nature of parental responses to systematic
differences in endowment among children, particularly among children who are not twins.
This paper analyzes the relationship between parental allocations of educational expenditure
and endowment, testing a model in which parents seek to maximize the total returns to all
educational investments against one in which they have a preference for equality of expected
lifetime income across their offspring.
Employing an identification strategy that relies on the correlation between climatic varia-
tion and children's endowment, mediated through the impact of nutritional shocks in infancy
on physical development, I find a pattern of preferential allocations of discretionary educa-
tional expenditure to child of lower endowment, conditional on the attained grade level. This
is consistent with a parental preference for equality of outcomes. The relationship is robust
across multiple specifications and measures of expenditure, and robust to the inclusion of
both gender and sibling parity.
However, evidence suggests that this pattern of allocations is not a response to higher
returns to educational expenditure for children of lower endowment. In fact, for some cate-
gories of expenditure, returns are higher for children with greater height-for-age, indicating
that households seeking to maximize returns to their educational investment would invest in
the more robust child.
These results suggest that, at least in the area of education, the household is serving
as a mechanism for the mitigation of existing inequalities. It is impossible to rule out the
possibility that the observed allocative decisions would be altered by an external shock.
However, based on this evidence it seems a priori plausible that a positive income shock to
the'households examined would disproportionately benefit the more vulnerable among the
children, where vulnerability is measured as a lower physical endowment. For the purposes
of the welfare analysis of potential household interventions, this is an encouraging result
that suggests that household-level interventions will in fact improve welfare outcomes for
the weakest members of a family.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Demographic data Panel B: Educational expenditure per child
Sample Subsample Mean Std. Dev. Max.
Net income 7297.35 7459.49 Total 291.78 384.00 7760
Income per capita 1825.92 1850.27 Discretionary 112.32 205.50 2240
Father educ. 6.84 6.84 Tuition 179.47 228.56 6000
Mother educ. 4.17 4.17 Supplies 39.43 43.39 600
Father age 38.6 35.1 Transport / Housing 13.16 48.86 600
Mother age 35.2 33.0 Food 42.3 127.99 1700
Index child age 11.0 11.1 Tutoring 7.20 35.17 1000
Height-for-age Z-score -1.18 -1.20 Other fees 10.21 30.78 420
Obs. 1918 596 Obs. 596 596 596
Notes: Income is reported in yuan; educational expenditure is reported in yuan per semester.
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Table 3.2: OLS
Enrollment Discretionary Tuition Supplies Transport Food Tutoring Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Height-for-age .013 -3.933 6.990 -.516 .151 4.177 1.136 .126
(.010) (9.083) (5.743) (.611) (1.602) (7.084) (.704) (.252)
+ Grade FE 7.55e-17 -6.873 -.168 -.991 -2.232 4.696 .882 .165
(6.83e-17) (4.596) (2.378) (.822) (1.380) (2.938) (.552) (.322)
Mean (levels) .93 94.31 170.27 36.50 6.73 9.24 6.73 9.24
Median (levels) 1 40 130 30 0 0 0 0
Mean (differences) .07 89.07 65.17 17.11 17.60 50.81 6.8 7.3
Obs. 422 422 377 377 377 377 377 377
Notes: The dependent variable is educational expenditure per child in the specified category; the
independent variable is height-for-age. All regressions include household fixed effects, year of birth fixed
effects for the older child, and standard errors employing two-way clustering by county and the year of
birth of the second child; grade fixed effects are dummy variables for the grade level attended in school.
The mean in differences reports the mean intra-household difference in expenditure (between the first and
second child) in the specified category. Asterisks denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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Table 3.3: First stage across households
Full sample First-born children Second-born children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Rainfall
Rainfall in utero -.021 -.021 -. 020 -. 020 -. 029 -. 026
(.005)*** (.005)*** (.002)*** (.004)*** (.005)*** (.005)***
Rainfall -.021 -.020 -.028 -. 028 -. 034 -. 027
(.005)*** (.006)*** (.008)*** (.008)*** (.006)*** (.005)***
Panel B: Grain yield
Grain yield in utero .125 .106 .094 .093 .160 .092
(.023)*** (.028)*** (.043)** (.044)** (.027)*** (.040)**
Grain yield year 1 .114 .098 .068 .072 .147 .085
(.023)*** (.027)*** (.047) (.048) (.029)*** (.042)**
Year-of-birth fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean height-for-age -1.19 -1.19 -1.27 -1.27 -1.17 -1.17
Num of obs. 2524 2524 705 705 759 759
Notes: The dependent variable is height-for-age Z-score; the independent variable is the specified climatic
shock measured either in utero (the year before birth) or in the first year of life. In Columns (3) and (4),
the sample is restricted to first-born children; in Columns (5) and (6), it is restricted to second-born
children. All regressions include standard errors employing two-way clustering by county and year of birth;
asterisks indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Table 3.4: First stage within households
Height-for-age Height (first-born child) Height (second-born child)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Rainfall
Rainfall 
-.043
(.006)***
Rainfall (child 1) -.038 .017
(.009)*** (.012)
Rainfall (child 2) -. 00005 
-.044
(.006) (.012)***
Household fixed effects Yes No No
Obs. 418 418 419
F stat. 40.924 12.870 7.679
Panel B: Grain yield
Grain yield .520
(.221)**
Grain yield (child 1) .233 
-.443(.140)* (.346)
Grain yield (child 2) -. 109 .523
(.116) (.296)*
Household fixed effects Yes No No
Obs. 418 418 419
F stat. 4.90 3.107 9.001
Notes: The dependent variable is height-for-age and the independent variables are climatic shocks (either
rainfall or grain yield). In the first column, household fixed effects are included, and the equation is
equivalent to a regression of the within-household difference in height-for-age on the within-household
difference in climatic shocks. In the second and third columns, household fixed effects are excluded. In
Column (2), height-for-age for the older child is regressed on climatic shocks observed in the infancy of
both the first and second child; in Column (3), height-for-age for the younger child is regressed on both
climatic shocks. All regressions include year-of-birth fixed effects for the older child and standard errors
employing two-way clustering by county and year of birth of the younger child; asterisks indicate
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Table 3.5: Reduced form
Enroll. Discret. Tuition Supplies Trans./Housing Food Tutoring Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Rainfall
Rainfall .003 4.098 1.813 .242 .794 3.497 -.061 .112
(.002)** (2.517) (.544)*** (.234) (.496) (1.961)* (.190) (.193)
+ Grade FE -7.93e-20 2.798 .954 .115 .448 2.384 -. 139 -.010
(1.29e-16) (1.702) (.698) (.085) (.306) (1.308)* (.140) (.137)
Expend. dummies .006 .006 .008 -.006
(.004)* (.004)* (.003)** (.004)
+ Grade FE .007 .007 .010 -.004(.004)** (.004)** (.003)*** (.002)*
Panel B: Grain yield
Grain yield .026 -168.500 -24.653 -12.276 -26.997 -109.667 -8.158 -11.401
(.025) (41.108)*** (12.322)** (.000) (7.470)*** (29.436)*** (2.998)*** (4.290)***
+ Grade FE 1.10e-17 -117.281 16.185 -5.279 -17.848 -77.287 -6.803 -10.064
(1.18e-15) (31.977)*** (9.497)* (2.324)** (5.898)*** (23.193)*** (2.603)*** (3.400)***
Expend. dummies -. 187 -. 187 -. 161 -.100(.074)** (.074)** (.061)*** (.053)*
+ Grade FE -. 153 -. 153 -.082 -.089
(.052)*** (.052)*** (.039)** (.045)**
Mean (levels) .93 94.31 170.27 36.50 6.73 9.24 6.73 9.24
Median (levels) 1 40 130 30 0 0 0 0
Mean (differences) .07 89.07 65.17 17.11 17.60 50.81 6.8 7.3
Num of obs. 419 419 375 375 375 375 375 375
Notes: The dependent variable is educational expenditure per child in the specified category; the
independent variable is the specified climatic shock. All regressions include household fixed effects, year of
birth fixed effects for the older child, and standard errors employing two-way clustering by county and the
year of birth of the second child; grade fixed effects are dummy variables for the grade level attended in
school. The mean in differences reports the mean intra-household difference in expenditure (between the
first child and the second) in the specified category. Asterisks denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels.
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Table 3.6: Two-stage least squares
Enroll. Discretionary Tuition Supplies Trans./Housing Food Tutoring Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Rainfall
Height-for-age -.056 -102.169 -41.496 -5.385 -17.694 -77.939 1.356 -2.506
(.029)* (36.198)*** (14.352)** (4.036) (8.001)** (27.268)*** (4.483) (3.111)
+ Grade FE 1.89e-18 -66.754 -22.756 -2.748 -10.688 -56.875 .233 3.323
(3.08e-15) (29.269)** (21.527) (1.843) (6.799) (23.318)** (3.355) (3.812)
Spending dummies -. 172 -. 172 -. 224 .105
(.077)** (.077)** (.073)*** (.089)
+ Grade FE -. 178 -. 178 -. 227 .090
(.062)*** (.062)*** (.000) (.071)
Panel B: Grain yield
Height-for-age .032 -358.421 -52.440 -26.112 -57.427 -233.276 -17.353 -24.252
(.047) (171.801)** (35.774) (13.755)* (36.677) (99.778)** (9.276)* (14.953)
Height-for-age 2.70e-17 -288.743 39.848 -12.996 -43.941 -190.280 -24.777 -16.748
(2.90e-15) (194.191) (25.606) (10.249) (36.436) (125.393) (15.758) (11.515)
Spending dummies 
-.384 -.384 -.334 -.215
(.250) (.250) (.196)* (.176)
+ Grade FE -.377 -. 377 -.203 -.218
(.308) (.308) (.163) (.190)
Mean (levels) .93 94.31 170.27 36.50 6.73 9.24 6.73 9.24
Median (levels) 1 40 130 30 0 0 0 0
Mean (differences) .07 89.07 65.17 17.11 17.60 50.81 6.8 7.3
Num of obs. 419 419 375 375 375 375 375 375
Notes: The dependent variable is educational expenditure per child in the specified category; the
independent variable is height-for-age, instrumented by the specified climatic shock. All regressions include
household fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects for the older child, and standard errors employing
two-way clustering by county and the year of birth of the second child; grade fixed effects are dummy
variables for the grade level attended in school. The mean in differences reports the mean intra-household
difference in expenditure (between the first child and the second) in the specified category. Asterisks
denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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Table 3.7: Educational expenditure and sibling parity
Enroll. Discretionary Tuition Supplies Trans./Housing Food Tutoring Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Rainfall
Height-for-age .002 -8.027 19.966 8.313 -6.470 -23.198 5.359 7.973
(.003) (21.786) (27.871) (6.853) (8.215) (20.923) (3.012)* (5.912)
Sibling height -.008 84.497 69.537 6.971 11.666 57.095 1.251 7.500
(.009) (29.376)*** (21.689)*** (4.334) (6.551)* (22.341)** (3.551) (3.028)**
Parity .002 1.916 -13.439 -. 391 .873 3.742 .121 -2.425
(.002) (19.470) (15.474) (2.890) (3.454) (12.130) (.471) (4.704)
Panel B: Grain yield
Height-for-age -. 194 -75.999 -132.328 9.940 -10.368 -27.855 1.215 5.670
(.096)** (63.696) (51.961)** (11.142) (27.757) (48.570) (8.943) (11.149)
Sibling height-for-age -.110 33.972 -37.682 8.680 5.782 49.802 -2.817 5.488
(.100) (64.246) (75.537) (5.706) (20.446) (55.112) (5.661) (9.873)
Sibling height-for-age -.024 -20.921 -45.370 -3.400 -.049 -1.667 -1.689 -4.858
(.033) (18.046) (13.494)*** (.000) (7.382) (17.804) (2.402) (3.794)
Mean .93 94.31 170.27 36.50 6.73 9.24 6.73 9.24
Median 1 40 130 30 0 0 0 0
Obs. 796 796 790 754 754 754 754 754
Notes: The dependent variable is educational expenditure per child in the specified category. The
independent variables are height-for-age and sibling height-for-age, instrumented by the specified climatic
shock in the year of birth, and a variable capturing sibling parity. All regressions include year of birth fixed
effects and standard errors employing two-way clustering by county and the sibling's year of birth.
Asterisks denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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Table 3.8: Medical expenditure and sibling parity
Doctor visit Doctor visit Clinic visit Clinic visit Medical expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Med episodes .119 .034
(.015)*** (.025)
Days missed -.026 .122
(.004)*** (.021)***
Days sick 18.626
(1.196)***
Parity .013 -.012 .001 .008 1.977
(.048) (.049) (.234) (.230) (15.921)
Mean 1.597 1.597 1.849 1.849 60.773
Median 2 2 0 0 10
Num of obs. 817 817 846 846 839
Notes: The dependent variables are various measures of medical attention received by the child; the
independent variables are measures of ill-health and a dummy for sibling parity. All regressions include
year of birth fixed effects. Due to the presence of extreme outliers in expenditure, the top 1% of
observations are trimmed; asterisks indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
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Table 3.9: Educational expenditure and gender
Enroll. Discretionary Tuition Supplies Trans./Housing Food Tutoring Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Rainfall
Height for age .054 -98.971 -42.032 -5.329 -17.866 -78.333 1.351 -2.544
(.029)* (33.089)*** (13.331)*** (4.115) (8.053)** (27.539)*** (4.497) (3.275)
Gender .046 18.666 15.695 -2.124 6.566 15.065 .153 1.436
(.006)*** (15.143) (9.843) (3.374) (4.221) (15.061) (1.095) (1.987)
+ Grade FE -9.58e-18 -66.757 -22.747 -2.751 -10.686 -56.876 3.323 .233
(3.18e-15) (29.194)** (20.061) (2.028) (6.761) (23.309)** (3.789) (3.372)
Gender -1.75e-18 -2.838 10.484 -3.776 1.613 -.493 -.363 .181
(7.26e-16) (12.668) (10.998) (2.567) (1.835) (11.816) (1.127) (2.488)
Panel B: Grain yield
Height for age .023 -309.448 -57.865 -26.362 -59.872 -240.757 -17.992 -25.195
(.057) (106.836)*** (34.323)* (13.991)* (38.683) (105.332)** (9.652)* (15.317)*
Gender .050 58.687 30.146 1.389 13.589 41.570 3.554 5.239
(.019)*** (43.186) (13.189)** (6.054) (8.939) (38.285) (3.026) (3.977)
+ Grade FE 1.56e-17 -296.726 39.236 -12.121 -45.831 -195.367 -17.527 -25.880
(2.79e-15) (200.339) (27.055) (10.214) (38.309) (129.514) (11.707) (16.225)
Gender 3.73e-18 24.532 1.881 -2.688 5.807 15.632 2.394 3.387
(.000) (37.145) (15.326) (3.205) (5.400) (26.252) (1.605) (2.885)
Mean (levels) .93 94.31 170.27 36.50 6.73 9.24 6.73 9.24
Median (levels) 1 40 130 30 0 0 0 0
Mean (differences) .07 89.07 65.17 17.11 17.60 50.81 6.8 7.3
Obs. 418 418 375 375 375 375 375 375
Notes: The dependent variable is educational expenditure per child in the specified category; the
independent variable is height-for-age, instrumented by the specified climatic shock, and gender,
instrumented by the gender of the elder child. All regressions include household fixed effects, year of birth
fixed effects for the older child, and standard errors employing two-way clustering by county and the year
of birth of the second child; grade fixed effects are dummy variables for the grade level attended in school.
The mean in differences reports the mean intra-household difference in expenditure (between the first child
and the second) in the specified category. Asterisks denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
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Table 3.10: Height-for-age and severe shocks
Height-for-age
(1)
Height-for-age
(2)
Panel A: Rainfall
Rainfall
Negative shock
Severe shock
-.018
(.007)***
-.042
(.107)
-.022
(.005)***
.080
(.070)
Panel B: Grain yield
Grain yield
Negative shock
Severe shock
Obs.
.114
(.033)***
.077
(.119)
.099
(.029)***
-.0009
(.026)
2524 2524
Notes: The dependent variable is height-for-age, and the independent variables are the specified climatic
shock (entering linearly) and dummy variables for negative and severe shocks, defined as rainfall (grain
yield) that is above (below) the 75th (25th) percentile for a negative shock, or above (below) the 90th
(10th) percentile for a severe shock. All regressions include year of birth fixed effects and two-way
clustering by county and year of birth; asterisks indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Table 3.11: Returns to educational expenditure
Total Discretionary Tuition/Supplies Food/Trans./Housing Tutoring Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Rainfall
Height for age -1.514 -.349 .095 -.425 -.281 -.351
(28.818) (.071)*** (3.239) (.244)* (.042)*** (.018)***
Expenditure .009 -. 00005 -.001 -.007 .053 .004
(.196) (.012) (.014) (.068) (.013)*** (.002)*
Expenditure int. .012 -.001 -.004 -.007 .038 .003
(.284) (.012) (.028) (.063) (.009)*** (.002)
Panel B: Grain yield
Height for age -.417 -. 369 -.457 -. 394 -.163 -.361
(.107)*** (.025)*** (.133)*** (.039)*** (.095)* (.046)***
Expenditure .001 .003 .001 .002 .113 .003
(.0004)*** (.003) (.0005)** (.004) (.044)** (.009)
Expenditure int. .0005 .002 .0006 .002 .083 .001
(.0007) (.003) (.001) (.003) (.034)** (.008)
Mean 136.970 46.501 91.777 12.525 .360 14.282
Median 113 25 85 0 0 0
Obs. 1585 1585 1564 1564 1564 1564
Notes: The dependent variable is the gain in test scores on a grade-specific exam in Chinese and
mathematics between a first and second round of testing; the first test was administered in 2000, and the
second test in 2004. Test scores are normalized by grade level to have mean zero and standard deviation
one. The independent variables are height-for-age, instrumented by the specified climate shock,
expenditure (in the specified category) reported in the year in which the first test was administered, and
the interaction of expenditure and height-for-age. The test score on the first test is also included as a
regressor, though not reported. All regressions include cohort fixed effects and two-way clustering by
county and year; asterisks indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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